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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
SOVIET AND WESTERN BLOC COMPETITION IN THE LESS DEVELOPED 
WORLD AND THE COLLAPSE OF DÉTENTE 
by 
Douglas Rivero 
Florida International University, 2009 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ronald Cox, Major Professor 
 The purpose of my dissertation was to examine the competition between the U.S.-
led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during Détente. I 
assessed whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the less developed 
world in the middle-to-late 1970’s and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to 
abandon Détente in 1979.  I made the attempt to test the international relations theory of 
balance of threat realism (Walt, 1992).  
 I accomplished the test in two ways. First, I measured the foreign aid allocations 
(military and economic) made by each respective bloc towards the Third World by using 
a quantitative approach. Second, I examined U.S. archives using the process-
tracing/historical method. The U.S. archives gave me the ability to evaluate how U.S. 
decision-makers and U.S. intelligence agencies interpreted the actions of the Soviet bloc. 
They also gave me the chance to examine the U.S. response as we evaluated the policies 
that were pushed by key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies.  
 On the question of whether or not the Soviet bloc was aggressive, the quantitative 
evidence suggested that it was not. Instead, the evidence found the Western-bloc to have 
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been more aggressive in the less developed world. The U.S. archives also showed Soviet 
actions to have been defensive. Key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies 
attested to this. Finally, the archives show that U.S. officials pushed for aggressive 
actions against the Third World during the final years of Détente. 
  Thus, balance of threat realism produced an incorrect assessment that U.S. 
aggression in the late 1970’s was a response to Soviet aggression during Détente. The 
evidence suggests structural Marxism and domestic politics can better explain 
U.S./Western actions. The aggressive foreign aid allocations of the West, coupled with 
evidence of U.S. decision-makers/agencies vehemently concerned about the long-term 
prospects of the West, strengthened structural Marxism. Domestic politics can also claim 
to explain the actions of U.S. decision-makers. I found extensive archival evidence of 
bureaucratic inter-agency conflict between the State Department and other intelligence 
agencies in areas of strategic concern to the U.S. 
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Chapter I:  Methodological and Theoretical Introductions 
Introduction 
 
 My dissertation will examine the competition between the U.S.-led Western Bloc 
and the U.S.S.R.’s Soviet Bloc in the less developed world during the period of Détente 
(1972-1980).  I shall assess whether or not the Soviet Bloc pushed for strategic gains in 
the less developed world in the middle-to-late 1970’s and whether this contributed to the 
U.S. decision to abandon Détente in 1979. Citing revolutionary turmoil in such regions as 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa and increased Soviet military power during the 1970’s, 
balance of threat realism argues that the U.S.S.R. began to provide significant military 
and economic aid towards traditional U.S./Western spheres of influence with the goal of 
weakening U.S. alliances. Since many U.S. academics and U.S. policymakers have 
viewed Soviet actions in this time period through the lenses of balance of threat realism, 
the purpose of this dissertation will be to test this theory of international relations.  
Indeed, conventional academic wisdom as to what U.S. policymakers were 
thinking follows along Stephen Walt's realist balance of threat theory. The balance of 
power theory contends that, in a bipolar world, revolutions in the Third World provoke 
changes in the distribution of power, which inevitably brings a war for influence among 
the superpowers (Walt, 1992, p. 321). A loss of U.S.-led Western influence inevitably 
caused the U.S.S.R. to seek influence, which then forced the U.S. to prevent this from 
happening. Ultimately, as argued by U.S. policymakers during the Carter and the Reagan 
Administration, by improving its strategic military position and its conventional arms in 
the 1960’s, the Soviets positioned themselves to project force in areas of the world 
experiencing a collapse of political and power structures. As a result, the Soviet Bloc 
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increased foreign aid (especially military) to the less developed world. Such moves, 
according to the Secretary of State at the time, Henry Kissinger, violated Détente. One of 
the most important goals of Détente, according to Kissinger, was to delineate each side’s 
sphere of influence.  
 Being that it could be entirely possible that U.S. actions were simply a response to 
revolutions in the less developed world, and not Soviet actions, my dissertation will also 
test some alternative international relation theories. These theories include structural 
Marxism and domestic politics. In contrast to balance of threat theory, structural Marxism 
argues that the U.S. (West) was the real aggressive superpower during the 1970’s. They 
suggest revolutions in the Third World and the imperatives of U.S. capital to dismantle 
such revolutions caused the U.S., not the Soviets, to be aggressive.  Adherents of 
domestic politics do not go as far as supporters of structural Marxism. Those that study 
domestic politics suggest that specific interest groups and/or those with 
economic/strategic reasons for engaging in conflict in the less developed world were 
responsible for the aggressive actions of the U.S. 
Chapter Breakdown 
 The main focus of chapter one will be to introduce the theories of balance of 
threat realism, structural Marxism, and domestic politics and explain how each theory 
would interpret the competition between the U.S. (Western Bloc) and the Soviets (Soviet 
Bloc) in the less developed world during the final years of Détente. However, before I 
proceed with a thorough review of each theory, I shall first elucidate the overall 
methodological approach of this dissertation. To begin with, I shall explain how each 
chapter proceeds in determining and testing whether or not the Soviets were aggressive 
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during the middle-to-late 1970’s. However, I not only deploy different testing approaches 
to answer my main research question, I also use each chapter as an examination of both 
the conventional theory of international relations in this domain, balance of threat 
realism, and the alternative theories of structural Marxism and domestic politics.  
 Next, chapter one will move on to explaining some of my unique testing 
methodology. For instance, I begin by explaining why I compare the Western Bloc 
against the Soviet Bloc. To many academics, especially realists, comparing the Soviet 
Bloc to the West is simply heresy. They would suggest I compare the U.S. to the Soviets. 
However, for reasons I shall discuss below, my dissertation does link together the U.S., 
Japan, and some Western European to form the Western Bloc. The main reason for doing 
this is because these nations, the Western Bloc, possessed a profound interest in 
maintaining an anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary world order.  In fact, I go ahead and 
explain how foreign aid (specifically military aid) has bound the Western Bloc together. 
Foreign aid (economic and military) is, after all, one of the tools I use (in chapter three) 
to establish whether or not the Soviets (or the West) were aggressive during the middle-
to-late 1970’s. I then go ahead and explain my historical/process-tracing approach I use 
in chapters three, four, and five. Lastly, I explain why my dissertation compares U.S.-
Soviet (Western-Soviet) foreign aid and archival data through five different regions of the 
world.  
Testing Methodology: Chapter by Chapter 
 My examination of U.S. (West) and Soviet (Soviet Bloc) competition in the less 
developed world during Détente begins with a historical analysis (chapter two) of such 
competition. From the post-World War II era to the end of the 1960’s, I examine the great 
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balance of power imbalance, both in strategic power and in the less developed world, 
between the U.S. and the Soviets. After all, the post-World War II era had left the U.S. as 
the most powerful state (a hyper-hegemon you can say) in the international system. I will 
also bring into focus the strategic importance of the less developed world to U.S./Western 
dominance in the international system. Finally, once I have placed into context the fact 
that the U.S. had overwhelming power over the Soviets and the less developed world 
prior to Détente, I shall use a historical analysis to assess the gains and losses in the less 
developed world of the U.S. (West) and the U.S.S.R. (Soviet Bloc) during the Détente 
time period.  
 To better (and truly) analyze my historical findings, however, I shall measure the 
foreign aid allocations (chapter three) made by each respective superpower Bloc towards 
the less developed world in a historical/process-tracing manner. More specifically, 
chapter three analyzes the foreign aid expenditures of both blocs towards the most 
strategic countries of each region, the timing of such foreign aid, the significance of each 
potential gain or loss, and other historical factors (most of which I already bring forward 
in chapter two) in my analysis of the final years of Détente.  
Measuring the quantitative evidence in a process-tracing manner is extremely 
prudent. I cannot simply look at the aggregate foreign aid figures in my attempt to 
measure whether the Soviets were aggressive. This is because quantitative data on its 
own fails to explain the complete story. Cases of large foreign aid contributions to non-
strategic areas of the less developed world could also throw off the analysis. The timing 
component is also extremely important in this analysis. Discovering that one bloc 
increased foreign aid (especially military aid) during the same time its competitor was 
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decreasing assistance will provide significant evidence as to whether the Soviet Bloc was 
attempting to reverse the balance of power.    
 The next step will be to evaluate whether top U.S. decision-makers and key U.S. 
intelligence agencies, such as the State Department, Defense Department, Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC), believed that the 
Soviet Bloc made gains in the less developed world during the middle-to-late 1970’s. As 
such, the archives of the Ford and Carter administration, which were in power during the 
last years of Détente, as well as national security archives, will be extremely important. 
Thus, chapter four will analyze how U.S. intelligence bureaucracies and key U.S. 
officials, such as Kissinger (Secretary of State under Ford), Cyrus Vance (Secretary of 
State under Carter), and Zbigniew Brzezinski (National Security Advisor under Carter) 
interpreted Soviet actions in the less developed world during Détente. Should U.S. 
archives not suffice, I may at times look at some Soviet archives to determine what top 
Soviet policy-makers were thinking. Overall, I shall analyze whether Soviet actions in the 
less developed world were aggressive or cautious. 
 Chapter five will then analyze the U.S. response and U.S. actions. Using U.S. 
archival material from U.S. intelligence agencies and the Carter/Ford administrations I 
shall explore which policies the U.S. pursued towards the Soviet Bloc and the less 
developed world during the 1970’s. Was the U.S. responding to the Soviet threat U.S. 
policymakers outlined in the previous chapter or simply revolutionary turmoil in the less 
developed world? 
 Once I have examined the archives I shall move towards the conclusion (chapter 
six). Chapter six will review all of the chapters and summarize my findings. It will also 
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(hopefully) provide an answer towards my research question as I determine whether 
balance of threat realism or an alternative theory (structural Marxism or domestic 
politics) best explains U.S.-Soviet competition during the 1970’s. 
The Theoretical Battle within the Chapters 
 In my quest to determine which theory best explains U.S.-Soviet competition 
during the 1970’s I shall use each chapter as an examination for the theories of balance of 
threat realism, structural Marxism, and domestic politics. Unfortunately, however, not 
every theory can be tested in every chapter. While each chapter can be used to test 
balance of threat realism and structural Marxism, domestic politics can only be tested in 
chapter four. Measuring and analyzing the foreign aid quantitative data, done in chapter 
three, does nothing to show whether or not there was any significant bureaucratic division 
within U.S. intelligence agencies. 
 For balance of threat realists, the examination of the foreign aid allocations 
(measuring them in a historical manner) of the Soviet Bloc and the West (in chapter 
three) should begin to show that the Soviets were becoming aggressive during this time 
period. They would then expect the intelligence and presidential archives (from Ford and 
Carter) to confirm these findings. Chapters four and five should show U.S. policymakers 
arguing that Soviet pressure against the balance of power was foremost reason for the 
U.S. abandonment of Détente (chapter four) and for the subsequent aggression actions on 
the part of the U.S. (chapter five).  
 On the other hand, structural Marxists would hypothesize that Soviet foreign aid, 
especially military, to traditional U.S. and Western spheres of influence was limited (less 
aggressive) and that there were no significant strategic Soviet attempt to outdo the 
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U.S./West in foreign aid allocations to the less developed world (chapter three). After all, 
structural Marxists have long argued that the U.S. cynically used the Soviet threat to 
advance and promote U.S. economic policies, especially in light of increased capitalist 
competition from other core states (the West itself). For structural Marxists, the internal 
class politics of the less developed world during the 1970s, reflected by rising 
revolutionary mobilization, are more significant than the Soviet threat in predicting the 
U.S. response. For these reasons, they would expect U.S. foreign aid to be the most 
aggressive. In addition, structural Marxists would argue that U.S. archives (chapter four 
and five) should show that U.S. policymakers were more concerned with the structural 
economic consequences of political upheaval in the less developed world and rising 
Western competition, independent of Soviet influence. 
 Another possible explanation for the abandonment of Détente, irrespective of 
Soviet gains or aggressiveness, is the domestic politics approach. The domestic politics 
approach argues that the political divisions among U.S. domestic constituencies, from 
interest groups to capitalists themselves, battled for policy influence within the U.S. 
bureaucracy. In effect, because Third World activity went against the political, interest-
group, and economic interests of these powerful “coalitions”, the U.S. abandoned 
Détente. Therefore, domestic politics would ask me to focus on the archives in chapters 
four and five. They would predict that I should find little evidence that U.S. policymakers 
were responding to Soviet gains in the balance of power during the 1970s. Instead, they 
would expect me to find that business conflict and bureaucratic competition better 
explain the timing of the U.S. abandonment of Détente.  
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 The result of this breakdown is that certain theories will be compared to each 
other in different chapters. Chapter three, my historical analysis of foreign aid data, will 
find me comparing balance of threat realism to structural Marxism. Chapter three is 
actually perfect for comparison since each theory has completely different predictions as 
to what I should find. The balance of threat realists would suggest the Soviets were 
aggressive while the structural Marxists would suggest the West was aggressive. 
Chapters four and five, however, will give me the ability to analyze each of the theories. 
The archival evidence will finally allow me to examine domestic politics and whether 
there were any significant divisions within U.S. intelligence agencies. However, they will 
also allow me to further test balance of threat realism and structural Marxism. The U.S. 
archives could show that U.S. policymakers were seriously concerned with Soviet gains 
(chapter four) and responded accordingly (chapter five). They could also show that the 
U.S. did not believe the Soviets were aggressive (chapter four) and that the U.S. response 
revolved more around its economic interests (chapter five). 
Focusing on the Less Developed World 
 Thus far, as you can see from the three competing theories, the underlying 
premise of my dissertation is that the main explanation and reason for the collapse of 
Détente lies somewhere in the realm of Third World activity. Whether caused by Soviet 
gains, economic interests, or bureaucratic conflict, Détente’s collapse is centered on the 
Third World. However there are some who seriously question the primacy of the lesser-
developed world's impact in bringing down Détente. In fact, asymmetrical realists (as 
opposed to symmetrical balance of threat realists) argue that the competition in the 
buildup of strategic nuclear weapons was significantly more important in bringing down 
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Détente than competition in the Third World. If asymmetrical realists are correct, then I 
should find evidence in the archives that U.S. policymakers were more concerned about 
the Soviet strategic gains in nuclear weapons and much less concerned about the Third 
World.  
Even if strategic calculations were far more important in the U.S. decision to 
abandon Détente, third world revolutionary turmoil certainly played a key role. Should 
the archives in chapter four (which should give me a better understanding of why the 
U.S. abandoned Détente) negate the centrality of third world revolutions and/or Soviet 
involvement there in bringing down Détente, it is imperative to understand which school 
of thought complimented the arguments made by realists who focus on the nuclear arms 
race as the determining factor in bringing down Détente. After all, the conventional arms 
increases of the Soviet Bloc and the possibility of increased support for revolutionary 
anti-U.S. regimes certainly weighed heavily on the minds of U.S. policymakers during 
the late 1970’s. So even if strategic nuclear weapons was most paramount in bringing 
down Détente, was it Soviet involvement in the less developed world, U.S. economic 
interests, or bureaucratic conflict that worked in combination with this strategic arms 
argument to bring down Détente?  
 In fact, although different theorists place the emphasis for the U.S. decision to 
abandon Détente on a range of different factors, all accounts of Détente’s collapse have 
to consider the relative weight of Third World competition between the U.S. and the 
Soviets as a potentially decisive factor when it comes to Détente’s collapse. To 
understand the increased U.S. militant fervor that developed in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s, culminating in the election of hardliner Ronald Reagan (US conservatives very 
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concerned over Iran and Nicaragua), it is paramount that I pay significant attention to the 
dynamics occurring in the Third World. Starting in Indochina and the Middle East, 
moving to the African states of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Angola, and finally shifting to the 
U.S. strategic zone of Central America, the superpower alliances engaged in many 
protracted proxy wars just before and after Détente’s collapse in the late 1970’s. Once it 
is recognized that the less developed countries in these regions were ripe with strategic 
natural and economic resources, which each superpower wished to control for itself  
and/or deny to the other, then it becomes extremely important that I study the less 
developed world’s impact on Soviet-American relations during the late 1970’s.  
The West versus the Soviet Bloc? 
In this section, however, I explain why I treat the U.S.-led Western Bloc and the 
U.S.S.R.’s Soviet Bloc as united entities. With the help of military aid, Western political 
elites worked together to promote an anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary world order. 
Geostrategic and economic considerations simply dictated this. For these reasons, I shall 
compare the military aid allocations (in chapter three) of the West and the Soviet Blocs. I 
will now also explain the importance of measuring the economic aid allocations of the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. towards the less developed world. Although important for alliance 
consolidation, I argue that economic aid is strategically inferior to military aid. Before 
doing that, however, I shall explain why foreign aid (especially military aid) is an 
important tool in consolidating and expanding alliances in the less developed world. 
Strategic Importance of Foreign Aid and the Dominance of Military Aid 
 Foreign aid is nothing more than a strategic tool used to gain allies and thus 
political and economic advantages in the less developed world. However, as argued by 
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Hans Morgenthau (1962), military aid is the most strategic type of foreign aid (in 
comparison with economic aid) since it is immensely useful in buttressing alliances and 
thus protecting military and economic interests in the less developed world (p.303 ). He 
cites that military aid has traditionally encompassed the “lion’s share” (besides a brief 
period in the early 1960’s) of U.S. foreign aid programs, especially since the onset of the 
Cold War, thus verifying the superiority of military to economic aid (Morgenthau, 1962, 
p. 302). Moreover, as evidenced by the rise of Great Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
large increases in military aid towards strategic countries in the less developed world is 
very much correlated with a country’s intent to alter the balance of power in their favor in 
order to make strategic and economic gains (that would further improve their military 
power). Looking through the treaties between Great Britain and its allies, Morgenthau 
(1962) was “struck by the meticulous precision by which obligations to furnish troops, 
equipment, logistical support, food, money, and the like” correlated according to the 
strategic importance of the recipient nation (p. 302).  
Although less significant than military aid, I shall also compare the economic aid 
allocations of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In fact, Morgenthau recognizes that economic aid 
is a very useful tool in helping to buttress and consolidate existing allies and/or emerging 
allies in the less developed world. Indeed, economic assistance is nothing more than 
bribery (according to realists) used by the donor country as they try to gain military and 
economic advantages in the less developed world. The stronger country simply buys out 
the loyalty and allegiance of the local regime in the weaker country. Local leaders from 
the weaker country benefit from some of the spoils of exploitation in exchange for their 
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subservience and the exploitation of their countries (to the benefit of the stronger 
country).  
However, within the pecking order of foreign aid assistance, Morgenthau and 
many realists believe that military aid is a much more significant and strategic type of 
foreign aid. Without military power as a backup, exploitative economic aid allocations 
(and thus exploitative economic relationships that enhance military power) to the benefit 
of the donor country would simply never occur. Far from benefiting from the infusion of 
capital, economic aid has never aided in the economic development of any country in the 
less developed world. Instead, U.S. aid packages “have helped create major markets for 
agricultural goods and industrial exports” for the donor country (Mittal, 2006, “U.S. 
Foreign Assistance”: Section: “A Murky Past”, para. 5). The reason for this is that 
“USAID (the agency responsible for allocating economic aid) follows and implements 
the Buy American Act, which requires that American money aid and grants be used to 
purchase goods and services which are U.S. produced and U.S. delivered” (Mittal, 2006, 
“U.S. Foreign Assistance”: Section: “A Murky Past” , para. 5). According to the “USAID 
Agency Performance Report” that Mittal (2006) cites that “71.6% of bilateral aid 
commitments were tied to the purchase of U.S. goods and services” (“U.S. Foreign 
Assistance”: Section: “A Murky Past”, para. 5). 
The Western and Soviet Blocs: The Strategic Alliances United Through Military Aid 
When analyzing the balance of power in international relations most scholars 
simply begin by looking at how many superpowers exist (whether the world is unipolar, 
bipolar, or multipolar). Such an analysis has often led to studying the Cold War in terms 
of assessing the strategic interactions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. while completely 
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negating the alliance partners of these two allies. The countries of Eastern Europe 
(Warsaw Pact) and the West were not only an integral part of the Cold War, but the 
alliance schemes they developed with the two respective superpowers exhibited longevity 
and significant military integration that have led certain analysts to “regard them as 
different from pre-WWII alliance schemes” (Rothgeb, 1981, p. 493). John Herz (1980) 
has argued that the “Soviet Union makes more concessions to its allies than often is 
acknowledged, and that the U.S. dominates its allies [Suez Canal 1956] more than the 
loose model implies” (p. 495).  Renowned realist Morgenthau (1993) has also pointed out 
that while “pre-WWII alliances were usually unions of near equals, the [newly evolving] 
blocs essentially consist of a clustering of smaller states around a superpower,” 
suggesting that NATO has been dominated by the U.S. (p. 494). Overall, these authors 
argue that the new NATO and Warsaw Blocs were far more integrated and vertically 
organized than any other historical blocs thanks to the dominant political and economic 
power of Washington and Moscow within these blocs.   
The main critique that comes from comparing the Soviet Bloc to the West 
suggests that it is foolish to lump the Western countries together since they were not as 
politically, ideologically, and militarily dominated by the U.S. Thus, it is suggested that 
the U.S.S.R. had much more control over the Soviet Bloc that simply did not allow any 
schisms on foreign policy matters. Many liberal scholars simply believe the U.S. used its 
superpower in a benign manner in regards to its Western allies, while the U.S.S.R. was 
the perennial bully. Traditional realism would scoff at analyzing NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact as separate and competing blocs as they would suggest that the U.S. simply could 
not be certain and confident that its NATO allies would not defect and or form their own 
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rival union (U.S. could not trust its Western allies in an anarchic world). In their view, 
any comparison of the Cold War must revolve around the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. These 
views have led to a biased study of the Cold War since many scholars go as far as 
compare the U.S. and the entire Soviet Bloc (since the Soviets dominated these countries 
in their view) without any mention of the rest of NATO and the other members of the G7. 
 However, when it comes to the military aid arena (the most significant and 
strategic type of foreign aid (as it can seriously affect the balance of power), which I 
analyze through the U.S. Disarmament Agency’s (USDA) own World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), there is research that shows consistent 
parallels between U.S. and G7 military aid expenditures. As shown by John Oneal’s 
(1990) Testing the Theory of Collective Action: NATO Defense Burdens 1950-1984, 
“the greater the perception of the Soviet threat was, the greater the demand for collective 
security, and the greater the contribution of the allies to the alliance” (p. 433). Analyzing 
the problem discovered by Mancur Olson (1971), in The Logic of Collective Action, 
describing how small states free ride on the defense expenditures of the larger alliance 
partners (in this case Western Europe on the U.S.), the U.S. could expect larger donations 
of military aid from its “free riding” Western partners whenever the Soviet threat seemed 
to increase, thus demonstrating parallel security interests (p. 15).  
The West was also united against the less developed world. While some critics 
would argue that Western nations pulled back from direct third world intervention during 
the 1960’s and 1970’s (such as in Vietnam and Angola), it is important to take into 
consideration the indirect support given by the Western nations to the U.S. when it came 
to crushing national liberation movements. In fact, France and Britain vetoed sanctions 
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against apartheid South Africa and provided significant aid to the pro-Western Mobutu in 
Zaire in the face of the “Angola” threat to Southern Africa. Western European nations 
also significantly increased military aid allocations towards pro-Western Southeast Asian 
regimes during the same time period as well (USDA, 1975-1979, pp. 128-131). Thus, it is 
apparent that the strategic interests of the U.S. and Europe were defended together. One 
notable exception was Latin America during the 1980s, when the U.S. could not count on 
the same level of support (especially South America). 
 Comparing the Western and Soviet Blocs (albeit in strategic military terms), does 
have credibility within realism thanks to both Stephen Krasner (1985) and Jeffrey Hart 
(1983). Their understanding of realist political economy not only put a dent on 
dependency and Marxist theories of exploitation, but they also helped to weaken 
traditional concepts of realism by showing how the U.S. and the G7 have common 
strategic interests (mostly defended with military aid) against the less developed world. 
Krasner’s (1985) Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism points 
out that the less developed world pushed for a New International Economic Order in 
1974 that among other things would call for the West to renegotiate Third World debt, 
provide industrial technology on more favorable terms, recognize the right to 
expropriation of foreign direct investment, provide greater control of MNC’s and the 
repatriation of money, establish preferences for Third World products coupled with the 
removal of Northern trade barriers, and establish Northern support for new commodity 
agreements (p. 3).  
 Thus, according to realist political economy, the Third World was promoting a 
new mercantilist power structure (the same the West has used against them) in seeking to 
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move towards the First World. Krasner (1985) points out that the multilateral character of 
the Third World’s call for change can be understood since the less developed world can 
only put pressure on the North by uniting since in division they can only extract bilateral 
agreements that force each country to “race to the bottom” and thus they all continue to 
be exploited (p. 4). This call for the First World to change its foreign economic policies 
against the less developed not only demonstrates that the less developed world believes 
that the First World has practiced mercantilism but it also shows that they were seeking 
to use mercantilism themselves as they abandoned some of the calls of dependency 
theorists to pull from the world capitalist system. Thus the Third World also viewed the 
First World as a mostly united entity. However, the goals of nationalists in the less 
developed world failed because of the total lack of consistent collaboration. The free rider 
problem and the self-interest of individual nations were ultimately significant roadblocks 
for leaders in the less developed world to overcome. 
 The response to the less developed world’s call for a New International Economic 
Order by the G7, which was very negative, demonstrates how much consensus and 
unification there was by the West in its foreign policies. Despite left-leaning governments 
within the G7, none were willing to back the Third World’s bid to reverse the 
international economic order. Division and partial support for the less developed world 
was only found in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway. Hart’s (1983) explanation for 
Swedish, Dutch, and Norwegian support is that small economies are better able to adapt 
to any changes in the international economy, especially when they can “free ride” on the 
hostility that they knew would come from the rest of the G7 (p. 46). Most importantly, it 
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is obvious these countries have much less access and rely much less on the raw materials 
of the less developed world. 
 In fact, a wide range of scholars from Helleiner (1996) and Harvey (2005) to 
Stiglitz (2003) are just a few who have shown that Third World revolutions that have 
threatened the Western backed international political order have always been condemned 
and punished by the G7. The Western countries neither break ranks to join the less 
developed world nor do they question their fundamentally hypocritical economic policies 
(pushing for the less developed countries to open up their borders for trade while keeping 
their own border closed) imposed on the less developed world. Further, as shown by 
David Calleo’s (1996) “Restarting the Marxist Clock”, one of the main reasons for 
Western unity during the Cold War and Détente, was the Soviet Union. Its call for a 
socialist economic order, which had much appeal in the less developed world, had 
managed to wedge the capitalist West even closer than before (p. 2). Thus, the West has 
been a very united Bloc. 
 For these reasons, I shall consider all G7 military aid as simply Western military 
aid that sought to keep the status quo (non-revolutionary) political and economic order in 
place. As mentioned above, military aid is the primary weapon through which the West 
maintained a political and economic order that brought most of the benefits of the global 
economy towards the advanced industrial economies. In fact, the U.S. and the West, as 
will be shown in Chapter two, possessed significant interests in maintaining a world order 
that was both anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary. Thus, military aid allocated by the West 
(the G7) will be considered an instrumental policy tool in preserving the national interests 
(non-revolutionary/anti-Soviet political order) of the West while military aid from the 
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Soviet Bloc will be considered an instrumental policy tool in preserving and expanding 
the national interests of the Soviet Bloc. These military aid deliveries (from both blocs) 
will be combed from the U.S.’s own Disarmament Agency, which publishes allocations 
of military aid in its annual WMEAT report.  
Economic Aid: The Other Strategic Tool 
 According to the realist perspective articulated by Morgenthau (1962), economic 
aid is an important policy tool used to buttress and consolidate alliances in the less 
developed world (304). Such aid allocations involved geostrategic considerations. Indeed, 
according to Quintin Bach (2003), the majority of Soviet economic assistance to the less 
developed world was funneled towards such Cold War strategic areas as Eastern Europe, 
Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam (Appendix VI). The U.S.’s economic assistance, on the 
other hand, was usually predominant in such strategic regions of the world as Latin 
America, the Middle East/Buffer Zone, and Asia (OECD). Ultimately, considering the 
predominance of American economic power following WWII, there should be no 
surprise that U.S. economic assistance was far more spread out than that of the Soviet 
Union. I will show this to be the case in Chapter two. 
Economic aid, however, ranks as inferior to military aid when it comes to altering 
the balance of power. Tanks, bombers, ships, troops, training, guns, and other types of 
military hardware are what it takes to protect allies and to help topple unfriendly regimes. 
Economic aid is also an inferior tool compared with military aid considering I cannot 
truly compare the Soviet Bloc and the West as united entities using economic aid 
allocations. I can only compare the economic allocations of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
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  In fact, though some could suggest that I should go on and include G7 and 
Warsaw Pact economic aid to the less developed world when analyzing foreign to the less 
developed world, my project rejects this position on the grounds that it fails to consider 
that the U.S. and the rest of the G7 members, though working together to prevent 
revolutionary movements from taking power and helping to maintain an unequal 
exchange political order (as well as maintain an anti-Soviet system), used economic aid 
packages to make slight gains at the expense of some other G7 countries. That is, it is 
possible that economic aid packages were used by G7 members to increase the gains they 
received from the unequal economic order, while lessening the gains received by other 
members of the G7.  
 It is important to consider that there have been some important differences in U.S. 
and European economic policy, both towards each and toward the less developed world. 
Examples of fissures between G7 states includes the case of the U.S. and Belgium in 
Zaire, the U.S., France, and Britain in regards to the Suez Canal Crises, and slightly less 
exploitive economic agreements between Canada and the less developed world (to gain at 
the expense of the U.S.). Moreover, I also find that the U.S. and Great Britain pushed for 
the EuroMarket and the elimination of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970’s, which is 
serious evidence of economic competition and policy fissures between the U.S./UK and 
its G7 partners (Helleiner, 1996, p. 3). While Japan (at first) and other G7 countries 
resisted the elimination of important capital and currency controls and other government 
regulation on national market systems, the U.S. push was driven by American fears of 
European superiority in productive capitalism. Therefore, although the U.S. and 
European states firmly sought to dominate the less developed world and to counter Soviet 
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power (obviously making the military aid arena between both highly parallel), they had 
important economic policy battles and incongruence in the less developed world, which 
would be most readily apparent in the economic aid arena.  
 Nevertheless, in figuring out whether Soviet economic aid was aggressive and 
seeking to steal away a certain sphere of influence away from the U.S. I shall analyze the 
foreign aid allocations sent by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to the most strategically 
important countries in the specific region, the timing of such aid, and other historical 
factors. It is important to consider whether such economic aid allocations were expended 
towards non-traditional recipients in the less developed world. Such a finding would 
highlight an increased desire by the donor nation to consolidate control over more 
countries in the less developed world. Overall, Soviet economic data comes from Bach’s 
(2003) Soviet Aid to the Third World while U.S. economic data comes from the OECD’s 
(1971-present) Stat Extracts: Development Aid. 
Process-Tracing and Historical Interpretation 
My dissertation also used the historical/process-tracing approach in chapters 
three, four, and five. Since timing would be very important in understanding 
U.S./Western foreign aid allocations during the 1970’s was a direct response to 
aggressive foreign aid allocations made by the Soviet Bloc, Chapter three goes ahead and 
measures the foreign aid allocations in a historical manner. Chapter three also analyzes 
the strategic value of the nation receiving foreign assistance from the Soviet Bloc.  
Analyzing the strategic importance of the recipient state is extremely important since 
large foreign aid allocations to non-strategic states could throw off my analysis regarding 
whether or not the Soviets were seeking to overturn the balance of power.  
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Chapters four and five have me introducing the process-tracing approach.  
Besides analyzing the documents in a historical manner, I use the process-tracing 
approach as it uses “evidence about various features of the decision-making environment, 
including both the actor's definitions of their situation and the institutional arrangements 
affecting their attention, information-processing and behavior” as an interpretive tool for 
analysis (Fordham, 1997, p. Section: “The Important of Process”, para. 2). Using the 
process-tracing approach, I shall interpret the decisions of top U.S. policymakers in order 
to determine whether there was a single cohesive balance of power policy view, as 
suggested by realism, being articulated. If not, then I shall study whether economic 
motives and/or significant bureaucratic and political divisions (domestic politics) were 
evident within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. 
Bringing in specific international relations theories (such as balance of threat 
realism, structural Marxism, and domestic politics) will give me a solid framework for 
measuring the political analysis and political decision-making of U.S. policymakers and 
U.S. intelligence agencies. It will give me a solid foundation for understanding how these 
actors viewed the international environment. Adherents of process-tracing strongly 
believe this method is reliable and scientific. Unlike my historical analysis in chapter 
two, which is much weaker considering it only looks at events in timeline fashion (and 
can thus be questioned by some as a cherry-picked bias account), my historical/process-
tracing method goes much deeper.  
Spheres of Influence 
To test whether the Soviet Bloc made gains during Détente and/or sought to 
reverse the balance of power, I shall break the world up according to spheres of 
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influence. During the Cold War there was acknowledgement that Western Europe was a 
U.S. sphere of influence while Eastern Europe was a Soviet sphere of influence. Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa were also considered to be under the U.S.-led Western sphere 
of influence while Mongolia, Afghanistan, and parts of Central Asia were classified 
under the Soviet sphere. While many scholars have done this in the past, the main 
difference in this study revolves around separating Northern Africa from Africa and 
uniting it with the Middle East while also taking Iran and Iraq away from the Middle East 
and uniting it with Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan (since the U.S. claims the Soviets 
were trying to advance in this region and eventually encroach on the Middle East) to 
form the traditional buffer zone. Other spheres such as Latin America and Asia will 
follow along traditional lines.  
 The unification of Northern Africa and the Middle East revolves around the fact 
that Northern Africa simply has more in common, geostrategically, with the Middle East 
than with Africa. Oil transportation along the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, its 
proximity to Western Europe, (the Western bridgehead in the Middle East), and their 
animosity and proximity to Israel make Northern Africa quite different from the 
dynamics involved with the rest of Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is mostly characterized as 
a strategic area for minerals and raw materials. Although there is oil in Africa, its 
quantities were not considered at the time to be even close to that of the rest of the 
Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa is simply not within most of the vital oil 
transportation routes. Culturally speaking, Northern Africa is also much closer to the 
Middle East (mostly Arab and hostile towards Israel) while the rest of Africa is 
characterized by many indigenous ethnic tribes with many local rivalries as well.  
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 As far as the traditional Buffer Zone is concerned, it should be treated as a region 
of its own due to the fact that it is located precisely between the Soviet Union and the 
Middle East (an area of Western superiority). Both the West and the U.S.S.R. had vital 
and strategic interests (the U.S.S.R. in a defensive manner and in regards to the Caspian 
Sea) and the West in terms of the strategic Middle East. Many analysts, however, have 
placed certain buffer states within certain Cold War blocs, such as Afghanistan within the 
Soviet camp and Pakistan within the West. Prior to the initiation of Détente, they also 
state that Iran was a Western backed state while Iraq was a Soviet backed state. 
Theoretical Explanations of the Second Cold War (1972-1980) 
 
 Now that I have explained my chapter by chapter approach and my testing 
methodologies, it is time to introduce how each theory analyzes Soviet and Western Bloc 
competition in the less developed world during Détente. My literature review will serve 
as an important background towards my analysis and conclusion relating to which theory 
best explains the foreign aid and archival data findings.  
Realism and the Fall of Détente  
 Realizing that the hegemonic costs to providing global security had eroded U.S. 
economic power and prestige (and thus weakening the Western Alliance) in the early 
1970's, U.S. foreign policy guru and National Security Advisor to President Nixon, 
Henry Kissinger, sought a new method of containing the Soviet Union at lower costs. 
Kissinger argued that the Cold War strategy of containment had failed since the U.S.S.R. 
still achieved nuclear parity, European allies such as West Germany were clamoring for 
better relations with the East, and the U.S. was failing in its mission to contain the 
U.S.S.R. in Southeast Asia (Cox, 1990, pp. 32-33). Recognizing the implications of the 
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Sino-Soviet split and the fact that the U.S.S.R. had severe economic problems, Kissinger 
pushed for negotiations. As a result, the U.S. moved ahead with tactical nuclear arms 
agreements and an overall agreement stated that each superpower would be left alone to 
manage their respective spheres of influence. It was believed this strategy would help 
stabilize the Vietnamese South and integrate the U.S.S.R. into the world market. Most 
importantly, U.S. policymakers believed this strategy would curtail Soviet “adventurism” 
in the less developed world and help shift U.S. attention to more significant areas of the 
world. 
 Détente collapsed between 1979 and 1980 and was followed in the early 1980's 
by the Reagan Doctrine. The Reagan Doctrine argued that Détente had not prevented the 
U.S.S.R. from trying to alter the balance of power, both conventional and nuclear. The 
critics of Détente behind the new doctrine blasted the original signing of SALT I. They 
believed Détente was flawed in favor of the Soviets since the U.S. was only possessed 
1,064 ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) while the Soviets possessed 1,618 
ICBMs (Woolf, Section: “The Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms”, para. 1). Détente 
critics believed this gave the Soviets an advantage in the strategic arms race. These critics 
also attacked a protocol to the treaty stating that “the U.S could deploy up to 710 SLBM 
[sub-marine launched ballistic missiles] launchers on 44 submarines, and the Soviet 
Union could deploy up to 950 SLBM launchers on 62 submarines” (Woolf et al, Section: 
“The Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms”, para. 1). They believed this further 
widened the strategic divide.  
 Incoming President Ronald Reagan and the alternative Team B within the CIA 
also believed the Soviets were becoming too aggressive with their military expenditures. 
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Team B, which included such prominent conservatives as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul 
Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle, suggested the Soviet nuclear arsenal war far more 
advanced (both qualitatively and quantitatively) than previous CIA estimates (Kahn, 
1998, p. 3). In addition, according to Roger Kanet (1992), in Soviet Foreign Policy and 
East-West Relations, instead of ceding to the limitations imposed by the SALT I and 
Vladiovostok Agreements, the Soviets increased production of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (p. 68). He argues the Soviets were manufacturing larger amounts of military 
equipment than the U.S. by the start of the 1970's. Most significantly, he suggests the 
introduction of intermediate SS-20 missiles (which were specifically targeted on Western 
Europe) significantly tilted the balance of forces more towards the direction of the Soviet 
Union. Though Kissinger suggested the U.S. still had an advantage with offensive 
military power, critics accused U.S. policymakers of weakening defensive capabilities.  
 As far as the less developed world goes, balance of threat realists further highlight 
that there were declines in U.S. defense spending every year during the early 1970’s. In 
fact, U.S. Senate Budget Committee figures show that U.S. military expenditures during 
the Nixon and Ford administrations decreased military spending by “nearly a third from 
its peak during the [Vietnam] war” (Finley, 2003, para. 2). Such a decline sent the wrong 
signal, according to balance of threat realists, to US enemies around the world.  
 The result, according to U.S. hawks/realists, was that the U.S.S.R. continued to 
build up its conventional military force with significant economic investments in military 
hardware. Francis Sempa (2004) certainly believes this was the case and agreed with the 
U.S. decision to engage in aggressive actions against the Soviets. In his view, 
“acquiescence to the loss of strategic nuclear superiority, a willingness to overlook Soviet 
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cheating on arms control agreements, and the U.S. abandonment of longtime allies in 
Southeast Asia” was only the beginning (Sempa, 2004, para. 7). The result was US 
aggressive actions. As Ronald Reagan stated in January 1983 (with National Security 
Decision Directive 75):  
 U.S. policy was "[t]o contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism…, [t]o 
 promote…the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic 
 political and economic system…, [to] exploit…vulnerabilities within the Soviet 
 empire" in an  effort to "loosen Moscow’s hold" on Eastern Europe. (Sempa, 
 2004, para. 8) 
 
 Far from freezing the balance of power in the military realm, realists contend that 
Détente only tied the hands of the U.S., threatening the prestige and leadership of the 
U.S. in relation to its Western allies. Neil McFarlane (1983), a prominent realist, argues 
in Soviet Intervention and Third World Conflicts, that the “failure of American 
deterrence was the critical permissive condition of Soviet intervention” (p. 17) in the less 
developed world during the late 1970’s. Because the risk of American involvement had 
diminished with Détente (and the Vietnam syndrome), the U.S.S.R. decided to pursue 
"cautious opportunism" in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and other significant Third 
World countries. The bottom line to realists, such as R.J Rummel (1976), is that 
“cooperation does not bring peace, nor does restraining one’s own power, because power 
must be backed up by military force” (p. 3). Instead of tying its hands down with arms 
treaties and slashing military spending, the U.S. should not have sought to “freeze” the 
balance of power, but should have matched and exceeded Soviet gains in the military 
sphere. As they see it, a relative decrease in U.S. military power (as the dominant leader 
of the West), combined with revolutionary turmoil, catapulted the U.S.S.R. into U.S. and 
Western spheres of influence.  
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Revolutionary turmoil, and thus Soviet interference, was further enhanced by the 
withdrawal of support for U.S. backed authoritarian regimes in Nicaragua (where 
President Carter terminated military aid and cut economic aid), and Iran (where President 
Carter drastically cut military aid). Thus, these were crucial mistakes made during the 
period of Détente, according to realists. U.S. restraint tilted the balance of forces in these 
countries allowing revolutions to emerge that challenged U.S. strategic interests. After 
all, the “insurrectionist movements [that] gained strength and achieved resounding 
victories in Asia, Latin America, and Africa favored the Soviet Union in the balance of 
forces” (Dixon et al, 1983, page 4), regardless of Soviet complicity in aiding these 
movements. The failure of such Western countries as Portugal in crushing national 
liberation movements in Africa also provided further power vacuums for the Soviet Bloc 
to take advantage of.  
For balance of threat realists, appeasement through arms control treaties, military 
aid cutbacks to Third World allies, and “reductions” in the rate of U.S. military spending 
meant the Soviets smelled “blood”. Thus, the U.S.S.R. intervened in the less developed 
world's revolutionary turmoil (in the most strategic countries) and altered the balance of 
power between 1975 and 1981 with foreign aid packages and increased strategic 
partnerships (Lagon, 1992, p. 44). Indeed, Lagon (1992) argues that increased foreign aid 
to Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Laos, Mozambique, Grenada, 
and South Yemen prove that the U.S.S.R. was seeking to alter the balance of forces to 
gain influence in the Third World.  
In fact, pointing to the rise of Marxist-Leninist regimes in Nicaragua and Angola, 
realism suggests that the Soviets had interfered in U.S. and Western affairs by providing 
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economic and military support to newly established strategic clients in the U.S. and 
West’s own backyard. While these leftist movements did have significant indigenous 
support, the Reagan administration argued that the U.S.S.R. was seeking to consolidate 
control over these regimes in order to thwart the “agreed upon” balance of power. Bruce 
Porter (1984) suggests the policies of Détente led to the deployment of over forty 
thousand Soviet-armed Cuban troops in Southern Africa, Soviet sealifts/airlifts to its 
allies at war, and the invasion of Afghanistan, which according to him, were completely 
atypical of traditional Soviet policies during the Cold War (p. 3).  
Overall, Soviet interest in the less developed world was a result of several 
important political and economic goals. According to Steven David (1986), “they 
included the establishment of military bases to assist in power projection, control over 
raw materials, the containment of the West and the People's Republic of China, [and] 
diverting American resources away from the defense of Western Europe (p. 4)”. In 
addition, because the Soviets were failing to meet the economic needs of its people, 
making strategic gains in the less developed world was important for the internal 
legitimacy of the regime. 
 Responding to “Soviet gains”, the U.S. (and its Western allies through indirect 
support) worked with local proxies in attempt to fight against a shift in the balance of 
power. The U.S. simply had to prevent these newly acquired Soviet clients from 
interfering in nearby U.S. client states. Indeed, balance of threat realists like to point out 
how the spiraling effect of distrust formed by revolution between the former superpower 
and the rebel colony often forces the rebel colony to ally itself with the rival superpower. 
as the rebel colony seeks to expand the revolution at the expense of its former 
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superpower for its own protection In the end, to balance of threat realists, it is no surprise 
that the U.S./West aided neighboring Soviet client states in such countries as Pakistan 
(against Afghanistan), Honduras (against Nicaragua), and Zaire (against Angola). The 
strategy was to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, especially in areas demarcated as 
U.S. and Western spheres.  
 Regardless of the desires for modernization and independence from foreign 
interference, Stephen Walt (1992) maintains that the U.S. had to respond to these states 
and surrounding social movements with uncompromising force, since “revolutions 
intensify the security competition between states” (p. 4). By destroying the old political 
infrastructure, revolutions temporally weaken the state, which inevitably causes 
important international actors to seek to “improve their relative positions either by seizing 
land or by seeking important diplomatic concessions” (Walt, 1992, p. 44). The bottom 
line is that the U.S. (as the leader of the West) dismantled Détente precisely because 
Détente had increased the potential for revolutionary success, and thus Soviet 
interference, in the Third World. 
 Afghanistan was the last straw for the U.S. and the West. While a “defensive” 
action on paper, the Carter administration suggested that a successful Soviet invasion and 
take-over of Afghanistan placed vital American and G7 interests (and the Western 
alliance) in jeopardy (could fracture Pakistan and eventually place Soviet troops close to 
Iranian oil fields). In fact, Shaheen Dil (1977) argues that: 
 Americans feared that each absolute increase in Soviet influence implied a 
 reduction of American power. The vision of Soviet paramountcy in a part of the 
 world which the U.S. is not willing to acknowledge as within the Soviet sphere of 
 influence is not comforting to U.S. policymakers. (p. 475)  
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In addition, now that the Soviet Union had employed the Brezhnev Doctrine with respect 
to Afghanistan, how else would the Soviet Union respond to the U.S. trying to subvert 
other socialist client states, especially if its stake in the distribution of power grew even 
further? Since the Soviets had sought to weaken the U.S. in Central America and 
Southeast Asia, it was only logical for the U.S. to step in and aid the likes of Osama bin 
Laden against the U.S.S.R.  
 The fear of looking weak to your enemy, according to realism, invites aggression. 
Inevitably, “this fear inclined both governments to view their rivalry as a zero-sum game 
and to blur the distinction between vital and peripheral interests” (Richter, 1992, 271). 
Thus, even if Nicaragua, Angola, or Afghanistan had little to no strategic interests for 
either superpower, each superpower had to act in order to deter increased aggression from 
the other. The Soviets had to invade Afghanistan in order to demonstrate that it was 
capable of stopping its satellites from seceding, while the U.S. had to let the Soviets 
know that it wasn't going to let them threaten its strategic interests in the Middle East.  
 After all, realists argue that the structure of anarchy in the international system 
forces states to play by the rules of self-help. Concern for the distribution of power and 
the bipolar nature of the Cold War inevitably caused each side to seek strategic and 
economic advantages against the other. One manner in which superpowers extract 
advantages is by establishing exploitive relations with less powerful peripheral states. By 
changing the core-peripheral dynamics, revolutions threaten the geopolitical and 
economic interests of the status quo power. Power distribution in the international system 
is simply a zero-sum game, especially in a bipolar world. As suggested by Phil Williams 
(1989) in “U.S.-Soviet Relations: Beyond the Cold War?”, “even if their intentions 
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towards each other are initially benign, the two great powers are stuck in a security 
dilemma in which actions taken by one for defensive purposes (such as the U.S.S.R.'s 
quest for nuclear parity) appear as threatening, aggressive, or expansionist to the other” 
(p. 274).  
 War in Nicaragua and other lesser-developed countries during the 1970's initiated 
a power vacuum, just as World War II had done so in Europe. Seeking to weaken the 
U.S. and its legitimacy as a strong defender of the Western Alliance, realists suggest the 
U.S.S.R. stepped in to fill this power vacuum, thereby altering the old distribution of 
power. From Africa to Southeast Asia and Central Asia, balance of threat realists suggest 
the balance of power was shifting and that the Soviets were striving to make further 
improvements in the balance of power. Thus, the Soviets were now free to alter the 
ideological and strategic orientation of these newly acquired satellite states, once the 
Soviets had forced them to become dependent on foreign aid.  
 In sum, an aggressive Soviet Union, bolstered by increased conventional military 
power was seeking to take advantage of this newly developed power vacuum is what was 
occurring in the late 1970’s according to realists. They believe the U.S.S.R. significantly 
increased its foreign aid flows towards the most strategically important countries of Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia (perhaps even away from Eastern Europe). If this is true, I 
should also find that the Carter administration, the NSC, Departments of State and 
Defense, and the entire foreign policy apparatus were primarily concerned with Soviet 
expansionism in the Third World. The archives should demonstrate that U.S. foreign 
policy, and the revolutions that were occurring, were primarily viewed through the 
context of power distribution, the decline of U.S. hegemony, and the weakening of the 
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Western Alliance due to the rise of Soviet power in the less developed world. There 
should be very little evidence in the archives that the U.S. was concerned with the 
economic interests of U.S. businesses or that bureaucracies competed for different 
policies.   
Structural Marxism and Détente (Core-Periphery Dynamics)  
 Structural Marxism argues that world capitalism encompasses a system in which 
the core states exploit the peripheral states. World capitalism is also inherently 
expansionist as the “key to accumulating capital, enlarging profit shares, and maximizing 
profits has historically been long distance trade”(McCormick, 1995, p. 2). Desire among 
core states for higher profit rates and greater wealth abroad inherently conflicts with the 
desires for economic development in peripheral regions. Thus, the fall of Détente, and the 
subsequent Second Cold War, was not the result of Soviet aggressiveness or a shift in the 
balance of power, but the result of the periphery's attempt to climb the core-periphery 
ladder, which threatened the interests of U.S. and Western capital. Decades of economic 
exploitation combined with Third World recession in the 1970’s simply served to 
increase the likelihood of revolutions in the less developed world. While the Vietnam 
example may have increased the likelihood of revolutionary activity during the 1970’s 
(both because of decreased U.S. militancy and as an inspiration in itself), such activity 
was not the result of a more aggressive Soviet Union during the 1970’s. In fact, it could 
be argued that structural economic shifts, which threatened U.S.'s dominant status within 
the core itself (Japan and Germany rising) actually forced the U.S. to tighten its grip over 
the periphery.  
32 
 
 Though structural Marxism contains a “rainbow” of schools, from 
transnationalists to world system theorists, they all agree that the world capitalist system, 
seen through five centuries of capitalist globalization, has annexed vital resources from 
such areas of the world as Latin America, Asia, and Africa, maintaining the Third World 
in dependency. Because of their overwhelming economic and especially military power, 
the core states have forced the peripheral states to engage in low-profit economic 
activities, such as exporting raw materials As world system theory suggests, the core 
takes these raw materials and creates the high value added manufactured products that 
creates a relationship of unequal exchange, which benefits the core.  
 Unlike the increased industrialization that occurs in the core, increasing 
dependence reflected in an increasing trade gap has been the result in the periphery 
(Petras et al. 1976, p. 2). Most of the economic benefits of trade “drains” into the hands 
of the MNCs of the North. For instance, Helen Caldicott (1992) argues that “U.S. 
multinationals invested $270 million in Africa and repatriated $995 million, $200 million 
in Asia and received $2,400 million, and $900 million in Latin America for $2,900 
million” (p. 127). The core states and core investors also use institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank as a means of shoving these unfair trading (as well as monetary 
policies against the South). 
 For these reasons, it is important to understand that revolutions in the periphery 
are a result of domestic movements that are seeking to break away from the exploitive 
economic superstructure. For instance, “revolutionary situations in Central America have 
been the outcome of a combination of economic and socio-political factors.” (Vilas, 
1989, p. 52). These economic factors include agriculture driven export, stagnation, and 
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high levels of unemployment. As for socio-political issues, Carlos Vilas (1989) cites 
forced land dispossession, political repression, and institutionalized political exclusion as 
unequivocal determinants leading to Marxist-Leninists revolutions.  
 Capitalism created these conditions of exploitation in which the wealthy 
landowners (the core's bridgehead) made huge profits while the rest of society went 
illiterate and hungry. The selling of primary products to the core in return for 
manufactured imports is not only unequal exchange, but it means that much of the local 
profits from trade end up in the hands of elite landowners who suppress and exploit the 
peasants. Though the country as a whole loses from unequal exchange, the core ensures 
that its bridgehead within the periphery is well compensated. 
 Besides the already sufficient reasons for revolutionaries in the less developed 
world to fight against U.S. and Western imperialism, there are many other factors to take 
into account when considering why revolutionary turmoil occurred during the 1970’s. For 
starters, many of the countries that experienced revolutions or significant revolutionary 
turmoil during the 1970’s had some of the worst unequal exchange rates in the world, 
costing each country millions of dollars. A 1965 study by Gernot Kohler (1998) entitled 
Unequal Exchange 1965-1995 illustrates these facts in the cases of Nicaragua, Angola, 
Salvador, and Mozambique. The nations suffered GDP losses of 53%, 25%, 13% and 8% 
respectively (Appendix A). Secondly, a cross-national research study based on class 
exploitation  between 1970 and 1972 (right at the start of Détente) developed by Boswell 
and Dixon (1993), highlights the extremely high levels of class inequality (surplus value 
extraction) evident in the countries of Nicaragua, Angola, El Salvador, and Iran (p. 695).   
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 Not only did these countries have politically repressive regimes, but their 
widening class differences inevitably mobilized the masses and thus spawned 
revolutionary movements in the less developed world. Further driving the potential for 
revolution were such factors as the oil crisis of the 1970’s (leading to higher fuel prices 
and thus economic stagnation) and a large increase in Third World debt. In fact, between 
1973 and 1980, Third World debt increased by a factor of four, to $650 billion (Caldicott, 
1992, p. 129). 
 The inability of the elite in the periphery to push forward modernization and 
industrialization is precisely why revolutions occurred in the periphery. Brian Meeks 
(1993), author of Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory, argues that 
revolutions during the Second Cold War in Nicaragua and Grenada were undertaken by 
nationalists seeking to push their states from the periphery towards the semi-periphery (p. 
2). Ultimately, the export-oriented policies of U.S. backed authoritarian regimes had 
marginalized their respective countries, leading to dependency and economic domination. 
  As for the argument that that increased Soviet military aggression during the 
1970’s was responsible for pushing forward and/or helping these revolutions consolidate, 
Marxists point out that Soviet military spending (according to the CIA’s own estimates) 
had actually “leveled off” beginning in 1975 to a growth rate of just 1.3 % (Haines et al. 
2003, p. 124). Once the Soviet economy is taken into account, it is simply no surprise to 
find that Soviet expenditures did not increase. While Soviet GNP hovered at around 6% 
between 1955 and 1964, GNP steadily began to fall thereafter to 5.3% between 1966 and 
1970, 3.7% between 1971 and 1975, and 2.6 percent during the end of the 1970’s 
(Kennedy, 1989, p. 165). Inefficiency, corruption, and too much military spending during 
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the 1950’s and early 1960’s had begun to suffocate the Soviet economy. Thus, the Soviet 
Union was simply not in any position to significantly increase its military spending, 
especially in regards to sending more aid to areas of the  less developed world that were 
not of serious strategic concern. Of course, the Soviets did try to exploit the chaos and 
instability in areas of strategic concern to the West. However, in the eyes of structural 
Marxists, the Soviets placed the burden of revolutionary change on the less developed 
world.   
 To truly understand why U.S. militancy increased during the late 1970’s/early 
1980’s it is vital to understand that revolutions in the less developed world are attacked 
by hegemonic core states with increased fervor whenever there is a crisis in the world 
capitalist system between the core states themselves. As shown by David Kowalewski 
(1991), in Kondratieff expansionist cycles and non-hegemonic years (capitalist 
competition) the relationship between peripheral revolution and core intervention 
becomes extremely strongly correlated (p. 70). Kondratieff expansionist cycles “present 
the core nations with the specter of incursions into their increasingly valuable periphery 
spheres by other competing and growing powers” (Kowalewski, 1991, p. 73) 
 Looking to the early 1970's, it is clear that the U.S. used its structural economic 
power primarily to deal with rising economic competition from Japan and W. Germany, 
and increasingly looked to stabilize its declining economic hegemony by asserting its 
financial power globally (Helleiner, 1996, 3). From destroying the Bretton Woods regime 
by pegging of the dollar to gold to eliminating financial and currency controls, the U.S. 
sought to remain the dominant core state.  
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 Kowaleski (1991) also finds that revolutions tend to spike during heightened 
competition between core states since rising core states may support these revolutions 
with assistance for their own motives (p. 74). Thus, it should be no surprise that the 
decline in U.S. hegemony eroded European support for many U.S. interventions, such as 
U.S. covert operations against Nicaragua. As revolutions rise, competing non-hegemonic 
core states lose their faith in the ability of the hegemon to ensure international trade and 
investment, from which the other core states free ride on. Since the U.S. feared such a 
move by Japan and Western Europe, it made sure it kept its grip on the Atlantic Alliance 
by restructuring the financial system and intervening in any and all attempts at peripheral 
revolution. Ultimately, it was not the balance of power threat from the U.S.S.R., but the 
rise in capitalist competition with Japan and Western Europe (in addition to revolutionary 
movements) that caused the U.S. to feverishly attack rising revolutions in the less Third 
World. Destroying Détente and painting the Soviets as aggressive was simply a domestic 
ploy to ramp up domestic and international support to wage covert and overt warfare in 
the less developed world.  
 Thus, although the U.S. and Western Europe/Japan was firmly embedded in 
seeking to stop revolutionary movements (thus united in military aid towards non-
revolutionary regimes), the Western Alliance tended to weaken whenever the other G7 
members viewed the Soviet threat as secondary, the U.S. as weaker, and making 
advances versus the U.S. (the dominant core power) through economic incentives and 
political support much more important. That is, the rest of the G7 was willing to begin its 
pullback of the dominant core state as some G7 states sought to work with some Latin 
American states that favored some elements of government intervention in the economy. 
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However, the U.S. recognized this immediately and engaged in economic and military 
policies that tightened Washington’s leadership of the Western Alliance in the 1970’s by 
destroying Bretton Woods and eliminating financial and currency controls (Helleiner, 
1996, p. 3). 
 Structural Marxist analysis further suggests that structural changes in the semi-
periphery during the late 1970's decreased American tolerance for revolutionary attempts 
in the periphery itself. Unlike the 1960's and early 1970's, in which the rates of profit 
making by U.S. MNCs in the semi-periphery were twice as much as the rate of profit 
within the core itself, the semi-periphery was no longer the golden child of U.S. or core 
capital by 1979 (McCormick, 1995, p.213). Thanks to the “insidious debt trap and of the 
extraordinary burden of its servicing, most of the semi-periphery stalled in mid-
development and deteriorated as avenues of profitable investment” (McCormick, 1995, p. 
213). Decline in the semi-periphery where U.S. MNCs had advantages against their 
European and Japanese counterparts, meant that the U.S. now needed to “step up its 
military commitments abroad to protect and expand America's share (hegemonic status) 
of global economic opportunities” as well as its leadership in the Western Alliance. In 
fact, McCormick suggests that Détente itself was a product of U.S. capital's desire to 
penetrate the semi-peripheral zones within Eastern Europe (McCormick, 1995, p. 213).  
 It is also necessary to take into account how shifts in the world capitalist system 
shifted economic power away from the internationalist North to the nationalist South. 
The rise of Japan and Germany combined with the inability of the internationalists to pry 
open significant profits from both Eastern Europe and the semi-periphery allowed 
protectionist, agricultural, and military interests (which favored interventionist policies in 
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the periphery) within the U.S. South to dominate the foreign policy landscape. Though 
initially favoring ISI policies in Latin America in the early 1970’s, U.S. policy shifted 
towards protecting and expanding commodity exports within the periphery regions of the 
world (Cox, 1994, 124).  
 Ultimately, revolutions in Vietnam, Angola, and Nicaragua caused Détente to 
collapse because the U.S. realized it needed to pump up its military power in order to 
weaken the less developed world's attempt to climb the core-periphery ladder. The 
decline in U.S. hegemony (especially versus other G7 states according to structural 
Marxists) and the crisis in the world economy explain why the U.S. attacked 
revolutionary movements with increased fervor during the late 1970's and 1980's. The 
U.S. cynically used the “Soviet threat” as the cover-up in explaining why it needed to 
withdraw from Détente and destroy these rebellions. Calls that the “Evil Empire” was 
spreading communism were simply a domestic ploy to rally the nation into going along 
with counter-revolutionary attacks against the periphery. Far from any Soviet gains 
developing from increased Soviet aggression, structural Marxists suggest that such gains 
were due to U.S. and Western imperialism.  
 Therefore, if structural Marxists are correct, then I should find that the overall 
goal of the U.S. was to stop revolutionary movements that were rising. The U.S. archives 
should demonstrate that U.S. leaders were not paying attention to the balance of power, 
but to the structural economic interests of U.S. capital. In addition, structural Marxists 
would also suggest that the U.S. was extremely worried about how the rise of Japan and 
Western Europe was affecting the U.S.’s position in the world economic capitalist 
system. Thus, I should find that U.S. policymakers (chapters four and five) were mostly 
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concerned with economic interests in the less developed world. For these reasons, it 
should be evident that the West was overly protective of its spoils in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America as the West itself actually made the gains and exhibited tendencies of 
aggressive foreign aid donations (chapter three) and actions in the less developed world 
(chapter five). In turn, I should discover U.S. archives agreeing that the Soviet Bloc was 
cautious and did not make significant gains (chapter four) and that their economic and 
military aid was not aggressive in the less developed world (chapter three). 
Domestic Politics and Détente  
 The domestic politics approach views the interpretations of realists and structural 
Marxists as incomplete and secondary. It suggests that there is “no objective international 
system with an independent existence or that systemic pressure is so weak and uncertain 
that there are indeterminate with respect to the foreign policy choices that states make” 
(Kapstein, 1997, p. 755). Instead, domestic politics argues that bureaucratic and/or 
business conflict, not structural explanations, best explains foreign policy because they 
open the “black box” of a state in order to understand what is happening within the unit. 
The Myth of Empire by Jack Snyder (1991) points out that to understand a nation's 
foreign policy “we need to understand the dynamics of policy formulation within the 
nation-state, especially the role of competing interest groups within various political 
structures” (p. 2). Viewed from this model, Détente collapsed because domestic interest 
groups in the U.S., in particular those interests that benefited from the policies of the 
Cold War, took over the reins of foreign policy.  
 A leading work on U.S. domestic factors causing the collapse of Détente is David 
Skidmore’s (1996) Reversing Course. Skidmore focuses on the influence of interest 
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groups and finds that the shift in Cold War foreign policy that culminated in Détente was 
due to the political victory of a loose coalition of anti-war activists and international 
business groups (Skidmore, 1996, p. 3). However, “multinational corporate interests and 
liberal political supporters, found it difficult to work together, each possessing liabilities 
that limited popular appeals (Skidmore, 1996 p. 3). The opposition, a “patriotic” 
conservative bloc that encompassed social reactionaries, the military industrial complex, 
and Zionists found cohesion within their domestic/international world views. 
 In fact, this coalition unleashed a conservative movement that removed moderate 
Republicans and Democrats from Congress in favor of hardliners beginning in 1974. It 
became so powerful that President Carter was forced to retreat from his liberal 
internationalist platform. Far from “adjusting” to the decline in American hegemony, 
Carter was forced to reverse his liberal policies, such as decreasing the rate of growth of 
the military budget, restricting CIA covert operations, pulling troops from South Korea, 
and normalizing relations with Vietnam and Cuba. Ultimately, the realist assertion that 
state executives are immune from interest group pressure fails to appreciate the power of 
private interest groups as well as sectors with interests in the military industrial complex 
from creating a succinct and coherent anti-Soviet world view that led to the capture of 
Congress and important parts of the bureaucracy.  
 Initiating major policy changes, such as lessening Cold War tensions with the 
Soviet Union, is also a rather difficult task considering that Cold War interests had 
entrenched themselves in the U.S. bureaucracy and throughout American society. Dan 
Caldwell (1991) in The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control advances this 
viewpoint. Caldwell suggests that U.S. Presidents must pay attention to creating a foreign 
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policy consensus among key bureaucratic officials and influential elites in Congress, as 
well as being attuned to the influence of the media, before going ahead with major shifts 
in foreign policy (p. 4). Carter's failure to do this meant that domestic factors, such as 
interest groups, public opinion, and the Senate derailed his attempt at completing SALT 
II negotiations.  
 The primacy of domestic politics and interest groups in destroying Détente is also 
cited by Anne Cahn(1998) in Killing Détente. She contends that powerful bureaucratic 
conservatives, such as Paul Nitze and Richard Pipes, forced the CIA to create an 
alternative “Team B” to evaluate Soviet military power (p. 2). Team B’s assessment of 
the Soviet threat (in regards to airpower and nuclear missile capability) came up far 
graver than the previous NIE estimates which ultimately helped galvanize conservative 
opposition to Détente.  
 Such work connects well with Graham Allison's (1971) bureaucratic approach 
which articulates that there is no single maker of foreign policy (p. 3). Policy flows 
instead from an “almagram of large organizations and political actors who differ 
substantially on any particular issue and who compete to advance their own personal and 
organizational interests” (Clifford, 1990, p. 162).  All in, interest groups battles decide 
foreign policy. 
 Another way interest groups, especially business groups, affects policy is the 
manner in which their interests parallel with the interests of important bureaucracies that 
shape U.S. foreign policy. An important example of this is the U.S. military industrial 
complex (MIC). As argued by David Gibbs (1996), this bureaucracy encompasses the 
interests of many defense related companies, such as the Rand Corporation and Lockheed 
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Martin, and industries, such as electronics, mining, and oil which have vested interests in 
large military budgets (51). Moreover, the interests of such companies and the MIC 
parallel for the very fact that bureaus have an inherent tendency to expand, whether or not 
there is any real need for more of their services (Downs, 1965, p. 439). Their desire for 
larger budgets and policy relevance pushes them to promote the interests of businesses 
that depend on them. 
 Starting in the early 1970's the MIC and its business partners began to lose a large 
percentage of their share in the national budget and arms exports. The policies of Détente, 
such as scaling back military spending and military aid to authoritarian regimes, began to 
hurt the economic interests of U.S. businesses and the bureaucratic power of the MIC. 
Thus, these groups organized in the late 1970's to create very powerful political lobbies. 
The goal was to convince the American public that the policies of Détente made the 
country weak, allowing the Soviets to “expand” in the Third World. Culminating with the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the MIC and the pro-military business sectors had their 
"perfect storm" to force a shift in U.S. foreign policy (Gibbs, 1996, p. 51). These 
lobbying efforts led to the abandonment of SALT II, a 39 percent increase in military 
expenditures, and a significant increase in arms exports. 
 Why would the U.S. paint the Soviet invasion as expansionist when U.S. 
policymakers had declared in the 1940's and 50's that Afghanistan possessed no strategic 
importance and that Soviet involvement in the region was a result of U.S. aid to Pakistan? 
After all, “U.S. officials generally believed that the Soviets gained little offensive 
strategic value from their relations with Afghanistan” (Gibbs, 1996, p. 53). To explain 
U.S. policy reversal in 1979 it is pertinent and necessary to understand how the “group 
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interests” of the MIC, which invariably linked important business sectors, came to 
formulate national policy.  
Not only did Détente collapse due to interest group and bureaucratic pressures 
linked with important business sectors, but many within the domestic politics business 
conflict school suggest that the entire range of policies during the 1970's ebbed and 
flowed according to where the plurality of business interests lied. Though in agreement 
with structural Marxism those interventions in the Third World helped to protect and 
spread U.S. investments, proponents of business conflict would argue that competing 
business interests are far more significant than structural economic factors in determining 
policy outcomes.  
For instance, the business conflict model contends that a constellation of interests 
had emerged by the late 1960's and early 1970's that turned U.S. trade policy into the 
liberal internationalist direction. James Kurth’s (1979) The Political Consequences of the 
Product Life Cycle suggests that the U.S. auto industry, aerospace industry, and banking 
interests all (thanks to the logic of the product cycle) supported free trade and Détente 
during the 1970's for the very reason that each of these industries had saturated their 
established home markets (3). These industries were clamoring to expand and penetrate 
foreign markets. Jacqueline McGlade (2006) also finds that business conflict was 
significant in improving relations with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Citing increased 
pressure from computer manufacturers, capital equipment firms, and agricultural 
producers, the U.S. shifted policies and initiated Détente (p. 14, para. 1).  
 Facing stiff competition from Japanese and European start-up firms with lower 
overhead costs some industries made an abrupt turn towards protectionism, leaving 
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Détente with very little political support from the U.S. elite. In fact, the final phase of the 
“product life cycle” theory suggests that once industries can no longer compete abroad 
with more competitive and innovative firms, they seek protectionism. With international 
trade in the Eastern Bloc no longer important to U.S. industrial and financial sectors, and 
corporations facing increasing nationalism in the less developed world the tide was 
turned in favor of  the “labor-repressive business sectors” (Cox, 120).  
 Competition between business internationalist/capital intensive firms and 
nationalist labor/repressive firms during the final years of Détente, not the prospects of 
Soviet gains, is precisely what determined U.S. foreign policy towards Central America. 
The business conflict approach highlights that labor-intensive firms were far more 
antagonistic towards revolutionary movements for the very fact that they depended on 
cheap labor and were vulnerable to expropriation measures. In contrast, capital-intensive 
firms and banks were willing to work with the Sandinistas, so long as they promised to 
pay Nicaragua's debts (Cox, 1994, 121). In essence, U.S. foreign policy was developed 
depending on which business sector captured the foreign policy-making process. More 
pointedly, it was the realization that the plurality of firms benefited from export-led 
industrialization policies in Central America that altered the playing field in favor of 
interventionist and militant policies towards revolutionary movements.  
 Overall, whether it is the political pressure of interest groups, the inertia of 
interventionist policies of the MIC or business conflict the domestic politics approach 
shows that it is imperative to open up the “billiard ball” of the state. Societal approaches 
conclude that, contrary to the realist view, there is no single national interest that can be 
promoted by the executive branch. Not only in regard to deterring Soviet national interest 
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gains, but also in regard to maintaining the Atlantic Alliance, domestic policy theorists 
suggest that these issues are way on the backburner compared to advancing the selfish 
interest of large and powerful organizations. For instance, they would suggest that the 
recent invasion of Iraq was not founded on the premise of promoting the national interest 
(America is bogged down, Iran may have gained a new sphere of influence), but 
promoting the narrow-minded interests of certain powerful interest groups.  
      Moving Forward 
My dissertation shall now trace the history of Western-Soviet Bloc competition 
and the importance of the less developed world in relation to this competition. More 
specifically, chapter two will also deploy the piercing lenses of historical analysis in 
order to provide a preliminary assessment of the gains and losses of the Soviet Bloc 
during Détente (chapter two). Did the Soviets, as predicted by balance of threat realists, 
make significant gains during the middle-to-late 1970’s.  
Afterwards, I go ahead and measure the foreign aid contributions (especially 
military) of the Soviet Bloc and the West towards the less developed world. My analysis 
will to begin to examine whether balance of threat realism or structural Marxism, best 
explains U.S.-Soviet/Western-Soviet Bloc competition in the less developed world during 
the 1970’s. Since it is only my first examination, I shall still need to wait for the other 
chapters to come to a final conclusion. 
Examining the foreign aid data is simply a requirement considering that any 
potential Soviet gains during Détente could have been the result of anti-Western 
revolutionary turmoil without the initial or further backing of the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Bloc did provide increased military and economic support towards newly installed 
46 
 
revolutionary governments in the less developed world that were either anti-American or 
anti-Western during the late 1970’s. However, I must look deeper at the foreign aid 
contributions in order to determine whether the Soviets placed the burden of 
revolutionary change on the less developed world or whether they themselves took a very 
active approach in seeking to reverse the balance of power. In fact, few analysts have 
bothered to thoroughly measure Soviet aid patterns during and after Détente as a way of 
gauging Soviet intentions, relying for the most part on assumptions based on the 
U.S.S.R.’s authoritarian political system, incomplete data, and/or inflated conventional 
military aid expenditures.  
I also reject aggregate aid comparisons in favor of a historical/quantitative 
method.  To truly get at the heart of the matter I believe I have to analyze Soviet and 
Western foreign aid (especially military aid) contributions to the most strategically 
significant countries in the region, the timing of such aid, and other important process-
tracing/historical factors. Large foreign aid allocations (especially military) towards non-
strategic countries could invariably bias the results. Some countries in the less developed 
world were more strategic than others. The timing of foreign aid allocations (especially 
military) also goes a long way in explaining whether the Soviets were seeking to make 
gains in the face of claimed Western retreats.  
  Once my interpretive quantitative analysis has determined whether the balance of 
power shifted and whether the Soviet Union became aggressive with foreign aid 
contributions in the less developed world during the 1970’s (both against the Western 
Alliance and the U.S. itself), taking advantage of revolutionary turmoil in the less 
developed world, I shall go ahead and study the policy archives (chapter four) of the U.S. 
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intelligence agencies (such as the Defense and State Departments) in the national security 
archives as well as the presidential archives of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
administrations. These archives will provide important documentation describing what  
policymakers were thinking and how they were analyzing the developments of the late 
1970’s. Do they cite Soviet aggression and advances in the less developed world as the 
key reason for increased U.S. involvement? I shall also analyze Soviet documents to 
better understand what policy decisions Soviet policymakers made and why they made 
them. Within this archival section, I shall also determine whether revolutionary turmoil 
was a primary or secondary reason for Détente’s collapse as I analyze the archives for the 
possibility that Soviet advances in the nuclear realm were much more significant in 
causing Détente’s collapse.  
Chapter five then moves to comb the U.S. archives in order to analyze the U.S. 
response during this time period in the less developed world. The U.S. response will help 
give a lot of insight as to how the U.S. was reading the situation in the less developed 
world during this time period. Was the U.S. sleeping at the wheel (as described by 
balance of threat realists) or engaged in aggressive actions (as argued by structural 
Marxists)? 
Chapters four and five will allow me to introduce the important theory of 
domestic politics. Supporters of this theory would contend that the archives will highlight 
the overwhelming influence of interest groups within the U.S. bureaucracy. In their view, 
the U.S. response to revolutionary turmoil had nothing to do with balance of power or 
agreed upon economic interests, but with the dominant domestic groups promoting and 
protecting their respective interests.  
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Structural Marxism and balance of threat realism can also be tested in the archival 
chapters (four and five). For structural Marxists, the archives should show that U.S. 
policies drove these states into the hands of the Soviets. Pointing to former U.S. diplomat 
Cole Blasier (1976), structural Marxists would concur that U.S. intervention had “the 
effect of achieving what it sought to avoid” (p. 6). Instead of paying attention to the “root 
causes” of revolution (social discontent) U.S. policymakers consistently ignored the 
moderate nationalists in favor of all or nothing policies. Balance of threat realists would 
counter that the archives should confirm Soviet Bloc aggression. They suggest U.S. 
policymakers were most concerned with Soviet adventurism throughout the less 
developed world. 
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Chapter II:  Tracing Soviet Gains in the Less Developed World during Détente 
 
 Introduction 
       Chapter two will provide an historical analysis of Soviet Bloc strategic 
gains/losses in the less developed world during Détente.  Before chronicling Western and 
Soviet competition in the Third World during Détente, however, I will highlight the 
historical importance of the less developed world in regards to the Cold War. I shall also 
trace the enormous advantages of the U.S./West when it comes to both strategic military 
power and foreign aid allocations to the less developed world.  
Containing the Soviets and Controlling the Third World 
Rebuilding Western Europe at the Expense of the Third World  
 Notable Cold War historian Melvyn Leffler’s (1992) A Preponderance of Power, 
an account of the origins of the Cold War based on new U.S. archival material, suggests 
that “fear and power…not unrelenting Soviet pressure” was the driving source of U.S. 
policy at the onset of the Cold War (p. 51). In fact, an assessment report by U.S. defense 
officials following World War II confirms “that the Soviets had no long-range strategic 
air force and meager air defenses” (Leffler, 1982, p. 23). They also considered the Soviet 
navy ineffective and stated that: “The U.S.S.R. will require approximately 15 years to 
overcome wartime losses in manpower and industry, 5 to 10 years to develop a strategic 
air force, 15 to 20 years to construct a modern navy, [and] 10 years to refurbish military 
transport” (Leffler, 1982, p. 51) 
 Instead, U.S. foreign policy was driven by concerns over the “decline of British 
power, the economic devastation of Germany, the dollar shortage in Western Europe, and 
the threatening strength of communism in Greece, Italy, and France” (Leffler, 1982, p. 
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51). U.S. policymakers simply understood that the Soviets were down. U.S. fears and 
U.S. policy still focused on countering the possibility that “the Soviet Union might take 
advantage of such developments” in the future (Leffler, 1982, p. 51). However, for the 
time being, the primarily concerns of U.S. policymakers dealt with defending their new 
allies and countering the potential rise of indigenous threats within the less developed 
world. 
 In seeking to counter the possibility of a rising Soviet Bloc decades later, U.S. 
policy thus focused on rebuilding Western Europe and Japan. Considering their enormous 
military and economic potential, this was seen as essential to enhancing the balance of 
power advantages of the U.S. over the Soviets. U.S. planners did not wish for these 
industrial states to be controlled by any hostile power. George Kennan (1946), considered 
the primary architect of Soviet containment policy, underscored the importance of 
rebuilding and controlling the industrial centers of the world. Kennan (1946) believed 
that harsh economic sanctions against former US enemies would result in Soviet-friendly 
communist parties coming to power and so he pushed for policies that would result in 
large-scale economic development in Western Europe and Japan (p. 4, para. 3). After all, 
he stated that “gauged against Western world as a whole, [the] Soviets are still by far the 
weaker force…..their success will really depend on the degree of cohesion, firmness, and 
vigor which Western world can muster” (Kennan, 1947, Section: “Practical Deductions 
From Standpoint of US Policy”, para. 3) 
 To finance the development of Japan and its European allies, however, the U.S. 
had to ensure stable access to cheap raw materials in the less developed world. In his 
analysis of U.S. archives Leffler (1992) points out “resisting communist or anti-Western 
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forces in the Third World” was crucial “since the prosperity and stability of these areas 
was seen as being dependent on their [Western Europe and Japan] having free access to 
the raw materials and markets of the Middle East and Southeast Asia” (p. 51) After all, 
Western Europe's development historically came at the expense of the periphery as 
“superior militaries and state organizations allowed the Europeans to turn the conditions 
for international trade heavily in its favor” (O’Brien, 1982, p. 2). Ensuring continued 
European access to markets in the less developed world following WWII was also 
essential for the development of U.S. manufacturing, since Europe would then be able to 
increase imports of highly valued American products.  
 Indeed, controlling the less developed world was also considered immensely 
important for U.S. corporations and U.S. strategic interests. For instance World War I 
witnessed the U.S. becoming the largest importer of strategic raw materials during World 
War I (Dunn, 1987, p. 106). So expansive was the reach of U.S. power that by 1929, 
“U.S. imports of non-fuel minerals were greater than the rest of the world combined” 
(Dunn, 1987, p. 107).  
The post-WWII era, however, witnessed the rise of significant revolutionary 
turmoil throughout the areas of the less developed world, especially in areas that were 
previously under Western European control.  Starting in Greece and continuing into such 
former European colonies as Vietnam (France's major colonial dollar earner), Indonesia 
(Netherlands's major dollar earner, and Malaysia (Britain's most profitable colony), it was 
obvious that nationalist revolutions in the Third World were beginning to threaten the 
Western “liberal” economic order. Consequently, the U.S., as the new leader of the 
Western Bloc, and Western Europe began to work together to quash third world revolts.  
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In fact, it was so important to protect the interests of Western Europe that U.S. 
commercial interests in Africa often took a backseat to defending the interests of the 
Western Alliance (Nwaubani, 2001, p. 4). Aiding its allies explains why the U.S. quickly 
came to the Western Alliance’s aid in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Using 
documents from the Truman and Eisenhower administration, Nwaubani (2001) argues 
that U.S. policymakers were most concerned with ensuring continued access to raw 
materials for Britain and France (p. 4).  
Working with Europe to Encircle the Soviets Militarily 
In its foresight of possible Soviet meddling in the less developed world in the 
future, the early 1950’s witnessed the U.S. push for permanent strategic and military 
superiority during the onset of the Cold War. With the help of its Western Allies, the U.S. 
worked to create an overseas supply of military bases that practically encircled the 
U.S.S.R. following WWII. To do this the U.S. negotiated with the British attain access to 
military bases and air facilities in the Middle East. Deals with the Germans, French (for 
North Africa), Turks, and Japanese vastly expanded the reach of U.S. military power.  
Using Foreign Aid to Control the Third World and Contain the Soviets 
Countering Soviet expansionism and controlling the less developed world also 
consisted of large allocations of military and economic aid to allies in the Third World. 
There is significant evidence that U.S. aid flows (not even including the rest of the G7) 
and assistance to pro-U.S. regimes vastly exceeded the Soviet Union’s foreign aid 
allocations. Total U.S. economic and military aid to the Third World from 1945 to 1980 
amounted to about $200 billion (Trofimenko, 1981, p. 2). On the other hand, a 
comparable study by Gu Guan Fu finds that the Soviets provided about $65 billion worth 
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of economic and military aid within the same time period (p.74), of which only $30 
billion of which were allocated between 1945 and 1975 (Fu, 1983, p. 74). This points to a 
significant disparity in strategic foreign aid in favor of the U.S. However, these “figures 
[alone] do not express the full extent of U.S. infiltration into developing countries, 
countless less conspicuous instruments of influence, from banking credits and managerial 
assistance all the way to aid in infrastructure development” (Trofimenko, 1981 p. 2). 
Section Conclusion 
 Overall, superior military positioning and strategic influence (both economic and 
military) is why Third World conflict during the early Cold War was largely confined to 
regions near the U.S.S.R. or China. U.S. military dominance with respect to air power, 
naval power, transportation of troops/equipment, artillery, and tanks meant the U.S. was 
the dominant conventional weapons state (Halliday, 1996, p. 20). The lack of comparable 
military power (mostly conventional) on the Soviet side was very much an “important 
geopolitical restraint that allowed the Western powers to remain dominant in the Third 
World during the 1950's and 1960's (Allison et al, 1990, p. 2).” These facts, combined 
with a significant disparity in foreign aid assistance in favor of the U.S., meant the 
Soviets really had no hope of expanding their influence in the Third World.  
The Tide Turns? 
 However, U.S. defense officials and U.S. hawks argued that Soviet strategic and 
conventional military force had significantly improved by the 1970’s, ushering in a 
completely different Cold War picture. Wayne Shroeder (1979) argues that the trend 
towards increased Soviet defense expenditures began in the mid-1960s (para. 9). He 
suggests that following the “Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets changed the economic 
58 
 
emphasis of their Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965) to reflect increased defense investment 
(particularly in the strategic area) as the means by which to bolster Soviet military power 
and political influence (para. 6).” Kim Holmes (1986) also painted a stark picture for the 
American public (para.1). He insisted that Soviet upgrades to their conventional navy and 
air force placed vital American interests in the less developed world in serious danger 
(Holmes, 1986, para. 1). In addition, U.S. defense officials pointed out that the Soviet 
Bloc was now superior to NATO in surface combat ships (230, v. 175), attack 
submarines (234, v. 78), tanks (20,500, v. 7,000), artillery (10,000, v. 2,700) and fixed-
wing warplanes (3,525, v. 2,050) (Time, 1978, para. 6).  
The Effects of Détente 
       However, the Soviet economy paid a heavy economic price pursuing mutually 
assured destruction (MAD) and increasing its ability to project force. For instance, Soviet 
leader Nikolai Khrushchev argued that the arms race (and a bloated military budget) had 
begun to cripple the Soviet economy leading to lower growth rates and economic 
stagnation (Ned, 1994, p. 373). Seeking to “attract credits, investments, and technology 
from the West” Khrushchev (just as Gorbachev later on) attempted to “implement 
domestic reforms and seek accommodation with the West” (Ned, 1994, p. 373). Thus, 
Soviet leaders pushed for Détente. They calculated that less military spending, as well as 
more trade with the West, would be in the long-term interests of the Soviet Union.  
 Policymakers in the U.S. also came to the conclusion that a relaxation of tensions 
(Détente), promoted through economic trade agreements and the signing of the SALT I 
nuclear delivery systems treaty, would serve to improve the U.S.’s economic balance 
sheet.  Just like the Soviet economy, the U.S. economy was also beginning to slump. The 
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Vietnam War and rising economic competition with Europe and Japan was beginning to 
chip away at the economic power and leadership of the U.S.  
 The U.S. camp also came away from Detente believing the negotiations had 
frozen the territorial balance of power. Allison and Williams (1990) point out that for the 
U.S., Détente amounted to a new code of conduct in which the U.S.S.R. would cede the 
Third World to Western influence (p. 3). Thus was the viewpoint of U.S. National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. He firmly believed “the superpowers [had] committed 
themselves to exercise restraint [in the less developed world]” and that “in our minds, 
efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear war by the control of arms had to be linked to an 
end of the constant Soviet pressure against the balance of power (Allison et al, 1990, p. 
3).” 
       In contrast, many within the Soviet camp grasped Détente as a victory. While 
acknowledging that the signing of Détente did limit the continuous development of 
Soviet nuclear weapons, the U.S.S.R. did not view Détente as an agreement that limited 
their support for national liberation movements (Trofimenko, 1981, para. 4). When these 
movements benefited their strategic interests, the Soviets believed it was within their 
right to expand their sphere of influence. So long as their proxy intervention would not 
lead into a potential nuclear showdown, Soviet leaders believed they had every right to  
seek influence in the less developed world (Trofimenko, 1981, para. 6). In essence, the 
Soviets felt that along with the nuclear parity the U.S. ceded, the U.S. also ceded its 
dominance of the Third World.  
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Soviet Gains during Détente? 
 Many U.S. officials and balance of threat realists believe the carrots of 
accommodation and trade, enshrined within Détente, failed to block a significant increase 
of Soviet “meddling” in the less developed world. In their view, Soviet assistance 
towards Nicaragua, Angola, Vietnam, and other revolutionary movements/regimes led to 
significant Soviet gains in the less developed world during Détente. Regardless of the 
past power imbalance that significantly favored the U.S./West, balance of threat realists 
argue that a decline in U.S. hegemony in the 1970’s, revolutionary turmoil in the less 
developed world, and increased Soviet military power during the late 1960’s created the 
conditions necessary for a shift in the balance of power. The new environment invited the 
Soviets into the West’s sphere of influence.  
 In contrast to these claims, this chapter will chronicle that the Soviet Bloc barely 
improved its balance of power standing in the less developed world during the Détente 
time period. Partial gains in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Nicaragua seemed to have 
been offset by losses elsewhere in the Third World. Soviet defeats in Egypt, Peru, and 
Chile and the Sino-Soviet split were significant blows to Soviet interests in the less 
developed world. 
Soviet Involvement and the Competition for Allies in the Third World  
Section Introduction 
       The current section now aims to provide a historical account of the strategic 
competition between the U.S. (as the leader of the Western alliance) and the Soviet Bloc 
in the less developed world that took place during Détente, which according to U.S. 
policymakers, shifted the global balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. My main 
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goal is to examine whether or not the Soviets made vital strategic gains in the less 
developed world during Détente.  
 Of course, some regions had more implications for the breakdown of Détente than 
others, as they were more central to considerations of a definitive shift in power 
distribution between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Middle East/Northern quadrants of 
Africa, with vast amounts of strategic energy resources and the Buffer Zone, with its 
respective proximities to important interests of both superpowers were certainly much 
more important (especially to the U.S.) during the 1970's than either Southeast Asia or 
Southern Africa.  
Methodology 
       In defining Soviet gains and defeats in the less developed world between 1972 
and the collapse of Détente around 1979-1980 (vast increases in U.S. military spending, 
heightened counter-revolutionary activity, and breakdown of SALT II negotiations) I will 
use several definitions (slightly altered) developed by Ted Hopf (1992). A Soviet gain 
will come to refer to a victory that involves the “ascension to power by some group 
committed to Soviet positions on fundamental questions of foreign policy and domestic 
policies… or the removal of some group committed to policies consistent with U.S. or 
Western policy preferences” followed by a close Soviet alliance (Hopf, 1992, p. 22).  
       On the other hand, Soviet losses will include cases in which a “pro-Soviet regime 
was removed from power… or the removal of some group committed to policies 
consistent with Soviet policy preferences” (Hopf, 1992, p. 22) followed by a close U.S. 
or Western alliance. Considering Chapter three will go much deeper in measuring Soviet 
aggressiveness (measuring significant foreign aid, especially military), I will now simply 
62 
 
provide a historical analysis of U.S.-Soviet Third World competition and trace 
gains/losses of the U.S.S.R. 
Asia 
Section Introduction 
 To understand U.S.-Soviet (Western-Soviet Bloc) competition in the less 
developed world during Détente period, I will begin in Southeast Asia with Vietnam. I 
begin here because there is some evidence that the U.S., through the signing of Détente, 
was hopeful that a new age of Soviet restraint would ensue in Southeast Asia. Others, 
such as John Lewis Gaddis (2004) also interpreted U.S. actions as accommodating to the 
U.S.S.R.'s improved power position (p. 264).  
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia 
 Those who believed the U.S.S.R. would link Détente with an end to its 
involvement in the region were clearly wrong. Regardless of the negotiated settlement of 
1973, ending U.S. involvement in the conflict, the Soviet Union's pursuit into Southeast 
Asia did continue. According to the U.S. Library of Congress, the Soviets stepped up 
their military assistance and provided over $800 in military assistance to Vietnam in 1978 
(1987, para. 4). This was considered very alarming due to the fact that U.S. military aid 
to Southeast Asia had significantly decreased. 
 The Soviets, working together with Vietnam, also allocated military resources to 
the revolutionary forces in Laos and Cambodia during the late 1970’s. Such assistance 
was crucial as it helped the revolutionary forces in Cambodia (partial victory as 
Vietnamese-backed rebels only took over the urban areas) and Laos overthrow their 
oppressive Chinese and U.S. backed authoritarian governments. Overall, this maneuver 
63 
 
did result in additional Soviet gains. The Soviets gained access to Haiphong harbor, Da 
Nang airfield, and Cam Ranh Bay. These ports and airfields, located in Cambodia and 
Laos, were very strategic for the U.S.S.R. It gave them crucial access to the Indian 
Ocean. 
 Consequently, the U.S./West blasted the Soviets for acting in an aggressive 
manner. By acquiring strategic bases in Southeast Asia, U.S. policymakers and U.S. 
hawks argued that these  
 developments have put Soviet bombers within two hours of the Straights of 
 Malacca, used by the bulk of the shipping in the region and through which 
 most of Japan’s oil passes from the Middle East. Soviet ships and planes now 
 could also easily monitor movement at the American naval bases in the 
 Philippines, the South China coast, and the Straits of Malacca. (Keleman, 1984, 
 p. 342) 
 
Nevertheless, Soviet improvements in the combat effectiveness of the Soviet Pacific 
fleet, through the acquisition of strategic bases, still left the “U.S.S.R. as marginally 
inferior to the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which had a more complete network of bases in the 
area” (Keleman, 1984, p. 341). 
The China Split 
 Soviet bases in Southeast Asia would not have been acquired without the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Upon further review, however, it is important 
to recognize the role of China and the U.S. in creating this opportunity in the first place. 
Although Vietnam already possessed some influence in the states of Cambodia and Laos 
during the late 1970’s, it can be argued that Chinese destabilization campaigns (fearing 
increasing Soviet power in Asia) against Vietnam, through the use of its Cambodian and 
Laotian proxies, pushed the Vietnamese to invade. John Pilger (1997) makes this very 
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point (p. 47). He contends that by economically and militarily supporting Pol Pot’s 
massacres (against ethnic Vietnamese) and incursions into Vietnamese territory, China 
and the U.S. gave Vietnam (especially) and the Soviet Union the pretext to move into 
Cambodia in 1978 (Pilger, 1997, p. 47).  
 The consequences of the Sino-Soviet split reverberated beyond Southeast Asia. 
Soviet power was now checked throughout the rest of Asia. The communist dominoes 
were not going to continue to fall. Any further Soviet incursions in the region would have 
instigated a large-scale Chinese and American response. Both U.S. officials (hence 
Nixon’s 1972 China visit) and Soviet leaders recognized that Beijing no longer wished to 
subjugate itself to Moscow. 
ASEAN 
 Another reason as to why the dominoes were not going to continue to fall is 
because of the rise of ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The 
ascendance of ASEAN, which included the states of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Philippines, and Singapore) ultimately helped curtail any further Soviet and Vietnamese 
gains in Southeast Asia. For instance, “the ASEAN states worked together to come to the 
aid of Thailand (internal problems and facing a political threat from Vietnam)” (Kurus, 
1993, p. 822). The ASEAN states were also effectively able to use the UN Security 
Council to isolate Vietnam internationally as the majority of the world (91-21) called 
upon Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia (Kurus, 1993, p. 822).  
 While many suggest that severance of the West’s economic linkages with Laos 
and Vietnam was a major blow for the Western Bloc, it is very important to recognize 
that the rise of ASEAN during the final years of Détente was extremely beneficial for the 
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West. Donald Weatherbee (1978) cites how “the ASEAN export economies had been 
integrated [during the final years of Détente] into the international trading framework of 
the industrial economies of the Western world with 61% of ASEAN’s exports going to 
the U.S., Japan, and Europe” during the latter years of Détente (p. 415). Western imports 
also accounted for just over half of all imports to the ASEAN countries as well. In 
addition, Weatherbee (1978) points out that U.S. economic assistance to ASEAN 
between 1974 and 1978 amounted to 1150 millions of dollars (p. 415). France, the UK, 
Italy, and West Germany also provided significant support (Weatherbee, 1978, p. 416). 
Ultimately, Weatherbee’s data suggests that Europe (and the US) discovered another 
outlet in which to obtain the raw materials they desperately desired.  
 The economic policies chosen by ASEAN elites had strong support in Western 
and Chinese circles. They believed the policies helped contain the Soviet-Vietnamese 
threat. Indeed, Acharya Amitav (1991) points out that Western and ASEAN political 
elites both talked about how rapid economic development in the region would help 
counter the emerging domestic and international communist threats (p. 161).  
 The West did not just provide economic assistance. In addition, the economic aid 
was very significant as it helped the ASEAN nations overcome the internal threat of 
communism. However, the West also backed up their economic aid with “security” 
guarantees and moderate lines of military credit (Weatherbee, 1978, p. 414).   
Section Conclusion 
 As I analyze the balance of power before and after Détente, I find it difficult to 
say the U.S.S.R. made significant gains in Asia. The consolidation of Vietnam into one 
country, the invasion of Laos, and the partial takeover of Cambodia certainly provided 
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important strategic, economic, and military gains for the Soviet Bloc. We can quantify 
this as at least two gains for the Soviets. However, one must also understand how Soviet 
gains and revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia rallied China against the Soviets in 
Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split certainly helped, in the eyes of the West (the U.S. 
archives will show this) to offset the Soviet gains of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 
Having China as a nemesis throughout the entire Asian continent, whereas it was 
previously confined to Central Asia, was a huge blow to the Soviets. Soviet revolutionary 
gains also served to rally the nearby states (pro-Western orientation) to Vietnam to form 
an economic bloc in the form of ASEAN.   
 Moreover, as it relates to the balance of power, it is important to mention that the 
additional strategic ports gained by the Soviet Bloc were simply not enough to counter 
the “complete” network of bases devised by the U.S (Owen et al, 2005, p. 13). Strategic 
naval bases for the U.S. in Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore 
were far more strategic and technologically advanced than those gained by the U.S.S.R 
(Owen et al, p. 13). Therefore, it is hard to suggest that the Soviets had made significant 
gains in Asia during Détente.  
Middle East 
Section Introduction 
       No other region in the less developed world was more important for the Western 
Bloc during Détente than the Middle East/Northern quadrant of Africa region. The 
Middle East possessed (and still possesses) oil and natural resources that are extremely 
vital for the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. Thus, the strategic zones of the Persian 
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Gulf, Suez Canal, and all of the shipping lanes throughout the Horn of Africa had to be 
military defended against any internal and external enemies. 
       A snapshot of the competition between the West and the Soviet Bloc in the 
Middle East in 1972 reveals a region with strong Western influence. With a firm military 
ally in Israel and a variety of pro-Western Arab governments, the West certainly had the 
upper hand in the Middle East as the superpowers reached Détente. While the Soviet 
Bloc provided little military aid towards the most strategic countries of the region, 
Western Europe and Japan provided a total of 1.1 billion of military aid to Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Jordan between 1967 and 1976 (USDA, 1967-
1976, p. 68).   
Soviet and Western Bloc Competition in the Middle East 
 The late 1960’s/early 1970’s witnessed an increased effort on the part of the 
Soviets to gain more leverage in the Middle East. With their nationalist postures, Egypt 
and Syria became the primary vehicles through which the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw 
countries could pursue these interests in the Middle East. Anti-Zionism in the region also 
provided a perfect opportunity for the Soviet Bloc to move in to the Arab world. 
       As far as the Soviets were concerned, their actions were defensive. Soviet leaders 
believed they were responding to the previous aggressive actions on the part of the West. 
For starters, the Soviets “regarded the Baghdad Pact (U.S. Buffer Zone Alliance with 
Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey during the 1950’s and 1960’s) as a direct threat to its security 
(Slater, 1990, p. 565). They also believed the U.S. had managed to create a very powerful 
bloc of American-backed Arab regimes within striking distance of the U.S.S.R.'s 
southern flank Finally, Soviet leaders were also very much concerned over the recent 
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“deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers and (nuclear-armed) submarines in the 
Mediterranean” (Slater, 1990, p. 565). As a result, the Soviet Bloc “leapfrogged over 
Dulles's northern tier straight into Egypt, the Middle East's southern rear and front gate to 
Africa”  (Slater, 1990, 568). 
 Policymakers in the U.S. did not interpret increases in Soviet military sales to the 
Middle East and alliances with Egypt and Syria as a defensive move. They viewed them 
as expansionist. The U.S. believed that the goals of the U.S.S.R. were to replace Western 
influence in the region with Moscow's, threaten vital sea routes, outflank NATO, and 
gain a stranglehold on Middle Eastern oil, all while “using the Arab-Israeli conflict” as its 
pre-eminent weapon (Slater, 1990, p. 568).  
 Instead of re-arming the Egyptian and Syrian armies following the 1967 war 
against Israel, however, the Soviet Bloc did not provide the offensive weapons that Egypt 
and Syria were clamoring for (Slater, 1990, p, 572). Soviet leaders felt that peace and 
negotiations though the Rogers Peace Plan was the best way forward in their effort to 
become an “equal in the region.” Rather than another proxy war in the Middle East, 
which could have resulted in a direct confrontation with the U.S., Soviet leaders figured 
that a “political settlement that would recognize, preserve, and legitimize their ongoing 
presence and role in the Middle East” (Slater, 1990, p. 572) would be the best choice.  
 Egyptian and Syrian leaders were confused and did not understand why the 
Soviets did not wish to provide to them the offensive weapons they desired. However, 
realizing that they operated from a position of weakness, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat 
declared (following the advice of the U.S.S.R. and UN intermediary Gunnar Jarring), that 
if Israel committed itself to the “withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza 
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Strip” as well as the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242, Egypt 
would then “be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel” (Israeli Ministry, 
Section: “Israeli Response”, para. 8). However, Israel responded that it would not 
withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. Israeli leaders, operating from a position of 
strength, were ultimately “unresponsive to Egyptian overtures” peace (Burr, 2003, para. 
8).  
 Israel’s refusal to engage in serious negotiations with Egypt and Syria combined 
with the U.S.S.R.’s refusal to provide offensive military equipment, ultimately forced 
Egypt and Syria to attack Israel in October of 1973. The Soviets had gone as far as 
leaking Egyptians plans to invade Israel in 1972. Of course, such Soviet actions 
completely infuriated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who went ahead and expelled 
20,000 Soviet personnel from Egypt. Sadat and the Egyptian Arabs then develop a new 
strategy. They surmised that the only way that the Israelis would even negotiate and give 
them back the Sinai Peninsula was by going to war and provoking the Israelis (really the 
U.S.) to come to the bargaining table (Jordan, M, 1997, Section: “Background”, para. 2).  
 Though Egypt and Syria did witness some early victories, the tide eventually 
turned in the favor of Israel. Israel and the U.S. eventually offer, confirming the strategy 
of Anwar Sadat, the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in return for peace. In turn, Egypt 
recognizes the state of Israel and joins the Western orbit and becomes the 2nd largest 
recipient of U.S. military aid (Wall, 2003, para. 10). Overall, unlike the Soviets in regard 
to their allies in the region, the U.S./West did not pressure Israel to engage in diplomacy. 
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The Horn of Africa 
 While losing ground in the Middle East, the Soviet Bloc shifted their focus to 
other opportunities to weaken U.S. interests in this strategic region, such as in the Horn of 
Africa. The Horn of Africa was considered very strategic as this was the area in which 
Western oil tankers traversed. The states in this region (such as Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Sudan), that flanked the oil-rich states of Arabia, the Bab el Mandeb Straits, the Gulf of 
Aden, and the Indian Ocean, became the strategic targets of the Soviet Bloc.  
 To the benefit of the U.S.S.R., the correlation of forces in the Horn of Africa 
began to change during the late 1960's. Tired of U.S. favoritism towards Ethiopia, 
illustrated by the U.S. provision of over $200 million in military and economic aid to 
Ethiopia between 1953 and 1974, the new revolutionary military leadership in Somalia 
sought to extract the economic value of their strategic location (Schwab, 1978, p. 12). 
Thus, Somalia allied themselves with the U.S.S.R. in the early 1970’s and, in exchange 
for $250 million, the Soviets were provided with port facilities in Berbera overlooking 
the Red Sea, an air base in Harghessa, and several Naval support communication 
networks (Schwab, 1978, p. 12). Soviet assistance to the port of Berbera helped improve 
the capacity for “missile storage for the Soviet navy, an airfield with large runways that 
were capable of handling large bombers, and extensive communication facilities 
(Schwab, 1978, p. 17). Other attempts to bolster the Somalis in 1974 included jet fighters, 
tanks, a missile defense system, and Cuban military advisers.  
       Another pro-socialist military coup occurred in nearby Ethiopia in 1974. The new 
revolutionary regime banned the monarchy, eschewed U.S. imperialism, and turned into a 
Marxist-Leninist party resulting in a major cut of U.S. military and economic assistance. 
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Ironically enough, it was Soviet military aid to Somalia that helped create the instability 
that led to the coup in the first place (Schwab, 1978, p. 18).  
       Seeking to enhance its power in the region during Détente, believing it could 
mediate between its two new leftist allies (Somali and Ethiopia), the U.S.S.R. stepped in 
to fill the “military vacuum by providing over $385 in arms, including MIG Jet fighters, 
T-54 and 55 tanks, and anti-aircraft missiles” to the besieged Ethiopian regime (Schwab, 
1978, p. 17). Thus, at first glance it seems as if the Soviets were about to capture two key 
states in the strategic Horn of Africa. 
       Failing to understand that aid towards Ethiopia could upset the local balance of 
power, the Soviet gamble backfired badly. Soviet foreign aid towards Ethiopia ended up 
tilting the correlation of forces in the area towards the Ethiopians. Thanks to large 
amounts of Soviet support, as well as over 20,000 Cuban troops, the Ethiopians were able 
to regain the highly strategic Ogaden province (Zunes, 2002, para. 3) from the Somalis. 
Nevertheless, Soviet assistance towards Ethiopia forever alienated the Somalis (Zunes, 
2002, para. 3).  
 The souring of relations between Somalia and the Soviet Bloc opened the way for 
the U.S. to exploit events to its liking. Between “the late 1970's until just before Siad 
Biarre's overthrow in early 1991, the U.S. sent hundreds of millions of dollars of arms to 
Somalia in return for the use of military facilities which (ironically enough) had been 
originally constructed for the Soviets” (Zunes, 2002,para. 5). Thus, rather than expanding 
its influence in the Horn of Africa, Soviet military aid during Détente towards the 
Ethiopians only caused a shift in alliances. While they may have gained a stronger ally in 
the region, their investments in Somalia ended up in the hands of the U.S/West 
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Section Conclusion 
       Scanning the Middle East and Horn of Africa it is evident the U.S./West 
improved its balance of power position. While successful in improving its overall 
position in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia was much more strategic than Somalia) the 
Soviet Bloc loses Egypt to the West during the Détente time period. U.S. policymakers, 
such as Brzezinski, who claim that one of the main reasons for Détente’s collapse was 
Soviet aggression in the Ogaden region, ultimately neglects to address U.S. and Israeli 
maneuvers in regards to Egypt (Zunes, 2002, para. 4). Egypt was, after all, the U.S.S.R.’s 
most strategic ally in the region.  
 However, to better study whether the Soviets were aggressive or defensive in the 
Middle East I will examine the aid allocations of the Soviet Bloc in comparison with 
those of the West during the Détente time period. It is not just about scanning to see 
which superpower made new alliances. It is also about analyzing which superpower, if 
any, sought to change the balance of power.  
Southern Africa 
Section Introduction 
       My next examination concerns sub-Saharan Africa. According to U.S. 
policymakers, the Soviet Bloc, thanks to extensive Cuban support for the MLPA (Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in Angola, was aggressive in this region. They 
argued that the Soviets were strategically after countries with ports so as to deny the West 
important shipping routes.  
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U.S. and Soviet Competition in Angola 
 The U.S.-Soviet competition in Angola began following the collapse of 
Portuguese hegemony in the region. Initially, three different groups- the tribal based 
FNLA (The National Liberation Front of Angola), the Maoist UNITA (The National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola), and Soviet-backed MPLA were 
responsible for the revolutionary victory against the Portuguese in 1974. What exactly 
occurred next is subject to historical interpretation and analysis.  
 Hawks in the U.S., such as those found within the Heritage Foundation, pointed 
out that the Alvor Agreement, which called for elections and a coalitional government, 
collapsed due to the fact that the “MPLA imported 13,000 Cuban troops and Soviet 
advisors and ousted the other two movements” (Pascoe, 1985, para 8.). Seeking to control 
strategic ports as well as the vast oil and mineral resources of Luanda in Angola, the 
MPLA and the U.S.S.R. pushed against reconciliation. According to the Heritage 
Foundation, policymakers in the U.S. believed that the U.S. had no choice but to protect 
against future Soviet gains in the area (Pascoe, 1985, para. 11.). The arming of UNITA 
(through Zaire), support of South Africa, and coordination with China were meant to 
curtail continued Soviet aggression in the region.   
 Critics of U.S. foreign policy argue that the coalitional settlement known as the 
Alvor Agreement collapsed due to U.S. insistence that the Marxist/Soviet-backed MPLA 
should not be a part of the new government (Hormenku, 2006, para. 11). Most 
importantly, U.S. critics contend that the Ford administration provided covert aid towards 
UNITA and the FNLA long before Cuban troops landed. Operation IA provided $6 
million towards these groups on July 18th, 1975 $8 million was allocated several days 
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later with an additional $25 million send out in August (Andrew, 1995, p. 412). These 
critics also argue that U.S. policy should not have been any surprise considering “U.S. 
exports (construction and mining equipment) to Angola soared from $54 million in 1969 
to $166 million in 1973, a 245% increase (Hormenku, 2006, para. 8) U.S. businesses 
simply wanted the most business friendly groups at the policymaking table.  
       Critics also cite that the US, with the help of China, “coordinated and furnished a 
joint South African, Zaire, FNLA and UNITA offensive against the MPLA. Such U.S. 
actions simply emboldened the anti-MPLA opposition (Hormenku, 2006, para. 11). South 
Africa (attacking from the south) and Zaire (attacking from the North) also became 
conduits by which the U.S., France, and the UK supplied funds, arms, and troops toward 
their FNLA [and UNITA] patrons” (Minter, 1994, p. 20). Indeed, Western European 
countries, the proverbial U.S. allies in the Cold War, provided about $140 million to 
Zaire and about $240 million to South Africa during the 1976-1980 time period (USDA, 
1980, p. 131). 
 Regardless of who initiated the aggression, which I more thoroughly evaluate in 
the forthcoming quantitative and archival chapters, it is obvious the Soviets picked up a 
state with Angola in 1975. Though civil war raged on past 1976, Soviet Bloc and Cuban 
assistance came a long way towards helping the MPLA gain control over the most 
strategic parts of Angola. The U.S.S.R. was now in a position to expand its naval power 
and influence in a region where it traditionally had very little.  
Mozambique 
 Another revolutionary struggle that resulted in a diplomatic gain for the Soviets in 
this region occurred in Mozambique. Years of harsh Portuguese and South African 
75 
 
economic exploitation led to a Marxist-inspired coup in 1974. Believing the U.S. and 
Western Europe were hostile to their revolution, the Marxists leaders in Mozambique 
pushed for an alliance with the U.S.S.R.   
Section Conclusion 
 Are these Soviet diplomatic gains enough to suggest the Soviet Bloc was able to 
alter the balance of power in the region? U.S. and Western claims of a considerable shift 
in the balance of power could be exaggerated considering how the U.S. and the West had 
already developed a large network of alliance partners in the region in the years prior to 
Detente. All together, the West had managed to secure 17 highly strategic military bases 
and 10 naval dockyards throughout the continent (Coker, 1982, p. 319). 
 The Soviets, on the other hand, didn’t have much luck penetrating the continent 
before the 1970’s. Despite some considerable investment in Ghana, the Soviets were 
thrown out in 1966 by a Western-backed group (Bissell, 1978, p. 89). With the Western 
Alliance states of Italy, France, Belgium, German, and the U.S. holding ground in the 
continent, only the total collapse of Portuguese control over Angola and Mozambique 
offered the U.S.S.R. any real hope of penetrating sub-Saharan Africa.  
 However, to really understand the conflicts in Southern Africa during the 1970’s I 
will study the strategic allocations (as well as timing) of the Soviet Bloc towards the most 
strategic countries in Africa. Examining strategic allocations in this manner will allow me 
to ascertain a better picture as to whether or not the Soviets were seeking to make gains 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Latin America 
Section Introduction 
       For many years the Soviet Union kept a hands-off approach when it came to Latin 
America. Once described as geographical fatalism, the Soviets calculated that the U.S. 
strategic rear fell under the “unchallengeable influence of the U.S.” (Nogee et al, 1979, 
341) After all, the 1954 invasion to depose democratically elected nationalist Juan 
Arbenz in Guatemala served to highlight the futility of nationalist/anti-imperialist 
struggles in Latin America. Deeply embedded economic linkages and a proximate 
military network of bases, and ports gave Washington a strong hand in Latin America.  
       After all, Latin America was the U.S.’s strategic rear and the region provided the 
U.S. a considerable amount of strategic raw materials. Investments by U.S. corporations 
were considerable in Latin America. For instance, by the start of the 1960’s “ U.S. 
investment in Latin America had already reached about $6 billion, compared with direct 
private investments outside the western hemisphere of only $4.6 billion (Immerman, 
1981, p. 291). Figures for this same period show that about “35 percent of United States 
imports (valued at approximately $2.9 billion) came from Latin America” (Immerman, 
1981, p. 291) Thus, U.S. planners were keen on protecting American interests in Latin 
America. 
 Geographical fatalism on the part of the Soviets, however, had all but faded by the 
early 1970's. James Cochrane (1989) argues Cuba’s survival and a larger array of 
communist parties throughout the region all but shifted the potential for Soviet Bloc gains 
in Latin America (p. 213). Moreover, severe social discontent in Latin America 
(especially Central America) against the economic policies imposed by the Colossus to 
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the North posed significant problems for the U.S. and provided an opening for the 
Soviets.  
The Soviets Lose Chile 
       Increased Soviet Bloc penetration of Latin America, which began with Cuba in 
1959, expanded to Chile in 1970, several years before Détente's implementation. Unlike 
others on the left, the socialists in Chile decided they could take power through 
democratic elections. Developing a political platform that blamed Chile's “poverty and 
inflation on its intimate economic ties with the U.S,” the Socialists led by Salvador 
Allende were able to take the Presidency, many local councils, and gained considerable 
ground in Congress by 1970 (Nogee, 1979, p. 339).  
 Allende’s victory immediately brought Soviet support. From 1971-1973 it is 
estimated that the Soviet Bloc funneled in $363 million of worth of aid (Nogee, 1979, p. 
354). Additional credits for Soviet Bloc machinery and assistance for the construction of 
a basic oils plant, housing, and chemical plants sealed Moscow’s ties to Chile (Nogee, 
1979, p. 354). Though Chile eventually rises to become the U.S.S.R.’s number two Latin 
American client in economic aid expenditures, Soviet policymakers and scholars pointed 
out that they would not subsidize the Chilean economy in the same manner that they had 
done for Cuba. The Soviets fully expected new allies to mostly stand on their own two 
feet (Nogee, 1979, p. 355). 
 Planners in the U.S., however, could not stomach increased Soviet influence in 
Latin America. The CIA engaged in funneling money to civilian sectors (destabilization 
campaign) that would help undertake a 1973 coup against the Soviet-backed Allende 
government. For instance, covert aid was sent to an opposition research organization, 
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which provided “a steady flow of economic and technical support to opposition parties 
and private sector groups” (Petras et al, 1978, p. 216). The CIA also “funded various 
political organizations that acted as conduits for funneling money to [copper] strikers,” 
strikers that cost the Chilean economy over $80 million in 1973 (Petras et al, 1978, p. 
216). The CIA also worked to “foster coup plotters within the Chilean military through 
deception operations (Kornbluh, 2000, Section: “A Critique”, bullet 3). Overall, 
documents within the National Security Archive (Project FUBELT) contend that the CIA, 
if not directly responsible for the coup, undertook operations (collecting coup-arrest lists, 
pointing out key government installations which needed to be taken over, and prepared 
propaganda operations) to promote a coup while [economically] undermining Allende's 
government (Kornbluh, 2000, Section: “A Critique”, bullet 4). 
       Even before Allende had taken power in 1970, the CIA tried to prevent his 
coming to power in the elections of 1958 and 1964 (Nogee, 1979, p. 346). A U.S. Senate 
Report entitled “Alleged Assassination Plots Against Foreign Leaders” also shows that 
the U.S. used bribery and propaganda techniques during the 1960’s as it sought to prevent 
the coming to power of Salvador Allende (Kornbluh, 2000, Section: “A Critique”, bullet 
1). With over $1.7 billion in U.S. investments and strategic interests at play, Nixon and 
Kissinger issued National Security Memorandum 93 upon Chile’s alliance with the 
U.S.S.R. Bent on a strategy of “making the Chilean economy scream,” the U.S. slashed 
aid from AID, the Export-Import Bank, World Bank, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Petras et al, 1978, p. 216). The U.S. also pressured private banks to 
reduce their short-term credits, which seriously affected Chile's capacity to import 
adequate quantities of essential goods for the day-to-day operation of the system (Petras 
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et al, 1978, p. 216). Other policies of economic warfare included the reduction of 
commercial credits, from $150 to 110 million, hurting Chile's ability to buy replacement 
parts for machinery equipment necessary for its most important sectors (Petras et al, 
1978, p. 216). 
 Despite the aggressive actions on the part of the U.S., there is no evidence that the 
Soviets attempted to counter the U.S. moves in Chile. Eschewing Cuba’s call to the 
Soviets to get more aggressive in the region, Soviet leaders were under the impression 
that they could gain more influence throughout Latin American capitals if they would just 
refrain from covert and aggressive actions. Quite the contrary, it is obvious the peaceful 
approach did not work out in the case of Chile. All of the political and economic 
investments the Soviets made were lost.  
The Soviets Lose Peru 
 Prior to gaining Chile in 1970, however, the Soviet Bloc managed to expand its 
influence in the region via the gain of Peru in 1969. In fact, the Soviets benefited from 
General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s socialist-leaning coup against the U.S.-backed 
Belaunde government. The new Soviet-backed regime nationalized several U.S. holdings 
(oil, mining companies) and called for a diversification of Peru's foreign trade. In their 
strategy to acquire air routes in Latin America, sea routes, and expand trade the Soviets 
offered Peru low lines of credit, generous grace periods, technical assistance, and 
professional personnel (Berrios et al, 1991, p. 366). The U.S.S.R. and Warsaw countries 
also offered “assistance for infrastructure projects, solicited a contract on the building of 
80 ships for the navy, and provided large arms transfers and the training of army and air 
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force personnel” (Berrios et al, 1991, p. 372). On the whole, Peru actually became the 
second-largest recipient (at the time) of Soviet aid in Latin America. 
       To the chagrin of the U.S.S.R., General Francisco Morales Bermudez (citing 
economic mismanagement by the pro-Soviet leaders) of the Peruvian armed forces leads 
a coup in 1975 and begins to return the country to orthodox [pro-Western] economic 
management (U.S. Department of State, Section: “Military Rule and the Return to 
Democracy”, para. 2). Bermudez also freezes economic aid with the U.S.S.R., halts 
Soviet access to Peruvian ports, and pursues an independent foreign policy. Though the 
U.S. was not directly involved in the coup, the U.S. did pursue informal blockade and did 
refuse (along with France) to provide military aid on the previously favorable terms to the 
Soviet-backed Velasco regime (Berrios et al, 1991, p. 368). 
 Once again the Soviets lose an ally in Latin America during Détente. Once again 
it can be noted that the Soviets were cautious and non-aggressive. Just as in Chile in 
1973, the Soviets did not come to the aid of its Peruvian client in 1975. Should this have 
occurred in Eastern Europe, you can bet the U.S.S.R. would not have sat idly.  
Nicaragua 
       The most significant occurrence in the less developed world during the 1970’s (in 
U.S. eyes) was probably the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua in 1979. Many factors 
were in place to propel revolutionary struggles in the region. These included the failures 
of dependent industrialization, cheap labor strategies, no land reform, no tax reform, 
massive inequality, high unemployment rates and political repression (Jonas, 1982, p. 
125). Once coming to power, the Sandinistas promoted a mixed economy and lobbied the 
U.S. government for a $75 million economic aid package.  
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 The U.S. did not attack the Sandinistas at first. Liberal internationalists in the 
U.S., who sought bank repayments, favored a different approach and they won out over 
the military industrialists. With Carter's human rights stance being wielded against the 
U.S.S.R., the liberals figured it would be more practical to keep Nicaragua out of the 
Soviet camp by using economic leverage (aid with strings attached, preserving the role of 
the business community) rather then engaging in costly U.S. intervention.  
 Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers still blamed Cuba for helping the Sandinistas 
rise to power. According to the State Department  a series of talks with Fidel Castro and 
FSLN officials led to the unification of the FSLN, which ultimately allowed  the 
movement to become much more effective (State Department, 1985, Section: “Central 
America”, para. 5). The State Department also argued that these “unification” talks laid 
the “groundwork for an arms supply network” that began in Cuba, traversed through 
Panama (via small aircraft), and continued through Costa Rica and on towards Nicaragua 
(State Department, 1985, Section: “Central America”, para. 5). The arms supply network 
allegedly allowed Cuba to provide Nicaragua with some 1.8-million tons of arms 
between 1978 and 1979. 
  A few months after the Sandinistas achieved victory in Nicaragua, the U.S. State 
Departments also claimed that Cuba and Nicaragua began to spread their anti-American 
influence throughout Central America (State Department, 1985, Section: “Introduction”, 
para. 2). According to their sources (statements of Sandinista officials and defectors, 
Salvadoran guerrilla defectors, captured documents, physical evidence, intelligence 
observations, and other evidence), the State Department argued that the Sandinistas 
funneled military support towards El Salvadorian rebels (State Department, 1985, 
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Section: “Against its Neighbors”, para. 1-2). Military assistance towards to El Salvador 
turned them “a major military force able to mount a nationwide offensive” (State 
Department, 1985, Section: “Against its Neighbors”, para. 2). The State Department 
report also contested that the Sandinistas (with the backing of Cuba) “used Costa Rica as 
a channel for unlawful assistance to the Salvadoran rebels and have [also] supported 
terrorist actions in Costa Rica” (State Department, 1985, Section: “Against its 
Neighbors”, para. 3). 
  In response to continued “large-scale” offensive revolutionary aid by Cuba to 
buttress Nicaraguan support for rebel movements in El Salvador and Guatemala, the U.S. 
became aggressive and began to block Nicaraguan loans from the Inter-American bank, 
beefed up military aid towards Nicaragua's right-wing neighbors, and began to organize 
the counter-revolutionary groups that would eventually push for civil war in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador (Stokes, 2003, para. 8). Overall, U.S. policymakers claimed that 
negotiating with the Sandinistas was simply impossible as the “ideological” regime was 
bent on turning toward the Communist bloc. 
 Unlike the cases of Chile and Peru, in which the Soviets simply sat by, U.S. 
aggression against Nicaragua prompted the Soviets to move in and secure their alliances. 
Starting in 1981 (two years after the Sandinistas take power), the Soviet Bloc finally 
signed an extensive military aid package with Nicaragua worth $28 million, which 
increased every year from there on (Duncan, 1984, p. 167). The Soviet Bloc also 
equipped Cuba to become one of the largest and best equipped national armies in the 
region in the early 1980’s. For instance, the Soviets increased their economic and military 
aid to the Cubans from $3.6 billion to 4.9 billion in 1982 (Duncan, 1984, p. 168). Further 
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steps to secure the Nicaraguan regime included the intelligence support of several 
thousand Cuban advisors. 
 All in all, the Soviets gained Nicaragua as an ally. Though this “officially” 
occurred in the early 1980’s, and not during Détente, it is possible to suggest that Cuban 
organizational assistance laid the groundwork for the initial Sandinista victory. Many 
U.S. policymakers and analysts also believe that the Sandinista victory in 1979 already 
meant that the Soviets had made a significant gain. In their view, the Sandinistas were 
determined to shift Nicaragua’s allegiance to the Soviet Bloc. To better understand 
whether the Soviets intended to make a push for Nicaragua, I shall have to analyze the 
quantitative data and the U.S. archives.  
Grenada 
 Another gain for the U.S.S.R. and its allies occurred in the Caribbean island of 
Grenada. Pointing to U.S. dependency and unequal economic exchange, the New Jewel 
Movement (NJM) galvanized public support for a fairer economy and undertook a 
revolutionary coup in 1979. Viewing the arrival of Bishop in Grenada as a strategic 
opportunity to turn the tide against U.S. hegemony in the region, Cuba and the U.S.S.R. 
stepped in to stabilize the regime. In fact, as quickly as the regime had taken office, Cuba 
helped “destroy the old army infrastructure and instituted a new people’s army, donated 
countless fishing vessels, and helped improve the island's electrical grid” (Duncan, 1984, 
p. 169).  
 The Soviets and their Cuban allies also began to provide several million dollars in 
economic aid, loans, and manpower towards the building of an airport and a state-of-the-
art seaport. Such Soviet/Cuban actions struck fears among many in U.S. circles. A new 
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international airport/seaport expanded the range and abilities of the Soviet/Cuban air 
forces and navies within the Caribbean.  
Section Conclusion 
  Superpower competition in Latin America during the Détente period led to two 
Soviet Bloc political gains (Nicaragua, Grenada) and two Soviet Bloc defeats (Chile, 
Peru). Thus, on the surface the balance of power sheet seems to be even. However, a 
deeper look suggests that this was not the case. Chile and Peru were simply more 
economically significant for the U.S. and the Soviets than Nicaragua and Grenada. For 
instance, Chile’s GDP per capita in 1973 was $5,028 while Nicaragua’s Grenada’s GDP 
per capita in the low hundreds (NationMaster, para. 5). Chile and Peru also possessed 
more strategic raw materials than Grenada or Nicaragua. 
 Perhaps U.S. claims draw on the fact that the Soviet navy’s strategic positioning 
may have improved with the Nicaraguan and Grenadian gains? Regardless, in my attempt 
to examine why the U.S. claims the Soviet Bloc was expansionist, I will rely on 
comparing Soviet Bloc foreign aid allocations to those of the West (especially the U.S.). 
Only through measuring the strategic aid allocations, as well analyzing the U.S. archives 
in chapters four and five, can I really get to the heart of the matter. Analyzing the 
quantitative data and the U.S. archives will also give me the opportunity to determine 
whether the Soviets made a push for Nicaragua during the final years of Détente.  
The Buffer Zone 
       The final blow to Détente occurred with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. Beginning on December 27, 1979, “under cover of an ongoing Soviet military 
buildup, heavily-armed elements of a Soviet airborne brigade were airlifted into Kabul, 
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Afghanistan” in an attempt to “violently overthrow the regime of President Hafizollah 
Amin” (Phillips, 1984, para 2.) Thus, the Soviets were on the verge of pushing their 
influence to within striking range of the West’s Middle East.  
 Despite traditional Soviet influence over this part of the world, which the U.S. 
itself was comfortable with so long as Afghanistan maintained internal autonomy, the 
Soviet intervention in late 1979 brought U.S. condemnation (Gibbs, 1987, 369). 
Policymakers and hawks in the U.S. argued that the U.S. had to halt “the southern 
expansion of the Soviet Empire and prevent Moscow from establishing a land bridge to 
the Persian Gulf” in order to deter the Soviets from trying to choke the West's oil supply 
(Phillips, 1984, para. 2). They also suggested that the Soviet invasion increased its 
leverage over Iran, Pakistan, and India.  It was obvious that Western Alliance partners 
(such as France and Britain) thought so also. Their military aid towards Pakistan 
significantly increased from 41 million per year between 1967 and 1976 (415 million 
total) to 104 million per year (520 million total) between 1976 and 1980 (USDA, 1967-
1976, p. 68, and USDA, 1975-1979, page 128). 
 On the other hand, some suggest that increasing Islamic fundamentalism within 
the Soviet empire’s borders together with a newly installed hostile and anti-Soviet 
leadership in Iran meant that the Soviet Bloc was actually defensive in this part of the 
world. President Carter’s own Secretary of State Vance argued that the Soviets had 
invaded because they had “a dangerous problem” on their border (Lafeber, 2006, p. 317). 
Moreover, the history of Soviet economic aid towards Afghanistan seems to underscore 
the historical importance of Afghanistan as a Soviet sphere of influence. According to 
Quintin Bach, the Soviets actually pumped in about 5% of all their economic aid to the 
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less developed world during the Cold War into Afghanistan (Bach, 2003, Appendix VI). 
Only Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam, and India received more economic aid.  
Section Conclusion 
       Soviet intervention, however benign in its attempt to secure its own borders, did 
expand the Soviet military presence in Central Asia, thus legitimizing U.S. fears of Soviet 
penetration into the West's most vital sphere of influence (the Middle East). However, as 
I shall do with all the other regions, to better understand whether such a move was 
aggressive (as there are competing viewpoints) I shall look at historical factors, the 
timing of aid allocation, and the strategic foreign aid allocations of the Soviet Bloc to 
better determine whether the Soviets were striving to alter the balance of power.  
Conclusion 
Western Dominance Prevails  
The lack of Soviet gains in the less developed world during Détente, at a time 
when the “tide” was supposedly turning in the Soviet Bloc’s favor, suggests that I should 
take into consideration the overwhelming strategic power the U.S. possessed following 
World War II. Indeed, the historical evidence suggests U.S./Western power was ample 
enough for the U.S. to absorb the military expansion of the Soviet Bloc. U.S./Western 
military and economic power, combined with significant amount of proxies/allies the 
U.S./West had secured in the less developed, proved to be a potent shield against Soviet 
advances in the less developed world. 
Soviets Quantitative Gains and Loses during Detente 
       Now that I have dissected U.S.-Soviet /Western-Soviet Bloc competition in the 
less developed world during Détente, I should lay out all of the gains and defeats 
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experienced by the Soviets between 1972 and 1980. Considering SALT I was the 
hallmark that characterized the fundamental relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union (Détente), the date in which both the nuclear and the territorial balance 
of powers were to be carved out, then it surely makes sense to analyze only those gains 
and losses that happened after this date. Some may suggest that I should include such 
Soviet gains as Peru in 1968, Sudan in 1968, Bolivia in 1969, South Yemen in 1970 and 
Chile in 1970 as well as Soviet losses such as Sudan in 1971, Bolivia in 1971, and Mali 
in 1968 in order to attain a truer picture measuring the shift in the balance of forces. My 
project rejects this on the fact that these gains and losses never affected the signing and 
implementation of Détente.  
       Overall, there were quantitatively eight Soviet gains (Table 1) between 1972-80, 
which include the cases of Grenada in 1979, Nicaragua in 1979, Afghanistan in1979, 
Angola in 1975, Ethiopia in 1977, Vietnam in 1973, Laos in 1975, and Mozambique in 
1975. There were five Soviet loses (Table 1), which include Egypt in 1976, Somalia in 
1978, Chile in 1973, China in 1977(in Indochina) and Peru in 1975. Ted Hopf (1994) 
goes on to suggest that there were other Soviet loses, such as Zaire in 1978 and 
Zimbabwe in 1980 (p. 219). My analysis excludes these two latter cases considering that 
Zaire and Zimbabwe tended to have very cool relations with the Soviet Union, with the 
constant expelling of Soviet diplomats and very little economic aid ever provided by the 
Soviets. Moreover, Mobutu (Zaire) and Ian Smith (Zimbabwe) constantly played the 
Soviets against the Americans and the Chinese, to the point where they were actively 
fighting against the MPLA in Angola, a crucial Soviet ally. 
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 Thus, the historical record and the balance of power sheet points to a more 
moderate picture of Soviet gains in the less developed world during Détente than that 
stressed by many U.S. policymakers at the time. The characterization of an aggressive 
Soviet Bloc seeking to push against Western interests in the less developed world comes 
across (at least preliminarily) as a myopic account of US-Soviet competition during 
Détente. The gains for the Soviet Bloc in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America were 
offset by the rise of the Sino-Soviet split, the loss of Egypt in the Middle East, and the 
parting of several allies in Latin America (all without much of a fight). Besides and 
Angola and Afghanistan, which some dismiss as a defensive Soviet move, the Soviets do 
not seem to have been aggressive in the most vital areas of the world.  
Nevertheless, measuring Soviet aggression and pressure against the balance of 
power does not just revolve around tallying up Soviet gains and loses. After all, some 
scholars could suggest that my historical analysis is biased. This is why I now move to 
analyze the hard-core quantitative and archival evidence. It is simply more significant 
and important for me to study the foreign aid allocations (especially military) of the 
Soviet Bloc towards the less developed world. Examining foreign aid allocations actually 
allows me to understand what the Soviets were actually trying to do. Was Soviet aid 
massive? Did they send significant foreign aid to areas of vital concern to the West? This 
quantitative analysis is what I do in chapter three. In addition, it would be very significant 
for me to actually analyze the perception of U.S. policymakers regarding Soviet and U.S. 
actions during Détente. U.S. intelligence archives, which I analyze in Chapters four and 
five, should provide for me a wealth of material in this domain.  
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Table 1. 
Soviet Gains and Losses 
 
Gains    Losses   
Vietnam 1973   Chile 1973 
 
Laos 1975   Peru 1975 
 
Mozambique 1975  Egypt 1976 
 
Angola 1975    China 1977 (in Indochina) 
 
Ethiopia 1977   Somalia 1978 
 
Afghanistan 1979   
 
Nicaragua 1979 
 
Grenada 1979    
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Chapter III: Examining Soviet and Western Bloc Foreign Aid to  
the Less Developed World 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter three I will examine Western and Soviet foreign aid allocations to the 
less developed world during the years prior to and during Détente. Bringing in the 
balance of power results from chapter two, which showed a mild to moderate increase in 
Soviet strategic gains in the least important regions of the world, my overall purpose will 
be to assess whether the Soviet Bloc attempted to expand its influence. That is, regardless 
of whether they made gains or losses, which I more succinctly evaluate in chapters four 
and five, I shall measure whether the Soviets aggressively allocated foreign aid towards 
traditional and strategic Western spheres of influence undergoing revolutionary turmoil 
(as argued by many realists) at a time when U.S./Western was (supposedly) decreasing. 
Thus, I shall measure the strategic allocation of Soviet aid towards the most 
strategic countries in each region, the timing of such foreign aid, and other process-
tracing quantitative factors in assessing whether the Soviet Bloc became aggressive in the 
Third World during the late 1970‘s. As highlighted earlier, I shall scrutinize military aid 
much more thoroughly considering its immeasurable intrinsic value in helping to alter the 
balance of power in the less developed world.  Of course, in order to extract (through 
investments) the economic benefits that come from making gains in the less developed 
world, as well as help cultivate and consolidate allies, the superpowers needed to provide 
economic aid. Strategic areas of the world such as the Middle East (for the Western 
Bloc), Latin America (for the U.S.), and the Buffer Zone (for the Western Bloc) will be 
considered much more important for the maintenance of the U.S.-led Western world 
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order than others like Africa and Asia. Chapter three will also analyze Soviet military and 
economic aid towards its Warsaw Pact allies. Should the U.S.S.R. have decreased aid to 
Eastern Europe during this time period, while increasing aid to other areas of the less 
developed world, it would certainly provide evidence that the U.S.S.R. was neglecting its 
traditional allies. 
My analysis determines whether balance of threat realism or structural Marxism 
best explains the undercurrents of the final years of Détente. Should I find Soviet foreign 
aid to have been aggressive, it would suggest balance of threat realists are correct. On the 
other hand, if I fail to uncover aggressive allocations of Soviet aid, it would lend 
credence to the arguments laid forth by structural Marxists. 
Asia 
Section Introduction 
 Chapter two highlighted the fact that the U.S.S.R. had managed to make inroads 
into Asia thanks to revolutionary victories in South Vietnam and Laos. These Soviet 
gains, however, came at a significant price.  As I highlighted in the previous chapter, 
Soviet gains in Indochina (South Vietnam, Laos) worked in tandem with an about face by 
the Chinese. Once aligned in their foreign policies with respect to Indochina, the initial 
Sino-Soviet split spreads even further. Gains by the U.S.S.R. in Southeast Asia also 
rallied the ASEAN Western-backed elites to band together and pursue policies that in 
their minds would block the expanding Soviet-backed communist periphery. 
 To better understand the character of Soviet policy during the final years of 
Détente it would be prudent to compare Soviet and American military (Soviet bloc versus 
West) and economic assistance during this time period. Are the Soviets actively working 
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to expand their influence in the region as many U.S. policymakers would argue? Was the 
communist periphery seeking to expand?  
Correlating nicely with my findings in the previous chapter, the 
historical/quantitative data will highlight that the continuation of the Sino-Soviet split 
brought about severe consequences for the Soviet-backed Indochinese communist 
periphery. In the face of Chinese military aid cutbacks towards the Communist bloc 
alliance, I find that military aid towards the communist periphery in Southeast Asia 
significantly declined during the final years of Détente. The historical analysis also finds 
that the Western alliance’s military aid towards the Western-backed ASEAN Bloc 
(significant strategic part of Asia) trumped Soviet support towards their allies. These 
findings suggest the potential for further Soviet gains in Southeast Asia were all but 
exhausted by the end of the 1970’s. My analysis of economic aid also points to a much 
more defensive Soviet Bloc in Asia than that commonly portrayed.  
The Soviet-Sino Split and Western Advantages in Military Aid 
Taking into account Chinese military aid during the various periods of Détente, I 
find that military aid towards the communist periphery did not increase during the final 
years of Détente. Although the Soviet Bloc allocated about 300 million per year (Table 2) 
in military aid (most to Vietnam) during the 1967-1976 time period and 400 million per 
year during final Détente years, such figures do not take into consideration that the 
Chinese provided substantial assistance towards the communist periphery during the 
early and middle Détente years. The U.S. Disarmament Agency’s WMEAT shows that 
the Chinese allocated some 1586 million towards Southeast Asia (1300 million to 
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Vietnam) between 1967 and 1976, which turns out to be 160 million per year in military 
aid. The overall Soviet-Chinese assistance to Vietnam was 459 million per year. 
Although it seems that the Soviet Bloc has increased its military aid by 100 
million dollars during the final years of Détente (Table 2), the overall contributions 
towards communist allies (the anti-American Bloc) in Southeast Asia actually declined 
during Détente (from 459 million to 400 million per year) since Chinese assistance dried 
up by 1977. In fact, Chinese assistance actually turned against Soviet allies in the region 
as the Chinese aided anti-Soviet clients in Laos and Cambodia while also invading 
Vietnam in 1979.  
The data also show that the West significantly increased military assistance 
towards its anti-Soviet/anti-communist partners in the region. Compared with the 1967 to 
1976 time period, in which the West provided 375 million per year (Table 3) in military 
aid towards what would become the ASEAN Bloc, the Western allies dramatically 
increase military aid to 680 million per year towards the ASEAN Bloc by 1975-1979. 
One way to look at these findings is to argue that the fall of Vietnam mobilized the U.S. 
and West into a new “containment strategy” in the region. In fact, despite an initial 
decrease in military aid towards the ASEAN countries at the onset of the creation of 
ASEAN, Weatherbee’s (1978) “U.S. Policy and the Two Southeast Asias” also 
chronicles significant increases in U.S. military aid (doubling in most of them) between 
1974 and 1978 for ASEAN countries (p. 415).  
Understanding what exactly the Western allies were containing is quite difficult to 
answer, however. The data in Table 2 (and Table 3) show that the Communist bloc’s 
military allocations toward their Vietnamese-Cambodia-Laotian allies dropped from 460 
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million per year during the middle years of Détente to 400 million per year during the 
final years of Détente. Western Bloc military aid, however, expanded from 375 to 680 
million per year. Thus, it is clear the West was becoming much more active than the 
Soviets in this region. 
Soviet defensiveness in Mongolia and the Economic Aid Advantages of the US 
 My economic aid/historical analysis also brings to light the defensive character 
(against the great powers at least) of the Soviet Bloc during the final years of Détente. 
Increasing competition, as mentioned in chapter two, with China likely forced the 
U.S.S.R. to spend larger and larger amounts of economic aid on Mongolia (which 
sometimes exceeded Soviet military assistance to Indochina). Indeed, Bach’s figures 
show that Soviet allocations to Mongolia increased from 68 million per year during the 
1965-1969 time period, to 107 million per year between 1970 and 1974, to 380 million 
per year during the 1975-1979 time period (Table 4).  
      Nevertheless, several events in the early 1960’s, relating to a significant rift in 
relations between the Soviets and the Chinese, help to explain why Soviet increases in 
economic aid to Mongolia can be characterized as defensive in nature. These include 1)  
Increasing efforts by China to “regain” Mongolia as a piece of national territory 2) Soviet 
aid to India during its war with China and 3) Soviet failure to deliver nuclear weapons to 
China (Rupen, 1963, pp. 83-84).  
 The most significant of these was the attempt by China to exercise control over 
Mongolia. Chinese attempts were met by significant resistance from the Mongolian 
leadership. In fact, fearing a return to Chinese colonialism the Mongolian leadership 
moved in 1966 to “sign a treaty of friendship [with the Soviet Union], co-operation and 
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mutual assistance, which promised to use all means, including military to safeguard the 
security and independence of both countries” (Radchenko, 2003, para. 4). In turn, 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member Liu Shaoqi stated in 1956 “that the 
Chinese people deeply regret the fact of Mongolia’s secession from China and consider 
Mongolia, like Taiwan, a part of their territory” (Radchenko, 2003, para. 8). 
            The continued persistence on the part of the Chinese to assert greater control over 
Mongolia led the U.S.S.R. to dramatically increase their external and internal control 
over the country during the late 1960’s. The Soviet leadership deployed 52 Soviet 
divisions along the eastern border of Mongolia (Enkhsaikhan, 1999, Section: “The Soviet 
Period”, para. 3). Significant purges of the military leadership as well as propaganda 
attacks against Mongolian nationalist hero Ghenghis Khan were also increased by the 
Soviet leadership during this time period (Rupen, 1963, p. 84).  
         Such Soviet moves in Mongolia, however, should have been expected, argues 
Robert Rupen (1963), especially considering Japanese aggression in Central Asia during 
the 1940’s also led to increased Soviet control of Mongolia (p. 84). The Soviets simply 
regarded Mongolia as a buffer against foreign aggression. It should be no surprise then 
that increased Chinese determination to gain leverage in Central Asia moved Moscow to 
send most of its economic assistance in the region towards Mongolia.  
 If I accept that Soviet economic aid was defensive in nature and entirely eliminate 
it from my analysis, I would discover that Soviet economic assistance towards the rest 
Asia was very small and non-changing throughout the 1970’s (Table 5). Stable payments 
over the decades to Asia were stable and not aggressive in any way. On the other hand, 
Table 5 actually shows the significant economic aid advantage the U.S. possessed over 
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the U.S.S.R. in the entire region of Asia. More than that, the U.S. actually significantly 
increased its economic assistance to the most strategic parts of Asia (Weatherbee, 1978, 
p. 415).  
Section Conclusion 
The historical quantitative foreign aid analysis, as I found in chapter two, points 
to a more defensive Soviet Bloc in Asia (during Détente) than that commonly depicted by 
U.S. policymakers. As I showed in the previous chapter, the consolidation of Vietnam 
into one country, the invasion of Laos, and the partial takeover of Cambodia certainly did 
lead to important diplomatic, economic, and military gains for the Soviet Bloc. However, 
there are several reasons why such gains came back to haunt the U.S.S.R. For one, China 
was no longer a reliable Soviet ally in the region. As shown in chapter two, the Chinese 
were now determined to aid anti-Soviet movements in the region. Soviet 
gains/revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia also rallied the ASEAN Western-
backed elites to block the expanding Soviet-backed communist dominoes. The 
quantitative data demonstrated that the Western Bloc outpaced the Soviet Bloc in military 
assistance to the region, especially to the ASEAN countries.  
Secondly, Soviet economic assistance toward the region during the final years of 
Détente was also much less than that of the US. Once I take into consideration that the 
Soviets had become very defensive (due to the Sino-Soviet split) in Mongolia (their 
historical buffer), I find that the West significantly increased their economic aid towards 
the enhancement of ASEAN in manner that was much more aggressive than the Soviets 
in Asia. Thus, I find the West having aggressive intentions in the region and not the 
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Soviets. However, I shall dig deeper and analyze the archives in the next two chapters in 
order to obtain a better picture of Soviet actions in Asia. 
The aggressive allocations of foreign aid by the U.S./West towards ASEAN, 
coupled with Soviet defensiveness in the region, strengthen the arguments laid forth by 
structural Marxists and weaken those made by balance of threat realists.  The evidence 
does not show the Soviets upping the ante in the least. Of course, I must consider the rest 
of the regional evidence before arriving at a final conclusion. 
Middle East 
Section Introduction 
 My analysis of the balance of power in chapter two demonstrated that the Soviet 
Bloc lost ground in the Middle East region during Détente. The Soviets may have gained 
Ethiopia as an ally, but they lost Somalia and Egypt to the U.S./Western camp. Chapter 
three strengthens these findings and shows that the West not only improved its balance of 
power standing in the region at the onset of Détente, but they were also the more 
aggressive superpower bloc when it came to the distribution of strategic foreign aid. The 
West’s military aid to the most strategic countries of the Middle East outpaced Soviet 
foreign aid. On the other hand, Soviet foreign aid allocations were not even strategic at 
times and seemed to have been allocated for economic reasons. The Soviet Bloc’s failure 
to provide economic aid towards Ethiopia and their significant arms packages for Libya, 
which were located in the extreme periphery of the region, convinces me that the 
U.S.S.R.’s primary motivations (at times) in this region may have been to sell military 
arms.  
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Western Aggression in Military and Economic Aid 
 My historical/quantitative analysis finds that the Soviet Bloc was aggressive in 
this region in the years prior to Détente (thus the Egyptian gain). Soviet military aid to 
the region between 1964 and 1973 (Table 6) surpassed Western military aid by a margin 
of 412 to 301 million per year. The U.S.S.R. also overtook the U.S. in economic aid 
allocations between 1965 and 1969 (Table 7).  
As I look into the Détente period, however, I find that Western foreign aid 
completely outpaced Soviet assistance to the region. Western allocations of military aid 
increased from 301 million per year in the 1964-1973 to 840, 4096, 3920, and 3690 
million per year during the 1967-1976, 1973-1977, 1974-1978, and 1975-1979 time 
periods (Table 6). The Soviets were simply not able to match these increases as their 
military aid allocations were 412, 658, 1588, and 2128, 2496 million per year during the 
same respective time periods (Table 6). The same pattern emerges within the economic 
aid arena as U.S. economic aid outpaces Soviet economic assistance to the region (Table 
7). 
The picture becomes even clearer once I go ahead and analyze the military aid 
allocations made by the West and the Soviet Bloc towards their most strategic allies in 
the region. The most important countries of the Middle East (remember I am excluding 
the Buffer Zone) are Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, UAE, Kuwait, Yemen Aden, and 
Yemen Sanaa. Together, these countries form a triangle around the most important 
natural resources of the Persian Gulf. From oil and natural gas to the transportation 
systems they depend on, these countries are prized possessions for hegemonic powers. By 
studying foreign aid allocations (especially military) to these countries, on the part of the 
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West and the Soviet Bloc, I will better understand what exactly was occurring during the 
final years of Détente in the Middle East.  
 My analysis of military aid allocations towards the most strategic countries of the 
region  (Table 8) suggests the West came out much stronger at the end of Détente than it 
was heading into it. The West’s military aid contribution towards its most strategic clients 
during the final years of Détente was 1780 million per year. Conversely, Soviet Bloc 
military aid towards the most strategic parts of the Middle East totaled 1060 million per 
year. This pattern of Soviet-Western assistance was all in sharp contrast to the 1967-1976 
time period in which the West’s most strategic allies received 470 and Soviet strategic 
allies received 510 million per year in military aid. In fact, Table 8 shows that Soviet 
military aid towards the most strategic countries of the Middle East only slightly 
increased while Western military aid skyrocketed.  
 The increasing militarization of U.S. policy is also very apparent when 
specifically analyzing the increased U.S./Western military support towards its closest 
allies. Indeed, Table 9 shows Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait receiving 3-10 times more 
military assistance at the end of Détente than at its start.  
 Relating to gains and losses, analyzing military aid highlights the fact that Egypt’s 
allegiance was now being shifted over to the Western Bloc. Indeed, Soviet military aid 
towards Egypt plummets to about 120 million per year during the later years of Détente 
(Table 10). On the other hand, Table 11 shows in clear-cut fashion just how much 
Western assistance to Egypt during this time period significantly increased. 
The U.S. was also providing much more economic aid (Table 13) towards the 
most strategic countries in the region during the final years of Détente than the Soviet 
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Bloc. The U.S. allocated some 1160 million per year towards its strategic allies while the 
Soviet Bloc allocated 124 million per year. It is simply quite obvious that the tide had 
turned in the U.S.’s favor when examining the economic allocations of the preceding 
1969-1974 time periods. These early Détente years saw the Soviet Bloc possess a 106 to 
58 million per year advantage. As a result, the U.S. seems much more determined in 
seeking to consolidate its allies in the region during the final years of Détente than the 
U.S.S.R. Soviet economic aid allocations, on the other hand, remained relatively the 
unchanged (Table 13).  
Was Soviet Foreign Aid even Strategic? 
 There is some question as to whether Soviet foreign aid towards the Middle East 
was even allocated in a strategic manner. For instance, while Libya is certainly strategic 
and possesses oil, the fact of the matter is that Libya lies in the extreme periphery of this 
region. The ability of Libya’s leaders to influence events in the heart of the Middle East 
is questionable. If altering the balance of power had been the U.S.S.R.’s primary concern 
they should have shifted most or all of Libya’s military aid towards Syria and Egypt 
(providing them the offensive weapons they desperately desired at the time). Instead, the 
Soviet Bloc drastically increased military assistance towards Libya during Détente. The 
Soviets practically quintupled (Table 10) their already large amounts of military 
assistance towards Libya from 180 million per year between 1967 and 1976 to about 
1000 million per year during the latter years of Détente (1975-1979). In contrast, Soviet 
assistance to Egypt dried out and its military aid to Syria increased at a much slower rate 
during Détente (Table 10).  
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Some scholars, such as Menon (1982) and Laird (1984) suggest the Soviets were 
more interested in selling weapons than in expanding its geopolitical interests. How else 
can I explain why Soviet military assistance towards Libya quintupled while its 
assistance towards a more strategic Syria only quadrupled? One answer may lie in the 
fact that Libya was more willing to buy military hardware with hard cash (Menon, 1982, 
381). Additional research by Laird (1984) shows that the U.S.S.R. shifted its 1950-1960 
policy of providing arms to the developing world on a friendly 10-year credit basis to 
requiring hard cash payments from 65% of its customers by 1971 (p.192).  
 The strategic Horn of Africa is another example.  For starters, there is simply no 
comparison here between Soviet and Western military aid allocations (Table 12).  In 
contrast to the 1967-1976 time period, in which the Soviets had a 25 to 17 million per 
year advantage, there is simply a huge disparity in favor of the U.S.S.R. that emerges 
during the final years of Détente. Nonetheless, as in other cases throughout the less 
developed world, the Soviet Bloc did not provide the necessary economic support to 
bolster their newfound ally in the region. Considering the U.S.S.R. only allocated 5 
million (a negligent amount) towards Ethiopia between 1975-1979, while providing over 
1500 million in military assistance (Table 12) it could be once again that economic 
interests (selling weapons) were much more important in the calculations of Soviet 
policymakers than long range strategic interests. In fact, Colin Lawson points out that the 
Soviets only extended significant amounts of economic aid to Ethiopia in the early 
1980’s “once they became convinced of the regime’s ability to survive and to transform 
itself into a system with a vanguard party with intimate administrative, political, and 
ideological links to the Soviet Bloc” (Lawson, p. 514). 
106 
 
   
 
Section Conclusion 
The historical/quantitative foreign aid evidence suggests the U.S./West were the 
primary aggressors in the Middle East during the Détente time period. Western claims of 
Soviet aggressiveness in the Middle East are only substantiated within the decade prior to 
Détente’s initiation. Rather than counter such Soviet moves, the U.S. signs Détente. As 
witnessed from Henry Kissinger himself, the signing of Détente was supposed to have 
crystallized the territorial balance of power meaning each superpower would cease from 
making unilateral moves against another superpower’s allies. Going against the spirit of 
Détente, Washington and their ally Israel maneuver themselves into a better balance of 
power position than ever before.  
Instead, the West also overtakes Soviet foreign aid allocations by a long shot. 
Both in military aid and economic aid, I find that Soviet foreign aid packages to the 
Middle East during Détente failed to match the military and economic assistance 
increases of the West and U.S. Western foreign aid dominance was especially the case in 
the most strategic areas of the Middle East. 
However, I do find that the U.S.S.R.’s foreign aid towards the Horn of Africa 
trumped Western foreign aid. Nonetheless, the Soviets failed to provide any economic 
support to help in the consolidation of Ethiopia (in contrast to large economic aid 
packages by the U.S. towards its allies in the region). The U.S.S.R. also allocated large 
military aid packages towards Libya. The strategic nature of allocating military aid to a 
country that was in the periphery of the Middle East is very questionable. Nevertheless, 
even if I consider Soviet assistance to the Horn of Africa as aggressive, it simply pales in 
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comparison (both quantitatively and strategically to Western aid to the most strategic 
areas (oil triangle) of the Middle East.  
Such findings could suggest that the U.S.S.R.’s primary motives in the Middle 
East during Détente involved the selling of military equipment (its most important 
export). Why else would the Soviet Bloc allocate 1500 million of military aid towards 
Ethiopia while only allocating 5 million in economic aid? Why else would the Soviets 
increase their assistance to Libya to a higher degree than to a more strategic Syria?  
Moreover, ff Soviet policymakers were developing their policies according to 
geostrategic considerations they would have been much more cautious in regards to 
Ethiopia. Chapter two showed just how Soviet aid towards Ethiopia ended up alienating 
Somalia and costing them a valuable ally (as well as investments in a military port). 
Overall, these findings parallel nicely with those in chapter two.  The loss of 
Egypt for the Soviet Bloc is matched by decreasing foreign assistance to the region. The 
Soviets were also very cautious in regard to sending military aid towards Syria and 
Egypt. The Soviets simply abided by Détente as they did not wish to stir the ire of the 
U.S. Nonetheless, I shall explore further and analyze the archives in the next two chapters 
in order to attain a better picture of Soviet actions in the Middle East. 
The aggressive allocations of foreign aid by the U.S./West towards the Middle 
East also strengthen the arguments made by structural Marxists and weaken those made 
by balance of threat realists.  The evidence does not show the Soviet acting aggressive in 
this region. Of course, I must consider the rest of the regional evidence before arriving at 
a final conclusion. 
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Southern Africa 
Section Introduction 
 My chapter two findings showed that the Soviet Bloc gained Angola and 
Mozambique as allies at the very height of the Détente time period. Even though the 
U.S.S.R. provided significant military assistance to these states, however, I must look 
deeper to better understand Soviet intentions in the region. Were the Soviets actively 
seeking to arm and consolidate new allies in the hope that they would penetrate deeper 
into Africa for the benefit of the U.S.S.R.? Some scholars doubt these claims. They 
suggest that Soviet leaders exercised caution in Africa as they did not place much hope 
on the long-term prospects for advances in the region. After all, the U.S.S.R. only moved 
into Africa once Portuguese imperialism collapsed. 
 The historical/quantitative analysis of the foreign aid data corroborates nicely 
with the caution theory. Soviet economic assistance towards Angola and Mozambique 
was simply abysmal. There is no evidence that the Soviets were seeking to consolidate 
their newfound gains in the region. Soviet leaders also did not consider the strategic 
significance of African countries when allocating military aid. These two 
historical/quantitative findings suggest the U.S.S.R. may have been more interested in 
selling arms towards these countries. 
Portuguese Imperialism Collapses 
 Before analyzing the process-tracing quantitative data, it is important to 
understand that it was not military or economic aid that turned the tide against the West 
in Southern Africa, but the internal collapse of the Salazar dictatorship. History shows 
that the collapse of the fascist administration (ultimately the result of poverty and 
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repression) was immensely important in the ability of Cuba and the U.S.S.R. to make 
inroads in the region. Without a doubt, the new Portuguese rulers (Communist Party) 
were instrumental in allowing “ships from the Communist nations to dock in Luanda and 
transfer arms to the MPLA, without which Cuba and the U.S.S.R. could not have been 
involved to such an extent” (Bissell, 1978, p. 92). This new temporary administration was 
also important in that it also allowed the “communist” MPLA to monopolize power in the 
Luanda capital at the expense of UNITA and the FNLA.  
 The opportunity to extract a gain in Southern Africa was not lost on the Soviets. 
The Soviet Bloc shipped several hundred tons of light arms in April, May, and June of 
1975 (Bissell, 1978, p. 90). A superpower struggle for Southern Africa had now begun.  
Economic Aid to Southern Africa 
In sharp distinction with its policies towards Cuba and Eastern Europe, with its 
massive subsidy allocations, the U.S.S.R. was simply unwilling to allocate large 
economic aid packages towards the most strategic parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 
15).  In the end, according to Colin Lawson (1988) the “smaller aid packages which have 
been made available to Angola and Mozambique, ultimately reflected a rational Soviet 
calculation of those states’ more doubtful long-term prospects” (p. 514). 
Nation and Kauppi’s (1984) The Soviet Impact in Africa further suggests that the 
main failure of Soviet-backed regimes in Africa stems from the unwillingness of the 
Soviet Bloc to gamble and seriously deliver economic aid to the region (2). In 
comparison to other regions of the developing world Soviet Bloc economic aid also 
possessed lower grant elements with tougher loan terms (Lawson, 1988, p. 514). Failing 
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to provide the necessary economic assistance, especially towards its new strategic allies, 
the prospects for consolidation significantly dropped.  
Conversely, the U.S. provided ten times more economic assistance towards Sub-
Saharan Africa than did the U.S.S.R. during the final years of Détente (Table 16). Thus, it 
is obvious the U.S. was much busier consolidating its allies and expanding its influence 
in the region than the Soviets. After all, as my introduction in the first chapter showed, 
history has shown that the strength of any superpower lies not only in expanding its 
military power, but also in expanding unfair trade with the states they exploit. 
Soviet experiences in regards to failed economic aid strategies (infrastructure 
projects) in Africa during the 1950’s and 1960’s were probably responsible for Soviet 
retrenchment in economic aid assistance during the Brezhnev years and Détente. The 
Soviets fathomed economic aid allocations to these countries were “too expensive and the 
recipients to unreliable to warrant major investments in their loyalty” (Lawson, 1988, p. 
505). Soviet leaders also made the decision that economic assistance towards non-CMEA 
countries would have to factor both the political reliability of the respective vanguard 
party as well as the likelihood that the recipient state would eventually join (and add 
significant benefits to) the CMEA economy (Lawson, 1988, p, 506). For these reasons, 
the Soviets rejected Mozambique’s application to join CMEA. As a result, it seems that 
the states of sub-Saharan Africa were not worthwhile enough for Soviet exploitation. 
This may have been the case considering that unlike the West, the Soviet Union already 
produced in their domestic market many of the goods produced in Southern Africa. 
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Soviets and Western Bloc Military Aid to Strategic Southern Africa 
 Soviet military aid towards the strategic parts of Southern Africa slightly 
dominated that sent by the West (Table 14). Looking at the data in timeline fashion, I find 
that the Soviet Bloc sent 410, 925, and 1090 million towards Mozambique and Angola 
during the comparable five year spans of 1973-1977, 1974-1978, and 1975-1979 
(including Cuban military aid). On the other hand, the sworn enemies (Zaire and South 
Africa) of Angola and Mozambique received 895, 860, and 775 million during those 
same comparable five year spans from the West. These facts suggest the Soviets were 
becoming very aggressive in the region of Southern Africa. Of course, it should be 
considered that the Western allies already had years of military aid under their belt while 
Soviet allies were actually facing strong internal enemies. 
 However, there is also evidence that the Soviet Bloc may have allocated military 
aid in a non-strategic manner. Robert Grey (1984), in “The Soviet Presence in Africa: An 
Analysis of its Goal”, illustrates the lack of a significant connection between Soviet arms 
deliveries to sub-Saharan African states with ports (strategic as far as positioning Soviet 
navy is concerned) and those without ports (p. 517). The Soviets only allotted high 
amounts of military aid to 15% of the African states with ports while providing high 
levels to 7% of African states without ports (Grey, 1984, p. 517).  
 Grey (1984) also demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of Soviet military 
aid was delivered to countries that either would not seek Western military aid or the West 
itself would not provide it because of the ideological hostility between the new socialist 
rulers and the capitalist West. He cites that the U.S.S.R. only provided military aid to 
16% of the non-socialist oriented countries of Africa while allocating significant military 
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assistance towards the Marxist-Leninist and socialist-oriented states that were now 
enemies of the West (Grey, 1984, p. 520). 
 These findings have led some scholars to speculate that the U.S.S.R.’s main goal 
in sub-Saharan Africa actually involved the selling of arms (and Marxist regimes were 
willing to buy them), which was one of the U.S.S.R.’s most important exports, and not 
aggressive strategic calculations. Not only did arms sales account for about 22% of 
Soviet export earnings (which was second only to fuel exports by the 1970’s) but starting 
in the 1970’s the Soviets did “shift away from a policy of using arms primarily for 
geopolitical influence towards a policy that also provided economic benefits by requiring 
hard-currency payments for arms from virtually all its customers (Laird, 1984, p. 197). 
Prior to 1973 “Soviet arms (to the less developed world) were usually provided on credit 
at a 2-5% rate of interest with a 10-12 year amortization period” (Menon, 1982 p. 381). 
Since then, the Soviets required hard cash from 65% of their customers (Laird, 1984, p. 
197). While these facts alone do not necessarily push the Soviets geostrategic 
considerations (especially in Angola) to the background, my previous findings on the 
lack of Soviet economic assistance towards strategic sub-Saharan Africa probably close 
the deal.  They suggest the Soviets were more interested in selling arms to states (and 
most of them just happened to be anti-Western) that were willing to buy them. 
Section Conclusion 
 In summary, the Soviet Bloc seems opportunistic and not actively seeking to alter 
the balance of power in Sub-Saharan Africa considering the historical and process-tracing 
findings I have discovered. These include: 1) the reality that the Soviet Bloc only moved 
in to Angola and Mozambique once Portuguese imperialism collapses 2) the total lack of 
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economic assistance to the region (overwhelming focus on military aid), 3) the fact that 
the Soviet Union allocated military aid in a non-strategic manner and 4) the fact that the 
U.S.S.R. began to require hard currency for its military aid sales.  
 My findings in this chapter parallel those in the previous chapter. Just as the 
Soviets did not considerably expand their balance of power score sheet, the Soviets did 
not expand their foreign aid allocations in a strategic manner. They knew the West was 
dominant in the region. A large network of military installations (bases and ports) and 
strong economic linkages through Western institutions kept the Soviets at bay. However, 
I shall analyze the archives in the next two chapters in order to obtain a better picture of 
Soviet actions in Latin America. 
These findings continue to weaken the arguments made by balance of threat 
realists and strengthen the arguments made by structural Marxists.  The evidence does not 
show the Soviet acting aggressively in this region. Of course, I must consider the rest of 
the regional evidence before arriving at a final conclusion. 
Latin America 
Section Introduction 
 The most severe blow to Détente for some U.S. policymakers was the Soviet 
penetration of Latin America. Soviet and Cuban military aid/support towards Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador was cited by the U.S. as a destabilizing force in the region. If 
it were not for Soviet and Cuban support, U.S. policymakers suggested that anti-
American revolutionary movements in Central America would have been crushed easily 
by the U.S. Instead, the Sandinistas managed to take control in Nicaragua in 1979 while 
114 
 
   
 
other revolutionary groups threatened to overturn pro-American governments in El 
Salvador and Guatemala into the 1980s.  
In contrast to U.S. suggestions of Soviet aggression, I find that Soviet military aid 
towards the U.S.’s strategic rear during the final years of Détente (1975-1979) was not 
very aggressive. Once I take into account that a good portion of Soviet military aid 
towards Cuba made its way unto Angola (the 1975-1979 time period) and the fact that 
Cuba did not send much assistance to Central America, it seems the Soviets were quiet 
disinterested in the region. There is also evidence that the Soviets could barely even 
control its “subservient” Cuban proxy. Such a finding suggests the Soviets could not be 
confident that their military assistance towards Cuba would reach any of their desired 
ends. The U.S.S.R. also did not support the new Sandinista government until two years 
after Détente’s collapse nor was it Nicaragua’s primary donor. Finally, there is significant 
quantitative and historical evidence that a split was emerging within the Western 
Alliance. 
Soviet Foreign Military Aid to Latin America 
 Quantitative aid figures show that the Soviet Bloc presided over large increases of 
military aid towards Latin America during Détente (Table 17). The Soviets allocated 31 
million per year between 1964 and 1973, 206 million per year between 1973 and 1977, 
248 million per year between 1974 and 1978, and 300 million per year between 1975 and 
1979 towards Latin America. The West, on the other hand, did increase military aid from 
178 million per year between 1964 and 1973 all the way to 596 million per year during 
the final years of Détente (1975-1979) All in all, the ratios of military aid to Latin 
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America shifted from 6 to 1 in favor of the West to just over 2 to 1 by the final years of 
Détente.  
Soviet Foreign Aid to Central America/Caribbean 
To better understand and measure Soviet policy in Latin America, however, one 
needs to study the Soviet-Cuban connection. The main criticism of Soviet foreign policy 
towards Latin America by the U.S. revolves around the claim that Cuba (the U.S.S.R.’s 
Latin American proxy) was busy promoting revolution in Central America. As a result, I 
should study the strategic allocations of the Soviet bloc to Cuba and compare that with 
Western allocations towards its strategic allies in Central America. If Soviet allotments to 
Cuba were higher than in previous time periods and/or more significant, it could suggest 
the U.S.S.R. was seeking to turn the tide in Latin America. After all, of the Soviet Bloc’s 
1500 million in military aid towards Latin America between 1975 and 1979, Cuba alone 
received 50% of these aid allotments (USDA, p. 128). The U.S. itself admits (CIA, 1986, 
p. 7) that Soviet Bloc military deliveries to Nicaragua did not begin until several years 
after Détente’s collapse. 
 According to my initial historical/quantitative analysis, the Soviet Bloc seems 
aggressive in its foreign aid allocations towards Cuba when compared with Western 
allocations towards such Central American states as Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala (Table 18). Within the military aid arena (the more strategic aid variable), 
Soviet Bloc military assistance was 36, 96, 104, and 175 million per year during the 
1967-1976, 1973-1977, 1974-1978, and 1975-1979 time periods. Respectively, Western 
military assistance to Central America adds up to 13, 19, 24, and 32 million per year 
during those very same time periods. Though it is apparent that the Soviet Bloc’s military 
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support towards Cuba before Détente (1967-1976) was already three times that of 
Western aid towards Central America (remember that Western clients already possessed 
several decades of armaments under their wings), it seems that Soviet Bloc’s aid towards 
Cuba begins to increase during each subsequent time period while Western military aid 
remained relatively steady.  
However, some scholars suggest that Soviet military aid to Cuba and Latin 
America during Détente was actually intended for the war in Angola. One way of 
measuring how much military aid Cuba delivered and spent in Angola is to make a 
correlation between increases in Cuban troop level in Angola with the increases of Soviet 
military aid to Cuba. If I take the average of Cuban troops in Angola between 1973 and 
1977, 1974-1978, and 1975-1979 (about 8, 12, and then 16 thousand troops a year), I find 
that this conspicuously correlates with Soviet increases of at least 200 million towards 
Havana between each time period (Kahn, 1987, p. 39).  
The evidence of Cuban troop level increases implies that most of the Soviet 
military aid increased during the 1973-1977 and 1975-1979 time periods can be 
explained as Soviet aid for Angola. The reduction of (at least) 400 million from the 
Soviet Bloc to Latin America between 1975 and 1979 means that Soviet military support 
to Cuba was just 95 million per year (Table 19).  
Soviet military aid to Cuba is not as aggressive as aggregate U.S. figures would 
first indicate.  Most importantly, however, is the fact that Soviet military aid towards 
Cuba during the 1970’s was never put in play in Central America. The Cubans sent a 
large portion of this assistance towards Southern Africa.  
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An analysis of Cuban military and civilian aid by Susan Eckstein (1989) entitled 
“Foreign Aid: Cuban Style” backs this up. Eckstein’s study finds that “until the 1980s 
Cuba offered almost exclusively civilian aid to Latin America, military aid to the Middle 
East, and a combination of the two to Africa and Indochina” (1989, para. 16). However, 
by the 1980’s “the civilian component became more important, and the military 
component less important in Africa, whereas military aid to sympathetic governments in 
Nicaragua and Grenada and to rebels in El Salvador increased (1989, para 16).  
What about the rest of Soviet assistance towards Cuba? Table 19 shows that the 
Soviets were becoming aggressive in Central America/Caribbean. Soviet Bloc military 
assistance still jumped much more than Western Bloc assistance during Détente. 
However, as I mentioned earlier, it is not just about aggregate aid figures. It is also 
important to measure to see whether Cuba actually allocated significant assistance 
towards Central America. 
My historical findings suggest Cuba did not send any significant amounts of 
military assistance towards the Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua during the Détente time 
period. While Cuba did send some financial assistance (helped to create a small arms 
supply network), it must be understood that the “crucial financial support for the FSLN 
came from Costa Rica, Panama, and Venezuela” (Prevost, 1990, p. 124). Cuba’s most 
significant support towards the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 was Castro’s influence in 
helping to unify the three anti-Somoza factions.  
Organizational support, however, is simply not enough to suggest that Cuba was 
an aggressive actor in Central America during this time period. Even when the 
revolutionary potential skyrocketed in January of 1978 with the assassination of 
118 
 
   
 
opposition leader Pedro Chamorro, Cuba “did not greatly increase their level of material 
support to the Sandinistas” (Prevost, 1990, p. 125) Cuban aggression in Nicaragua had 
already peaked by 1972 (1960’s for the rest of Latin America) as they succumbed to the 
Soviet line of pursuing the peaceful road to socialism. The U.S.S.R. had used economic 
incentives to force Cuba to adhere to Détente. 
Was Cuba a Soviet Pawn? 
 Another important thing to consider is how much was Cuba really a subservient 
proxy to the Soviet Bloc? Many scholars would tie Cuba to the Soviet bloc by looking at 
the amount of economic assistance the Soviet bloc allocated towards Cuba during the 
1975-1979 time period (Table 20). They would argue that Soviet economic assistance 
quintupled from 240 between 1970 and 1974 to 1180 million during the comparable five-
year time span of 1975-1979 (final years of Détente).  
 Cuban dependence on the U.S.S.R. and Cuban acquiescence to Soviet foreign 
policy goals, however, rarely went hand in hand. According to the Eckstein (1989), the 
foreign policy of the two countries most diverged “when Cuba was at the peak of its 
economic dependence on the superpower for trade in the late 1960s” (para. 19) By the 
1970’s, they find that while Cuba and the U.S.S.R. did work much more closely, Cuba’s 
dependence on the U.S.S.R. had weaned considering Cuba’s overall trade with the West 
had significantly increased to 41%. Becoming dependent on the Soviet Union again for 
trade by the 1980s, Cuban-Soviet squabbles in foreign affairs resume once more. These 
facts lead to questions as to whether Cuba was truly a “mindless proxy” of the Soviet 
Bloc in Latin America. Such a finding suggests the Soviets could not be confident that 
their military assistance towards Cuba would reach any of their desired ends. 
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After Somoza’s Fall 
 Some U.S. hawks agree that the Soviets/Cubans did not push for nor cause the 
Nicaraguan Revolution that ousted the U.S.-backed Somoza government. However, they 
suggest that the Soviets moved in to shore up its new ally in the 1980’s. Although they 
established diplomatic relations and a working relationship, the evidence suggests the 
Soviet Bloc did not seek hegemonic control over Nicaragua during the early 1980’s. 
 As far as quantitative evidence goes, Doug Stokes (2003), “In Counterinsurgency, 
Coups, and Coercion: History and the U.S. Empire in Latin America”, finds that 
Moscow’s commitment to Nicaragua during the early 1980’s was modest (para 8). He 
points out (Table 21) that Soviet Bloc aid amounted to only $605.6 million by 1984. On 
the other hand, extensive aid by Mexico ($500 million in credits given by 1984), Western 
European countries ($282.9 million), the United Nations (UN) and World Bank provided 
($632.2 million) suggests many other countries and international agencies had attained 
significant influence over Nicaragua by 1984 (Stokes, 2003, para 8).  
Historical evidence also suggests Soviet policy towards Central America and the 
Caribbean was cautious. The Soviet Bloc simply “refused to underwrite socialist 
construction in such countries as Jamaica and Nicaragua” (Leogrande, 1982, p. 114 ) 
There are several reasons for this. First, the Soviet Bloc seemed “unwilling to engage in 
large-scale support of a regime not totally controlled by pro-Soviet Marxists” (Suchlicki, 
1987, p. 31). Experiences in Yugoslavia, as well as Cuba, served to highlight that such 
regimes “are more apt to pursue policy lines independent of Moscow and are difficult to 
control” (Suchlicki, 1987 p. 32). Secondly, Moscow feared that such foreign assistance 
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would bring about full-scale war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a region of the 
world where the U.S.S.R. was simply not well-positioned to effectively fight in.  
The Emerging Split between the US and Western Europe 
Détente sees the West strengthen its strategic relationship with South America. 
Table 22 shows that the gap between Soviet and Western military assistance widened 
even further in favor of the West during Détente. This primarily is due to the US adding 
insult to injury and gaining influence in the country of Peru during the 1975-1979 time 
periods. Previously the only Soviet ally in the region receiving military assistance, Peru 
slowly but surely receives more and more of its military assistance from the West 
(USDA, p. 128). This falls squarely in line with my findings of the previous chapter.  
Nonetheless, the military aid figures on South America forces me to question how 
close the US and the rest of the West were. Table 23 highlights that American influence 
in Latin America was progressively deteriorating during the Détente time period. 
Breaking down the data according to respective country, I find that France, Germany, and 
the UK all began to catch up (and some even surpassed) American military aid to the 
region. Unlike in Asia and Africa, where the U.S. did cede much influence in the region 
to European allies (thus making it alright if these nations allocated higher amounts than 
the U.S. in some instances), the case of South America is especially striking. As Wolf 
Grabendorff (1985) argues, the “traditional North-South domination pattern” established 
all of a Latin America as a dominant U.S. sphere of influence (p. 630). 
As I pointed out in the first chapter, European nations did become more politically 
and economically involved in Latin America, specifically South America, during the late 
1970’s and early 1980’s. Grabendorff points out that “given the strong economic 
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performance of some Western European nations during the 1970’s and their greater 
willingness to translate their economic position into a bolder international role, Western 
Europe became an attractive partner for Latin America” (Grabendorff, 1985, p. 630). 
Leaders in Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina began to prefer the Europeans over the 
American as business partners due to the fact that “Western European states neither had 
the capacity to exert political (military) pressure nor wanted to exercise moral leadership” 
(Grabendorff, 1985, p. 630). European nations, unlike the U.S.S.R., also offered the same 
possibilities in regard to capital, technology, and access to markets. 
Center-left political parties also preferred to work with Europe. Recognizing the 
larger amount of political pluralism encompassed within Western European nations, these 
non-mainstream political parties in Latin America formed links with churches and trade 
unions in Europe (Grabendorff, 1985, p. 631). Common interest in a social-democratic 
model of economic development in their respective nations invariably united these 
factions.  
These findings, combined with the overall lack of an aggressive drive by the 
Soviets in Latin America, force me to question whether U.S. policymakers were much 
more concerned with Western European encroachment on U.S. interests in the region. It 
is obvious the alliance of the Western Bloc was starting to weaken. Western Europe did 
not back up the U.S. against the Sandinistas in Latin America. Instead, some European 
countries encouraged the Sandinistas and provided economic support.  
Section Conclusion 
My historical/quantitative analysis of Latin America, just like my historical 
analysis in chapter two, seems to point to a more moderate picture of Soviet actions than 
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that described by the U.S. To begin with, it seems that Soviet military aid towards Central 
America was not destined for revolution in the region. Much of the military support sent 
by the U.S.S.R. towards Cuba was simply used for proxy warfare in Angola and not 
Central America. Historical evidence also suggests Cuba did not send much assistance to 
Central America. Regardless, there is also evidence that the Soviets could barely control 
Cuba. These aforementioned facts lead me to question how much of a proxy Cuba really 
was to the Soviets. The U.S.S.R. also did not immediately aid in the consolidation of the 
Nicaraguan regime considering it allowed many nations to work with Nicaragua. Finally, 
there is significant quantitative and historical evidence that a split was emerging within 
the Western Alliance.  
These findings piggy-back on those of my previous chapter. The Soviets did not 
make any gains in the region and they also did not allocate foreign aid in an aggressive 
manner. Further, Soviet assistance to Nicaragua also occurred very late in the game and 
even then, it was not much. Still, I shall dig deeper and analyze the archives in order to 
attain a better picture of Soviet actions in Latin America. 
My findings further strengthen the arguments made by structural Marxists and 
weaken those made by balance of threat realists.  The evidence does not show the Soviet 
acting aggressive in this region. However, as mentioned before, I must consider the rest 
of the regional evidence before arriving at a final conclusion. 
Buffer Zone 
Section Introduction 
 The traditional buffer zone of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq is 
another reference point in my examination of Soviet foreign aid to the less developed 
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world. As I mentioned earlier, this Buffer Zone is especially significant (oil reserves, 
strategic ports) and should be treated as a region of its own (and not as part of the Middle 
East) because both the Soviet and Western Blocs possessed vital interests in the region. 
In fact, many analysts have placed certain buffer states within certain Cold War Blocs, 
such as Afghanistan within the Soviet camp and Pakistan within the West. Prior to the 
initiation of Détente, they also state that Iran was a Western-backed state while Iraq was a 
Soviet-backed state. India, on the other hand, was largely independent although Soviet 
influence probably was slightly more than the West’s.  
 Chapter two pointed out that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raised many 
eyebrows in Washington. U.S. leaders feared the U.S.S.R. was determined to strike at 
vital Western security interests in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet invasion was simply the 
last draw for many U.S. policymakers in regards to dismantling their support for Détente. 
For instance, the U.S. responded by cutting grain exports to the U.S.S.R., scrapping the 
SALT II agreements, and boycotting the 1980 Olympic Games. Most significantly 
however, the U.S. began to aid Islamic fundamentalists against the U.S.S.R. This was 
rather ironic considering Islamic fundamentalists had just dealt a severe blow to U.S. 
interests in the region (Iranian Revolution).  
 Despite the fact that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, which at first 
glance seems like an aggressive move, my analysis of the foreign aid allocations suggests 
the Soviet Union had no intention to alter the balance of power in this region during the 
final years of Détente. When comparing the strategic foreign aid allocations of the 
Western and Soviet Blocs towards the most strategic countries in this region, in this case 
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being Pakistan and Afghanistan, I find that the West was much more aggressive with its 
foreign aid allocations (especially military).  
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to the Buffer Zone 
 To begin with, there is significant historical/quantitative evidence regarding the 
overall relative equality in military aid allocations of the Soviet Bloc and the West 
towards the entire strategic Buffer Zone in the time periods prior to and during Détente. 
According to the U.S. Disarmament Agency’s WMEAT (Table 25) the West extended 
1960, 4860, 5900, 8250, and 9900 million toward the Buffer Zone during the 1964-1973, 
1967-1976, 1973-1977, 1974-1978, and 1975-1979 time periods. On the other hand, the 
Soviets allocated 1810, 4180, 4340, 5290, and 8020 million during those very same time 
periods. Western military assistance during these comparable five-years was pretty much 
on par with Soviet military assistance to the region. Rather than Soviet aggression, these 
findings suggest continuity was at work. These findings also seem to confirm the claim 
that this area of the world was strategically significant for both Blocs. 
Nevertheless, I should analyze the military aid allocations by the Soviet and 
Western Blocs to the most strategic part (or most contentious) of the Buffer Zone 
(Pakistan/Afghanistan) in order to better determine whether or not the Soviets were 
aggressive. When looking at such aid allocations within the 1974-1978, 1975-1979, and 
1976-1980 time periods (Table 24), I find that the West and China (China became a 
Western ally in the region in the late 1970’s) allocated 755, 850, and 1080 million in 
military aid towards the region (Pakistan) while the Soviet Bloc sent 350, 475, and 460 
million in military aid (Pakistan and Afghanistan). These figures make it really difficult 
to contend that the Soviet Bloc was seeking to expand its influence in this region. 
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Western/Chinese military assistance during these comparable five-year time periods 
ultimately outpaced Soviet Bloc military assistance to the region. 
Soviet and U.S. Economic Aid to the Buffer Zone 
Could U.S. accusations have some merit when including economic aid 
allocations? Were the Soviets trying to consolidate existing alliances? Breaking down the 
three time periods, I find that the U.S. and the rest of the G7 (Table 26) provided 5463, 
2935, and 3469 million in economic aid to the buffer states during the 1965-1969, 1970-
1974, and19 75-1979 time periods while the Soviet Bloc provided 871, 1058, and 2706 
million during those same comparable five-year time periods. At first glance it seems a 
first that the Soviet Bloc is actually catching up to the West. Perhaps the Soviets are 
seeking to attain greater influence in this region and/or consolidate existing alliances? 
However, once I focus attention on Pakistan and Afghanistan (Table 27), which 
became the most competitive part of the Buffer Zone, I find that the West allocated 240 
per year (2160 million total) in economic aid towards Pakistan between 1972 and 1980. 
Of that total, 306 million per year (1530 million total) were allocated during the 1975-
1979 time period. In contrast, the Soviet Bloc provided 78 million per year of economic 
assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan during the 1972-1980 time period and 122 million 
per year between 1975 and 1979. So how exactly is the Soviet Bloc being aggressive in 
the Pakistan/Afghan region when the West’s economic assistance towards its Pakistani 
ally completely outpaced Soviet economic aid? Quite the contrary, this suggests the 
Soviets were not as aggressive as the U.S.  
Even more significant is the fact that Soviet Bloc economic aid increases towards 
Afghanistan only jumped from 15 million per year to 51 million per year (Table 28) 
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during the 1965-1974 and the 1975-1979 time periods. The majority of Soviet economic 
aid increases in the Pakistan/Afghanistan part of the Buffer Zone was actually funneled 
towards Pakistan during the 1975-1979 time periods (Table 28). So how could U.S. 
policymakers suggest the Soviets were seeking to expand their influence in Afghanistan?   
Why do I include the other G7 countries when my methodology suggests Western 
cooperation may be much less in the economic aid arena? The answer is pretty simple. 
France, Germany, and the U.K. (in particular) have traditionally worked together with the 
U.S. to dominate the oil-producing centers of the world. They certainly did not wish for 
the U.S.S.R. to advance in this part of the world. Unlike in the rest of the Middle East, 
where the G7 economic aid was minimal (400 million), the rest of the G7 allocated 3261 
million between 1975 and 1979 to the buffer states. On the other hand, the Warsaw allies 
of the U.S.S.R. allocated just 135 million (USDA, 1975-1979).  
Section Conclusion 
 The process-tracing and quantitative evidence demonstrates that the Soviet Bloc 
was not aggressive with its foreign aid allocations (especially military) towards the 
Buffer Zone. Relative equality had long existed in the military sphere between the West 
and the Soviet Bloc several time periods prior to Détente. Most importantly, the 
historical/quantitative data highlights that the Western alliance’s strategic military aid (as 
well as economic) allocations towards Pakistan (the West’s buffer against the U.S.S.R.’s 
Afghan ally) trumped Soviet Bloc foreign aid. These findings seem to suggest that the 
U/S West was aggressive in the Buffer Zone. After all, Soviet actions can be viewed as 
defensive in nature.  The quantitative evidence backs up the theory that the Soviets only 
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invaded Afghanistan once the spread of Muslim fundamentalism threatened the territorial 
integrity of the Soviet Union.  
Thus, as argued in my previous chapter by Secretary of State Vance, it seems the 
Soviets did not possess any ill intentions towards this region. They had no designs to 
make further gains. Chapter three has followed those findings by showing that the Soviets 
were not allocating significant foreign assistance to this region during the final years of 
Détente. Of course, I shall look further into the archival evidence in the next two chapters 
for a better understanding of the Buffer Zone. 
These findings further enhance the arguments made by structural Marxists and 
weaken those of balance of threat realists.  The evidence does not show the Soviets 
enacting aggressive policies in this region. Quite the contrary, the evidence shows the 
West aggressively increasing their foreign aid towards Pakistan, which eclipses Soviet 
aid increases by a considerable margin. As mentioned before, however, I must consider 
the rest of the regional archival evidence before arriving at a final conclusion. 
Eastern Europe 
Section Introduction 
 Another way of measuring Soviet motives during the Détente time period is to 
quantify the amount of military and economic aid the U.S.S.R. allocated towards their 
traditional Cold War allies, the Warsaw Pact, before and after Detente. If I find that there 
was a shift in Soviet economic and military aid to this traditionally vital region, then it 
would be possible to say that the U.S.S.R. was paying less attention to its traditional 
sphere of influence and perhaps directing its attention and perhaps more to other corners 
of the world. In fact, some Western scholars have suggested that increased Soviet 
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economic pressure on the Warsaw Pact during Détente means the U.S.S.R. was trying to 
squeeze its profits from Eastern Europe as it increased foreign aid to other areas of the 
world.  
Evidence suggesting that the U.S.S.R. was withdrawing foreign aid from Eastern 
Europe does not seem to be at hand. Significant increases in Soviet military assistance 
towards their traditional Cold War allies during the Détente time period is found in the 
U.S. Disarmament Agency’s own WMEAT. Michael Marrese’s (1986) “The CMEA: 
Cumbersome But Effective Political Economy” further suggests that the U.S.S.R. 
increased its economic aid (subsidy/credit allocations) to Eastern Europe during Détente 
(p. 302).    
Soviet Military Aid to Eastern Europe 
 The U.S.’s own figures on Soviet military aid (Table 29) to Eastern Europe shows 
that Soviet military aid to its traditional allies increased dramatically from 440 million 
per year between 1964-1973 to 714 million per year between 1967 and 1976. Thus, the 
Soviets actually increased military aid towards their strategic Cold War allies in the years 
leading to Détente.  The trend continued into the heart of Détente (1973-1977 and 1974-
1977) as Soviet military aid doubled to 1468 and 1566 per year. However, as the final 
years of Détente (1975-1979) roll in, there seems to be a slight drop in military aid 
deliveries to 1400 million per year.  
Some may take the 1975-1979 drop in military aid as evidence that the U.S.S.R. 
was shifting Eastern European aid to other corners of the less developed world, but such 
an argument is simply very weak. Soviet military assistance during the final years of 
Détente (1975-1979) only dropped by 11% from the 1974-1978 time periods and was 
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twice and three times the level of its military aid packages to Eastern Europe during the 
1967-1976 and 1964-1973 time periods (Table 29). Soviet leaders simply did not 
decrease the most strategic type of foreign aid towards its traditional Cold War allies. 
Soviet Economic Aid to Eastern Europe 
Economic aid deliveries to Eastern Europe (although less significant than military 
aid), mostly allocated through trade subsidies, would be another way in which to assess 
Soviet foreign policy during Détente. Subsidies to Eastern Europe primarily involved 
giving oil and non-fuel raw materials at prices below the world market (they could have 
obtained higher returns by trading with the West) while also importing Eastern European 
manufactured goods at prices above the world market price (Marrese, 1986, p. 289).  
These “implicit” trade subsidies are found to have increased during the middle to latter 
part of the 1970’s (Marresse, 1986, p.302/Table 30). Marrese’s baseline calculation 
shows that Soviet economic assistance between 1974 and 1979 was three times (7283 
million per year versus 2485 million per year) that of 1970-1973 (Marresse, 1986, Table 
30, p. 302). 
There also seems to be little evidence that the Soviet Bloc was abandoning its 
Eastern European allies as it “increased its use of bilateralism in order to put more 
selective pressure on East European countries in order to receive more non-market 
benefits for its subsidies or to reduce the level of subsidization” during Détente 
(Marresse, 1986, p. 304). Marrese (1986) goes on to suggest that the renegotiation of the 
Bucharest Price Clause in 1975 (which deteriorated the terms of trade for Eastern 
Europe), seems to be connected to a general shift in the world market price for oil (p. 
305). Such increases meant the U.S.S.R. was not willing to forego the benefits of trading 
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oil with the West as world prices had just increased. To soften the blow for the Eastern 
European countries the U.S.S.R. restructured loan payments while also increasing ruble 
trade credits. The more strategic countries (such as East Germany) also received more 
credits.  
Section Conclusion 
Thus, evidence of the U.S.S.R. neglecting Eastern Europe is very much lacking. 
The foreign aid allocations (especially military) by the Soviet Union towards its most 
significant sphere of influence dramatically increased during Détente. The only evidence 
cited, such as increased economic pressure on Eastern Europe (in order to possibly use 
such economic aid in an attempt to gain influence in the less developed world), can be 
explained by a general shift in the world price of oil.  
Conclusion 
 Chapter Three has found that the Soviet Bloc was not aggressive in its desire to 
influence the less developed world. In fact, such an assertion must be seriously 
moderated. Correlating with my findings in chapter two, I find historical/quantitative 
evidence to suggest (allotments towards the most strategic allies, timing, character of the 
foreign aid, etc) that the U.S.S.R. was not seriously aggressive in either Africa, Middle 
East, Latin America, Asia, or the Buffer Zone. The U.S.S.R. also did not abandon its 
traditional allies during Détente. Military and economic assistance actually increased to 
the Eastern Bloc. On the other hand, I do find the U.S. to have been aggressive in some 
key regions, such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Asia. 
 Within Asia, I found that the West also benefited from the Sino-Soviet split in 
Indochina. The split changed the balance of power dynamics in Southeast Asia to the 
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benefit of the West while also forcing the U.S.S.R. to deal with Chinese-American 
encirclement. Moreover, fearing the expanding communist threats nearby, the ASEAN 
Western-elites worked with the Western Alliance to preserve their domestic power 
positions. Indeed, the Western military assistance towards the ASEAN very much 
surpassed Soviet assistance towards Vietnam during the final years of Détente. Economic 
assistance from the U.S. also spiked during the final years of Détente, especially towards 
ASEAN. Though Soviet aid towards Asia did significantly increase, most of this 
assistance was funneled towards Mongolia. Once I exclude Soviet assistance to 
Mongolia, which I characterize as defensive, it is obvious US assistance was much more 
aggressive than Soviet assistance. 
 Within the West’s most strategically vital area of the world, the Middle East, the 
Soviet Bloc moved to make gains several decades prior to Détente as it helped tilt the 
balance of power away from the West by providing foreign aid to and developing such 
allies as Egypt and Syria. However, not only did the balance of power actually shift more 
towards the West (chapter two), but I found in this chapter that the U.S./West 
strengthened its relationships with the most important countries of this region and 
provided significantly more military and economic aid assistance than the Soviet Bloc.  
 I have also shown how the Soviet Bloc was not aggressive within the African 
continent. Despite the much larger strategic military aid allocations towards Angola and 
Mozambique than that provided by the West, there are important historical/quantitative 
variables that suggest the U.S.S.R. was not aggressive in this region. First of all, the 
collapse of the Portuguese imperialists can be traced to the rise of nationalist movements 
in Angola that sought to end the economic and political repression. The Soviets had no 
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hand in this. Secondly, unlike the extensive economic support the Soviet Bloc provided 
to its Vietnamese ally, they did not come even close towards consolidating its Angolan 
and Mozambique gains in Africa during Détente. Finally, not only did the Soviets 
overwhelmingly focus on military aid, but I also found evidence suggesting Soviet 
military aid towards the rest of sub-Saharan Africa was not allocated in a strategic 
manner (may have been more interested in simply selling arms).  
  Latin America was certainly one of the most important regions during the Cold 
War. As an invariable American sphere of influence and the U.S.’s strategic rear, Soviet 
involvement brought much alarm from Washington. Still, despite possible Soviet 
intentions of making gains, as highlighted by their increased aid allocations towards 
Cuba, the U.S.S.R. did not send military aid towards Central America (via Cuba) until 
1981. Most of the increase in Soviet military aid to the region could simply be attributed 
to Cuban military support for Angola. The Soviets also did not aid in Nicaragua’s initial 
consolidation as they allowed other countries (Mexico, Western Europe) to send 
considerable amounts of economic aid towards Nicaragua. U.S. unwillingness to work 
with Nicaragua, in light of the Soviets not getting involved for several years, points to a 
much different picture of what exactly was going on in Latin America. Perhaps American 
leaders were more concerned with increased European influence in Latin America after 
Europe increased its trade links with Latin America during the 1970’s and became the 
dominant provider of military weapons to South America. 
My analysis of the strategic Buffer Zone highlighted a non-aggressive Soviet 
Bloc. The process-tracing data highlights that the Western alliance’s strategic foreign aid 
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allocations (both military and economic) towards the Pakistan/Afghan region increased 
much more than that of the Soviet Bloc during Détente.  
 Finally, the U.S.S.R. did not abandon its allies in Eastern Europe. Military 
assistance towards Eastern Europe actually increased during Détente. I also found that 
economic subsidies during the latter years of Détente were much higher than those 
allocated during the early part of the 1970’s.  
My findings strengthen the arguments made by structural Marxists and weaken 
those made by balance of threat realists.  The evidence does not support the assertion that 
the Soviet Bloc was aggressive in the less developed world. Just the opposite, the 
historical/quantitative evidence points to the West as the aggressive superpower Bloc in 
the less developed world. Nonetheless, I will now turn to the U.S. archives in order to 
attain a better picture. If I can uncover the same pattern, of Soviet caution and Western 
aggression, it would only strengthen my findings.  
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Table 2 
Communist Bloc Military Aid to Indochina before and after Sino-Soviet Split 
 
Years     Soviet-China Bloc  Just Soviet Bloc 
1967-1976- pre/Early Détente 4586 (459 per year)  3000 (300 per year) 
 
1973-1977- Middle Détente  2150 (430 per year  1620 (324 per year) 
 
1974-1978 Middle Détente II  2075 (415 per year)  1850 (370 per year) 
 
1975-1979- Late Détente   2000 (400 per year)  2000 (400 per  year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
 
Table 3. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Indochina and ASEAN Spheres of Influence 
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   Western Bloc 
1967-1976- pre/Early Détente  3000 (300 per year)  3750 (375 per year) 
 
1973-1977- Middle Détente I  1580 (316 per year)  2500 (500 per year) 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II 1800 (360 per year)  3050 (610 per year) 
 
1975-1979- Late Détente   2000 (400 per year)  3400 (680 per year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
 
Table 4. 
Soviet Economic Aid to Mongolia 
 
Years     Soviet Union    
1965-1969-pre-Détente   340 (68 per year)    
 
1970-1974-Early Détente   535 (107 per year)    
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   1900 (380 per year)    
Source: Bach (U.S.S.R.), in Millions  
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Table 5. 
Soviet and US Economic Aid to Asia (Excluding Soviet Aid to Mongolia)  
 
Years     Soviet Union   US 
1965-1969-pre Détente   240 (48 per year)  4495 (899 per year) 
 
1970-1974-Early Detente  500 (100 per year)  5560 (1112 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   670 (134 per year)  2728 (546 per year) 
Source: OECD (U.S.), Bach (U.S.S.R.), in Millions 
 
Table 6. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Middle East 
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1964-1973-pre-Détente   4120 (412 per year)  3010 (301 per year) 
 
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  6580 (658 per year)  8400 (840 per year) 
 
1973-1977-Middle Détente   7940 (1588 per year)  20480 (4096 per year) 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II 10640(2128 per year)  19600 (3920 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   12480 (2496 per year)  18400 (3680 per year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
 
Table 7. 
Soviet and US Economic Aid to Middle East  
 
Years     Soviet Union   US 
1970-1974-Early Détente   1022    608 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   1150    4488 
Source: OECD (U.S.), Bach (U.S.S.R.), in Millions 
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Table 8. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Strategic Areas of the Middle East  
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  5100 (510 per year)  4700 (470 per year) 
 
1973-1977- Middle Détente I  3400 (680 per year)  4755 (955 per year) 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II 4100 (820 per year)  6750 (1350 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   5300 (1060 per year)  8900 (1780 per year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions (Includes Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
UAE, Kuwait, Yemen Aden, Yemen Sanaa) 
 
Table 9. 
Western Military Aid to Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
 
Years     Israel  Saudi Arabia  Kuwait 
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  49 per year  144 per year  18 per year 
 
1973-1977-Middle Détente  160 per year 414 per year  85 per year 
 
1974-1978-Late Détente I  196 per year 600 per year  140 per year 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente II  172 per year 720 per year  150 per year 
Source: corresponding WMEAT, in Millions 
 
Table 10. 
Soviet Military towards Libya, Syria, Egypt  
 
Years             Libya          Syria       Egypt 
   
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente         1800 (180 per year)   2000 (200 per year)  2400 (240 
per year) 
 
1973-1977- Middle Détente I        2750 (550 per year)   2150 (430 per year)  950 (190 per 
year) 
  
1974-1978- Middle Détente II      4100 (820 per year)   3100 (620 per year)  750 (150 per 
year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente          5000 (1000 per year) 3950 (790 per year)  600 (120 
per year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
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Table 11. 
Western Military Aid to Egypt  
 
Years       West 
1967-1976  pre/Early Détente   245 (25 million per year) 
 
1973-1977- Middle Détente    590 (118 million per year) 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II  840 (168 million per year) 
 
1975-1979- Late Détente    1090 (218 million per year)  
 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
 
Table 12. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Horn of Africa  
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  245 (25 per year)  165 (17 per year) 
 
1973-1977 Middle Détente I  740 (148 per year)  280 (56 per year) 
 
1974-1978 Middle Détente II 1360 (272 per year)  360 (72 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   1730 (346 per year)  500 (100 per year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
 
Table 13. 
Soviet and US Economic Aid to Strategic Areas of Middle East 
 
Years     Soviet Union   US 
1969-1974-Early Détente   635 (106 per year)  350 (58 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   620 (124 per year)  5800 (1160 per year) 
Source: OECD (U.S.), Bach (U.S.S.R.), in Millions 
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Table 14. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Strategic Areas of Southern Africa 
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1973-1977-Middle Détente I  410    895 
 
1974-1978-Middle Détente II  925 (200 from Cuba)  860 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   1090 (400 from Cuba) 775 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions (Includes Angola and Mozambique for the 
Soviet Bloc and Zaire and South Africa for the West)-comparable five year time periods 
 
Table 15. 
Soviet Economic Aid to Strategic Areas of Southern Africa 
 
Years     Soviet Union    
1965-1969-pre-Détente   0     
 
1970-1974-Middle Détente   0     
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   31 (15 Angola, 16 Mozambique)   
Source: Bach in Millions 
 
Table 16. 
Soviet and US Economic Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Years     Soviet Union   US 
1960-1964-pre-Détente I  40    1807 
  
1965-1969-pre-Détente II  40    1560 
 
1970-1974-Early Détente   127    1150 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   247    2938 
Source: corresponding OECD (U.S.), Bach (U.S.S.R.), in Millions-comparable five year 
time periods 
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Table 17. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Latin America  
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1964-1973-Early Détente   310 (31 per year)  1783 (178 per year) 
 
1973-1977-Middle Détente   1030 (206 per year)  1851 (370 per year) 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II 1240 (248 per year)  2385 (477 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   1500 (300 per year)  2984 (596 per year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
 
Table 18. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Strategic Areas of Latin America  
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  355 (36 per year)  132 (13 per year) 
 
1973-1977-Middle Détente   480 (96 per year)  96 (19 per year) 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II 620 (104 per year)  120 (24 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   875 (175 per year)  160 (32 per year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions (Includes Cuba for the Soviet Bloc and 
Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador for the West) 
 
Table 19. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Strategic Areas of Latin America (Excluding 
Cuban Aid to Angola)  
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  355 (36 per year)  132 (13 per year) 
 
1973-1977-Middle Détente   480 (56 per year)  96 (19 per year) 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II 420 (84 per year)  120 (24 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   475 (95 per year)  160 (32 per year) 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions (Includes Cuba for the Soviet Bloc and 
Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador for the West) 
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Table 20. 
Soviet and Economic Aid to Cuba  
 
Years     Soviet Union    
1970-1974-Middle Détente   240     
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   1180     
Source: Bach, in Millions-comparable five year time periods 
 
Table 21. 
Economic Aid to Nicaragua by Respective Countries/Agencies 
 
Years    Soviet Union Mexico     Western Europe UN/World  
          Bank 
1979-1984   605  500  282  632 
 
Source: Stokes, in Millions 
 
Table 22. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to South America  
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1967-1976-pre/Early   165    2345 
 
1973-1977-Middle Détente   550    2051 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II 605    2745 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   650    2835 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
 
Table 23. 
Western Military Aid to South America  
 
Years     US      France   UK    Germ.   Canada Italy   
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  917 555  423  270   270    0 
 
1973-1977-Middle Détente  586 470  525  325   325    130 
 
1974-1978- Middle Détente II 610 535  550  400   410    240   
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   660 675  635  440   440     350 
Source: OECD (U.S.), in Millions 
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Table 24. 
Soviet and Western/Chinese Bloc Military Aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West-China 
1974-1978-Middle Détente I  350    755 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente I  475    850 
 
1976-1980-Late Détente II  460    1080 
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions-comparable five year time periods 
(Includes Pakistan and Afghanistan) 
 
Table 25. 
Soviet and Western Bloc Military Aid to Buffer Zone  
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1964-1973-pre Détente   1810    1960 
 
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  4180    4460 
 
1973-1977- Middle Détente      4340    5900 
 
1974-1978-Late Détente I  5920    8250 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente II  8020    9900 
Source: corresponding WMEAT, in Millions (Includes Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, Nepal, 
Bangladesh, and Afghanistan) 
 
Table 26. 
Soviet and Western Economic Aid to Buffer Zone 
 
Years     Soviet Bloc   West 
1965-1969-Early Détente   871    5463 
 
1970-1974-Middle Détente   1058    2935 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   2706    3469 
Source: OECD (U.S.), Bach (U.S.S.R.), in Millions (Includes Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, 
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan). The Soviet Bloc is comprised of the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany.  The Western Bloc is comprised of the U.S., 
France, U.K., Germany, Canada, and Italy. 
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Table 27. 
Soviet and US Economic Aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan  
 
Years     Soviet Union   US 
1972-1980-Détente    704 (78 per year)  2160 (240 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   609 (122 per year)  1530 (306 per year) 
Source: Bach (U.S.S.R.), OECD, in Millions 
 
Table 28. 
Soviet Economic Aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
 
Years     Afghanistan   Pakistan  
1965-1974-Early Détente   145 (15 per year)  56 (6 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente   255 (51 per year)  354 (71 per year) 
Source: Bach, in Millions 
 
Table 29. 
Soviet Military Aid to Eastern Europe 
 
Years     Soviet Union    
1964-1973-pre-Détente   4400 (440 per year)    
 
1967-1976-pre/Early Détente  7140 (714 per year)  
 
1973-1977- Middle Détente   7340 (1468 per year) 
 
1974-1978-Late Détente I  7830 (1566 per year) 
 
1975-1979-Late Détente II  7000 (1400 per year)    
Source: corresponding WMEATs, in Millions 
 
Table 30. 
Soviet Subsidies to Eastern Europe 
 
Years     
1970-1973 Early Détente    2485 per year 
 
1974-1979 Late Détente    7283 per year 
 
Source: Marrese, in Millions 
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Chapter IV: U.S. Archives and the Soviet Response in the Third World during Détente 
 
Introduction  
 
 In Chapter Four I examine archival documents from the Carter administration and 
the respective U.S. agencies during the Carter era (the Africa section includes Ford) to 
analyze Soviet actions during the Détente time period from the U.S.’s point of view. 
Documents from U.S. intelligence agencies (such as the CIA, State, Defense, and NSC), 
along with those of the U.S. executive branch, should provide a wealth of information 
about how U.S. decision-makers interpreted the balance of power during the late 1970’s 
(some Cuban and Soviet archives are interjected with the U.S. analysis). Thus, I seek to 
capture the foreign policy view of significant players and policymakers within the U.S. 
foreign policy apparatus. Did these leaders suggest that Soviet Bloc actions in the late 
1970’s were aggressive or cautious? If so, why did they believe so?  
 I separate the archives according to six specific regions that were highlighted in 
the introductory chapter. These regions include Latin America, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Middle East/Northern Africa, the Buffer Zone, and Eastern Europe. Approaching the 
study in this fashion gives me the opportunity to understand where exactly U.S. foreign 
policymakers believed the Soviets were mounting an aggressive push. Most importantly, 
do I find U.S. policymakers contending that the Soviets were overturning Western 
influence in vital areas of the world or just marginal ones?  
Chapter four will also examine the U.S.’s interpretation of Soviet actions in the 
strategic nuclear realm during the late 1970’s. As I mentioned in first chapter, some 
suggests that the strategic nuclear arms race was much more significant to the end of 
Détente than conflict in the less developed world. Thus, I will evaluate what U.S. 
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policymakers believed at the time. In any case, even if the strategic arms race was more 
important, the analysis of revolutionary conflict in the less developed world and the 
Soviet role in that conflict was certainly a contributing factor to Détente’s collapse.  
The synthesis of the regional and archival approaches is designed to test the 
competing theories of U.S. foreign policy laid out in this dissertation. These theories 
include realism, structural Marxism, and bureaucratic politics. Should I find significant 
chasms between different agencies in several regions of the world it would lend 
significant credibility to the bureaucratic politics approach. Evidence for this would be 
found in the form of one or several agencies pushing for a cautious approach while one or 
several competing agencies would push for a more aggressive approach. Should I find 
little or no significant chasms between different U.S. foreign policy agencies, then that 
would only strengthen the explanatory potential of either realism (aggressive U.S.S.R.) or 
structural Marxism (cautious U.S.S.R.).  
Of course, suffice it to say that the evidence from the previous chapters did not 
help push the case of traditional balance of threat realists. I did not find any significant 
evidence that the balance of power shifted in favor of the Soviet Bloc nor did I discern 
that the Soviet Bloc’s foreign aid contributions were significantly aggressive. Such a 
finding has given structural Marxism an advantage over balance of threat realism. Thus, 
chapter four will analyze the view of U.S. decision-makers in order to determine whether 
this advantage remains consistently accurate. In addition, this chapter gives me the 
opportunity to introduce bureaucratic politics as I can now analyze whether different 
intelligence agencies possessed different views of Soviet actions. 
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The Bureaucratic Battle between Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski: 
Section Introduction 
A good way to begin chapter four is to highlight the foreign policy battles during 
the final years of Détente between the State Department and the rest of the intelligence 
community (DIA, NSC, and CIA). The State Department, represented by Cyrus Vance, 
argued that the Soviet threat was far from imminent. Brzezinski and the rest of the 
intelligence community, on the other hand, believed the Soviets were placing significant 
pressure on the balance of power in the less developed world. They argued that the failure 
of the West to demonstrate strength and resolve towards Soviet interventions in Vietnam, 
Angola, and elsewhere was leading to increased Soviet adventurism and aggression in 
many parts of the world that were vital to Western security and economic interests.  
Brzezinski and the Hard Line View 
Parsing through key National Intelligence Estimates from November of 1977, I 
find a significant gulf within the U.S. intelligence community in regard to Soviet 
capabilities and intentions in the late 1970’s. These reports lay out two competing views. 
The first view, which was supported by Brzezinski and much of the Defense community, 
the CIA, and NSC, argues that the Soviets were ready to pounce on any sign of Western 
weakness. The hardliners argued that “in the Soviet view, the correlation of forces has in 
the 1970’s shifted in the U.S.S.R.’s favor and that this trend is likely to continue” 
(“Soviet Goals and Expectations”, p. xii). They also argued that Soviet leaders believed 
that “the U.S. and its allies had entered upon a new stage of “general crisis of capitalism” 
that will prove irreversible” (“Soviet Strategic Objectives”, p. 15). As a result, the 
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hardliners argued that the Soviets were ready to make gains at the expense of the Western 
alliance in the less developed world.  
These views led to aggressive actions on the part of the U.S. As chronicled by 
Brzezinski (1983) in his memoir, entitled Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National 
Security Advisor 1977-1981, the U.S. policies helped “squeeze the Soviets out of the 
game” in the Middle Eastern talks between the Israelis, Egyptians, and Arabs, pressed 
“China into anti-Soviet military preparations in the Far East” through the further use of 
the “China Card”, and convinced the “whites that there was a future for them” in South 
Africa (113, 196, 143). Diplomacy was simply dismissed by Brzezinski and his hard-line 
Bloc. Rather than negotiate with the Soviets in the Middle East or the Angolans in 
Southern Africa, Brzezinski pushed against dialogue and in favor of aggression. 
The Doves: Vance and the State Department 
A contrasting view, that of Cyrus Vance and much of the State Department, 
argued that Soviet leaders were considerably worried about the “U.S.S.R.’s economic and 
technological weaknesses and its conflict with China” (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in 
the Global Power Arena”, p. 16).  Vance and the State Department also argued that the 
Soviets attributed a great deal of “resilience to the capitalist economies and do not 
discount the recent turnaround in U.S. defense spending as a short-term phenomenon” 
(“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 16).  In short, this view 
posits the U.S.S.R. in the late 1970’s as trying to “keep pace” with the West. 
Therefore, former Secretary of State Vance’s memoir, entitled Hard Choices 
(1983), comes out strongly against the asymmetrical realism of Brzezinski. He suggests 
that many of the problems in the world, especially the less developed world, had nothing 
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to do with the Soviet Bloc. Vance argued that one of the major flaws of U.S. policy in the 
1960’s and 1970’s “was that it was too narrowly rooted in the concept of overarching 
U.S.-Soviet geopolitical struggle” and not enough on the potential for U.S.-Soviet 
cooperation across a range of issues (p. 27). Such issues included arms limitation talks 
and trade talks.  
Rather than using the aggressive realpolitik tactics of Brzezinski, Vance (1983) 
and the State Department also argued in favor of human rights. In their view, the 
promotion of human rights, especially in strategic areas of the less developed world, 
would help the U.S. pursue its trade interests while also curtailing the potential for the 
Soviet Bloc to take advantage of future revolutions in those oppressed countries (p. 120). 
Vance (1983) ultimately argued that he called on the U.S. to reduce U.S. assistance to 
many U.S.-backed murderous regimes, such as those in El Salvador and Nicaragua (p. 
122).  
Of course, suggesting that Vance’s views permeated the State Department must 
be further examined in the U.S. archives. Did Vance, and most importantly the State 
Department, truly believe that the Soviets did not pose a significant threat to the world 
balance of power? Could it be, as many on the left have suggested, that the State 
Department preferred to advance U.S. interests through the economic domain? These 
questions will be answered once I examine the archives below.  
The Hawks Win 
The victor in this struggle for bureaucratic influence was none other than 
Brzezinski and the hawks. Although President Carter seemed to have initially agreed with 
many of the ideas promoted by Vance, he eventually came to adopt Brzezinski’s instead. 
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Why did President Carter make this decision? Did he firmly believe that the Soviets had 
become a far graver threat then he had first perceived?  
The answer to this is apparently yes. Carter’s Presidential memoirs, entitled 
Keeping the Faith (1982), suggests that Brzezinski had firmly convinced him that the 
Soviets were engaged in large scale attempts at destabilizing U.S. and Western areas of 
interest in much of the less developed world (p. 53). However, it also seems that 
President Carter was “turned off” by the State Department. Carter writes that the State 
Department never produced new ideas, churned out public statements that were “always 
mild and cautious, and rigorously assessed plans to the breaking point” (p. 53). In sum, 
he argues that Vance “mirrored the character of the organization he led” (p. 53). On the 
other hand, Carter viewed Brzezinski as a “first rate thinker” who led a strong NSC staff 
to produce new ideas and “incisive analyses of strategic concepts” (p. 53). 
Probing Further into the Archives 
The battles between Vance and Brzezinski (between the State Department and 
Defense Department during the late 1970’s cannot be extrapolated (on their own terms) 
to suggest a significant chasm between U.S. foreign policies agencies in regard to the 
Soviet threat in the entire less developed world and the collapse of Détente. While they 
frame the debate in a constructive manner, especially in regard as to why I need to study 
the domestic politics approach, I must delve further into these respective foreign policy 
intelligence agencies (and the Carter Presidency) in order to determine whether these 
respective viewpoints had become crystallized within each respective agency.  
Overall, studying each respective agency further will be vital to the explanatory 
potential of realism and structural Marxism. The previous chapter already began to give 
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structural Marxism an advantage over balance of threat realism as I did not find that the 
Soviets were allocating foreign aid in a manner that was more aggressive than the West. 
Chapter four will allow me to test whether structural Marxism, arguing that the Soviets 
were cautious, holds out against balance of threat of realism and its proposition that the 
Soviets were aggressive in the less developed world during the final years of Détente.   
I will also introduce the theory of domestic politics in chapter four. Domestic 
politics argues that U.S. agencies ultimately battled it for control over the direction of 
U.S. foreign policy. Now that I am introducing the agency archives, I will begin to test 
domestic politics.   
Regional Analysis 
Section Introduction 
 I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that the regional section will explore 
the U.S.’s interpretation of the Soviet threat in the less developed world during the final 
years of Détente. Do I find a singular and dominant U.S. interpretation of the final years 
of Détente or was there competition between U.S. agencies (and the U.S. Presidency) in 
regard to differing views on Soviet foreign politics.  
Of course, it must be understood that differing agencies will place different types 
of emphasis on the Soviet threat depending upon their “intellectual mission.” For 
example, the Defense Department is going to emphasize military spending much more 
than the State Department would. However, there could come a point in which the 
customary bureaucratic competition for executive attention and federal resources could 
exceed a significant threshold.  
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Bureaucratic conflict would be evident should one agency (or set of agencies) 
advocate a significantly more aggressive or less aggressive foreign policy than another 
agency (or agencies). Indeed, should I find a significant split between competing U.S. 
foreign policy agencies (and President Carter), I will then probe whether this split can be 
found in all the regions of the world and/or the most vital and strategic areas of the less 
developed world. If this is the case, bureaucratic politics/domestic politics would have a 
significant explanatory advantage over realism and structural Marxism. 
Once I have finished my regional analysis of the U.S.’s outlook of the Soviet 
threat in the less developed world, I shall also analyze U.S. archives to determine the 
effect the race for strategic nuclear arms had on the collapse of Détente.  The strategic 
arms section will help me determine which argument, between strategic arms and Soviet 
involvement in the Third World, was the most dominant in U.S. foreign policy circles. 
That is, I seek to catalog the primary and secondary reasons for Détente’s collapse. 
U.S. Archives and the Balance of Power in Asia 
 
 Consistency between U.S. bureaucratic foreign policy agencies in regards to the 
balance of power in Asia, during the beginning stages of the Détente time period can be 
found in several CIA-lead Soviet Estimates. A 1973 CIA report entitled “Soviet Military 
Policy and Posture and Policies in the Third World”, which was backed up the State 
Department and the NSC, concludes that the “presence of a hostile China has had a 
dampening effect on Moscow’s inclination to encourage the appearance of radical or 
communist regimes or to welcome regional conflicts as opportunities for the extension of 
Soviet influence” (“Soviet Military Policy and Posture in the Third World”, p. 19). These 
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findings support, to a large extent many of my findings from chapter two (historical 
approach) and three (process-tracing/quantitative). 
However, I do find a break between these agencies, represented in my analysis 
below by the State Department, and the Defense Department. For instance, the State 
Department strongly argued that the rise of ASEAN helped weaken Soviet power in the 
region while expanding the possibility for U.S. (and Japanese gains). The State 
Department really hones in on ASEAN’s development and its effect on the balance of 
power. The Defense Department on the other hand was extremely worried that the naval 
balance of power was shifting in the Soviet’s favor. 
State Department’s Analysis 
 
Sino-Split Changes the Overall Balance of Power 
 
 An archival analysis of the State Department’s unclassified documents pertaining 
to Asia seems pretty much in line with my earlier findings in previous chapters. For 
starters, a 1975 declassified State Department briefing memorandum paints an upbeat 
picture for U.S. policymakers in Southeast Asia. Arguing that “the structure of the Major 
Power balance in the Far East appears unchanged in its essentials,” the memorandum 
stresses that the Soviets have “probably lost as much ground (versus China) in Northeast 
Asia (Korea, Japan) as they have gained in Southeast Asia (Hanoi)” (“U.S. Strategy in 
Asia”, p. 1).  
The memorandum all but dismisses the significant of Vietnam. Stressing that the 
U.S. must be “realistic in setting goals for our policies in Indochina”, the report argues 
that the U.S. “cannot expect to prevent Hanoi’s takeover of South Vietnam or its 
establishment of hegemony over all of Indochina” (“U.S. Strategy in Asia”, p. 25). U.S. 
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policy in the region was advised to focus on “discouraging interference by the Indochina 
states in the territory or affairs of neighboring governments by helping Thailand and 
Malaysia protect their borders and strengthening their internal security” (“U.S. Strategy 
in Asia”, p. 15).  
US Uses ASEAN to Strengthen its Balance of Power Position 
Thus, it should be no surprise that I find State Department declassified reports 
depicting ASEAN Bloc survival as the most important buffer to maintaining political 
stability in the region (containing the Soviet Bloc) for the West (“US Strategy in Asia”, p. 
25). Indeed, “U.S. Strategy in Asia” highlights the fact that the rise of the ASEAN Bloc 
has curtailed Soviet expansion and brought forth new gains for the U.S. and its Japanese 
ally. It contends that: 
despite our disengagement from Indochina and the decline in our military profile 
in the area, the trend towards the expansion of our trade (and Japan’s) and 
investment in East Asia and the economic integration (into the U.S.-led world 
system) of the Pacific Basin will continue (p. 26).  
 
The report also highlights a 30% increase in trade with the region as well as a 25% 
increase in U.S. exports to the region.  
Another report, entitled “Southeast Asia”, contends that “thanks to frequent and 
candid exchanges on the situation in Indochina and the ASEAN region, we (the U.S. and 
Japan) have helped “minimize the Soviet presence” (“Southeast Asia”, p. 1).  In fact, the 
U.S. was able to convince Japan that “regional stability (deterring U.S.S.R.) would 
depend on [securing] the economic and political strength of the ASEAN countries” 
(“Southeast Asia”, p. 3). Strengthening ASEAN is exactly why Japan “greatly stepped up 
its economic assistance” as well was as “trade and investment to the region” (“Southeast 
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Asia”, p. 1). After all, integrating its economy with the ASEAN Bloc was seen as 
essential for both the economic security of Japan and for the political security of the 
Western Alliance in the region.  
Economic Power Trumps Military Power 
All in all, U.S. strategy in Asia seems to suggest that all was well in Asia for U.S. 
interests during the middle years of Détente. The U.S.S.R. was contained thanks to the 
Sino-Soviet split, the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and the rise of ASEAN. Most importantly, 
however, the State Department report also seems to play down the importance of 
geostrategic and military competition. It explicitly suggests that neither China nor the 
U.S.S.R., nor developments in Indochina, would have much influence on the “economic 
forces at play” (“U.S. Strategy in Asia”, p. 9). Therefore, the report seems confident that 
offering better than usual economic deals would undercut revolutionary insurgency as 
well as any appeal for any nation to ally with the Soviet Bloc. China, the U.S.S.R., and 
Vietnam were simply not able to compete with the economic power of Japan and the U.S.  
 State Department reports do take into consideration Soviet increases in the usage 
of Vietnamese military bases. “Implications to Japan of Soviet Use of Vietnamese 
Bases”, one of these reports, suggest the Japanese shipping routes were now in greater 
danger (“Implications to Japan of Soviet Use of Vietnamese Bases”, p. 2). However, 
these reports did not suggest such developments were anywhere as significant as the 
downturn in Soviet momentum in the region. The State Department understood the 
Soviets were aggravated in the military domain. For instance, a 1983 report entitled the 
“Soviet Role in Asia” argues that Moscow was deeply frustrated about its “inability to 
convert its impressive and growing military presence in Asia and the Pacific and Indian 
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Oceans into a coherent role…in which the Soviets could project their political and 
economic influence” (“The Soviet Role in Asia”, p. 1). It argues that Soviet exclusive 
reliance on military power to push forward its goals ultimately undermined the potential 
for Soviet influence in the region. The Soviets failed to use economic aid as a weapon for 
political influence (unlike the U.S./Japan in regards to ASEAN). Less trade with both 
Japan and China was the ultimate result (“Soviet Role in Asia”, p. 1).  
Defense Department Analysis 
 
Section Introduction 
 
While State Department archives all seem to emphasize U.S. and Japanese gains 
via ASEAN, the Defense Department’s analysis of the region during the latter years of 
Détente focuses a bit more on the U.S./Japan-U.S.S.R. naval (as well as air) conventional 
balance of power in Northeast Asia. I find this evidence in three declassified reports; 
“The U.S./Japan-U.S.S.R. Balance (June 1978)”, “The Northeast Asia Balance (1977)”, 
and “Northeast Asia: Summary (October 1978)”. Every single one of these reports 
focuses on upgrading U.S. protection for Japan. They suggest that the regional naval 
balance of power was tilting and rectifying this “seems critical in pursuing U.S. interests 
and in re-enforcing allied perceptions of U.S. commitments and capabilities” 
(“U.S./Japan-USSR Balance”, p. 2).  These reports also find the Defense Department 
pleading for more conventional weapons from Washington.  
Japan Becoming Vulnerable 
 The aforementioned reports saw Japan as becoming more and more vulnerable 
against the Soviet Bloc. For instance, “Northeast Asia Balance” argues that Soviet 
capabilities in regards to air power (modernization of bomber and tactical aircraft) and 
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naval power (larger number of submarines with cruise missiles and amphibious ships) 
had significantly increased during this time period. An additional 28 submarines, 5 
missile cruisers, 7 missile destroyers, 14 frigates, and the “deployment of the Backfire 
Bomber in large numbers” were all cited as significant improvements that would increase 
the ability of the Soviet fleet to threaten Japan (as well as Korea) (“Northeast Asia 
Balance”, p. 1).  
 Another example of the Department of Defense’s Asian perspective can be found 
in its defense of the 1977 Japanese Defense White Paper. “Your Meeting with Ganri 
Yamashita”, which describes a meeting with the U.S. and Japanese secretaries of defense, 
finds U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown telling his Japanese counterpart that he did 
see the Western-Soviet strategic balance of power moving dangerously in favor of the 
Soviet Bloc (“Your Meeting with Ganri Yamashita”, p. 5). He tells the Japanese 
Secretary of Defense that his department was working diligently to help procure military 
resources for U.S. upgrades (“Your Meeting with Ganri Yamashita”, p. 6). Nonetheless, 
Secretary Brown also told his Japanese counterpart that Japan must modernize its air 
defenses, taking more responsibility over its defenses, in order to counter the Soviet 
threat.  
Ultimately, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sought to soothe Japanese 
fears in 1979. The Japanese were concerned about a Defense Department staff study 
entitled the “Swing Strategy”. This leaked study called for the U.S. to “swing” the Pacific 
fleet over to Europe should the U.S.S.R. mount an attack against Western Europe.  
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Defense Department in the Minority and Overall Soviet Caution 
It seems obvious that the State Department and the Defense Department had 
different perspectives about the most important aspects of U.S. policy in this region and 
about the balance of power. The Defense Department was ultimately in the minority.  
President Carter’s NSA Advisor at the time, Zbigniew Brzezinski, finds (as compared 
with the early part of the 1970’s) that “U.S. relations in Asia were [more] favorable 
[now]” thanks to stronger relationships with Japan, China, Indonesia, and India (“U.S. 
National Strategy”, p. 2). In the end, for Brzezinski (and his NSC) to weigh in on the side 
of the State Department is extremely revealing. As you will see in the rest of this 
dissertation, Brzezinski and his NSC often proved to be an intransigent roadblock for the 
State Department’s efforts in other regions (such as Afghanistan and Angola).  
Regardless, the important thing is that most U.S. agencies argued that the ability 
of the Soviets to improve their balance of power standing had been considerably reduced 
by the final years of Détente. The main reason for this was the Sino-Soviet split. Indeed, 
even after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 1978, I still find State, Defense, 
NSC, CIA, and President Carter concluding in June of 1980 that the Soviets were 
concerned about the increasingly negative effects of Sino-U.S. normalization and the new 
military alliance between China, Japan, and NATO (“U.S.-Soviet Relations and SALT”, 
p. 5). At the end of the day, it was apparent to U.S. officials, such as U.S. Ambassador to 
Japan Sherman William, that the “Sino-Soviet confrontation has created a favorable 
situation for the free world (since 1969). The PRC [China] serves a useful function in 
countering Soviet military strength” (“Security Issues at the Meeting between Prime 
Minister Fukuda and President Carter”, p. 2). 
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Overall, the archival data serves to further weaken balance of threat realism. 
Soviet caution goes against the theoretical canons of balance of threat realism. Of course, 
I must wait for further evidence to dismiss this thesis. 
Nonetheless, if the Soviets were not aggressive, why did the State Department 
place a significant amount of emphasis on ASEAN while the Defense Department did not 
furnish ASEAN this central attention? The theories of bureaucratic politics and structural 
Marxists can offer some suggestions. Bureaucratic politics would argue that the Defense 
Department had different interests than the State Department. Structural Marxists would 
contend that the State Department encompasses the “economic imperialist” wing of the 
U.S. while the other agencies encompass the military imperialist wing. Structural 
Marxists believe these different wings are created to reinforce each other.  
U.S. Archives and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 
 
Section Introduction 
 
 The archival record is extremely clear in regard to the Middle East. The Soviets 
did not make gains in this vital region of the world. All significant national security 
intelligence agencies agree to this. I do not find any dissenting views in this regard. These 
findings nicely confirm my findings from chapter two (historical approach) and three 
(process-tracing/quantitative). 
U.S. Agencies and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 
 Foreign policy unity, among major U.S. agencies, can be found in “Soviet Goals 
and Expectations in the Global Power Arena.” This major CIA-led U.S. intelligence 
report (also supported by State, NSC, and the Defense Department) argues that the 
Soviets did not make balance of power gains in the Middle East. In fact, the part of the 
160 
 
less developed “considered of greatest concern to the Soviet Union” is where the Soviets 
“since the early 1970’s endured a succession of severe setbacks, most notably their 
humiliating expulsion from Egypt (which occurred in the mid 70’s)” (“Soviet Goals and 
Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 52). In addition, in regard to Soviet gains in 
Libya and Yemen, the May 1978 U.S. intelligence report suggests that such gains were 
“poor compensation for their losses” (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global 
Power Arena”, p. 52).  
The loss of Soviet influence does not end there. The report further cites several 
“converging” developments to show that “Soviet freedom of action has been constricted” 
(“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 52). These developments 
included the rise of the oil-producing states (Saudi Arabia and Iran), Soviet failings to 
counter Israeli influence through the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the 
increasing tilt of the radical Arab nations towards the industrial West. Thus, the U.S. 
archives show that the Soviet Bloc was losing ground in the region while the U.S. and its 
allies were increasing their gains. Even Japan (according to the NSC) was helping to 
enhance the Western Alliance in the region with its “generous” economic aid packages 
towards Egypt and Turkey in 1979 (“Japan and the Middle East”, p. 1). 
Additional support for this thesis can be found in another report from the CIA. 
“Changes in the Middle East: Moscow’s Perceptions and Options”, a CIA report from 
1979, underscores the Soviet Bloc’s “marginal” ability to injure U.S. interests in this 
region of the world. Framing the discussion around the theoretical possibility that the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty could push some Arabs nations to move closer to the Soviet 
Bloc, the report cites a list of political (U.S.S.R. does not hold the key in the Arab-Israeli 
161 
 
conflict), military (U.S.S.R. does not want to fight the U.S.), and economic (Arab nations 
desired Western currency and technology) impediments to such a prospect (“Changes in 
the Middle East”, p. iii). Thus, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was to the benefit of the 
U.S. The treaty was helping to drain the swamp of Soviet opportunities. 
The Soviets in the Horn of Africa 
 Did the Soviets make up this ground in the Middle East by turning up the heat in 
the Horn of Africa? “Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena” does not 
believe so. Rather than follow the rhetoric espoused by some hawks (Brzezinski’s public 
comments come to mind) that the Soviet Bloc was striving to gain complete control of 
the Horn, the report accurately describes the limitations of Soviet intervention in the 
region. For instance, the report points out that “having been ousted from Somalia and the 
Berbera base because of their support for Ethiopia in the Ogaden conflict”, the U.S.S.R. 
helped the Ethiopians win the conflict (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global 
Power Arena”, p. 52). I articulated this during my process-tracing approach in the Middle 
East section of chapter two. Soviet actions were not aggressive, but can instead be 
described as an attempt to hemorrhage “an increasing threat to the credibility of their 
pretensions to status as a great world power” (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the 
Global Power Arena”, p. 53). Since the Soviets were less optimistic now about making 
gains in the Middle East, the report describes the Soviet actions in the Horn as an attempt 
to “advertise Soviet-Cuban capabilities nationalist movements” in Sub-Saharan Africa (as 
the Horn served as a bridge to the rest of Africa) (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the 
Global Power Arena”, p. 53).  
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Section Conclusion 
  By and large, my analysis of the U.S. agencies shows that the Soviet Bloc was 
extremely cautious in this area of the world (which was also found in the historical and 
foreign aid quantitative evidence from the previous chapters). The fact that the CIA, 
NSC, and Defense (all usually considered more hawkish than State) perceived the Soviet 
threat in the Middle East during the late 1970’s to be cautious speaks volumes about the 
U.S.S.R.’s weaknesses in the region. Indeed, the aforementioned reports argued the 
political and economic landscape of the Middle East favored the U.S. and its surrogates 
in the region. Once Egypt turned against the Soviet Bloc, the cards were simply stacked 
against the Soviets.  
The archival evidence in this chapter, coupled with the evidence in the previous 
chapter showing the Soviet Bloc was cautious, diminishes balance of threat realism in 
favor of structural Marxism. Structural Marxists can clearly argue that the U.S. was 
determined to defend the area of the world that was most strategic to the interests of U.S. 
and Western capital and thus took aggressive action to secure this area. Domestic politics 
seems rather weak in this region. I do not find any chasms between any U.S. intelligence 
agencies. 
U.S. Archives and the Balance of Power in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Section Introduction 
  
My archival examination of Sub-Saharan Africa focuses on Angola as it was the 
single most strategic country that was in dispute in this region. My analysis will focus of 
the initial outbreak of violence during the middle part of the 1970’s. Overall, I will seek 
to determine which superpower, if any, was primarily responsible for the Soviet gain of 
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Angola.  Did the Soviets pluck this strategic country away from the West or did the 
U.S./West perhaps push Angola towards the hands of the Soviet Bloc (notwithstanding 
the long-standing Portuguese exploitation of Angola). I will also study the role of Cuba 
during and throughout the initial Angola civil war. Was Cuba selected and pushed as a 
Soviet-driven proxy to fight for Soviet interests in the less developed world? 
On the whole, my analysis yields interesting results. I initially find the NSC and 
the State Department to be on the same page. The initial documents from the NSC 
suggest that the Soviets were cautious in early 1975 (backing up the historical and foreign 
aid quantitative findings from the previous chapters). The initial archives (June of 1975) 
from the State Department also described Soviet actions in Angola as “modest.” After all, 
State Department documents argued that Soviet aid was only helping the MPLA level the 
playing field with its competitors. The National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) had already 
received several months of assistance from China and the U.S. However, the NSC’s and 
the State Department’s analysis of Soviet actions in Angola during mid-1970’s (once 
MPLA achieves victory) eventually gives way to a more aggressive one. Subsequent 
documents from the latter part of 1975 argued that the Soviets had been determined to 
reverse the balance of power in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.  
I also examine whether or not Cuba was truly a Soviet proxy during the initial 
launch of the conflict. Considering much of the initial support to the MPLA came from 
Cuba, examining the ties between Cuba and the U.S.S.R. is very significant. Were the 
Soviets truly pushing the Cubans to fight in Angola? My research suggests this was not 
the case. The Cubans wished to fight in Angola, they pushed the Soviets into Angola, and 
164 
 
they were even willing to help in Angola when the potential for Soviet assistance to dry 
up was a possibility. In addition, NSC and State Department archives do acknowledge 
that Cuba was not just another Soviet proxy. These agencies admit that Cuba’s actions in 
Sub-Saharan actions did take into consideration Cuba’s political and strategic interests.  
The NSC’s Analysis of Angola before and after MPLA Claims Victory 
 
Declassified reports from the NSC, such as “United States Policy toward Angola” 
and its second version also entitled “NSSM-224 United States Policy towards Angola”, 
which were all written before the MPLA achieved victory, put forward the view that 
placating local regional allies explains Soviet assistance towards the MPLA. They 
contend Soviets did not seek to alter the balance of power in Angola at the time. Quite the 
contrary, both reports argue that “the Soviets would appear to have few, if any, important 
economic or strategic interests in Angola and their support for the MPLA appears to be 
dictated by their desire to maintain credibility and influence with their various clients-the 
MPLA, Congo, Algeria, and the communists in Portugal” (“NSSM-224 United States 
Policy toward Angola”, p. 56). 
On the other hand, the same report still argues that communist assistance was of 
“major significance” to the MPLA in early 1975. Were it not for Soviet Bloc military 
assistance, MPLA aggression in Southern Angola would not have been possible. 
Moreover, the battles instigated “by the MPLA (in early 1975), resulted in a significant 
improvement of the MPLA’s military fortunes at the FNLA’s expense and made it 
increasingly difficult for UNITA to maintain its preferred role as natural mediator above 
the fray” (“NSSM-224 United States Policy toward Angola”, p. 56). As such, the NSC 
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summarized that Soviet/MPLA actions were slightly aggressive. Soviet/MLA actions 
ultimately created the conditions for a possible civil war.  
Once the MPLA declares total victory, I do find the NSC arguing that the Soviets 
were determined (from the get-go) to seriously alter the balance of power. “Approaches 
to Dealing with the Soviet Union” and “The Soviet Union; Europe; The Middle East; 
South Asia; Angola” are two December 1975 reports published with the assistance of the 
NSC. Highlighting important conversations between President Ford, Secretary of State 
Kissinger, and Chinese Premier Mao Zedong, the reports suggest the Soviet actions in 
Angola were nothing short of expansionist (“Approaches to Dealing with the Soviet 
Union”, p. 4). 
State Department Analysis of Angola before and after MPLA Claims Victory 
 
The initial reports from the State Department back up the initial ones from the 
NSC. In fact, the State Department responded to the NSC’s “United States Policy 
Towards Angola” with a special memorandum on June 25, 1975 and concurred with the 
initial NSC report. It argues that “up until now their [Soviet] interests appeared modest” 
(“Special Sensitive memorandum Regarding the Response to NSSM-24”, p. 5). Other 
documents from the State Department also contend that Soviet assistance towards the 
MPLA in March of 1975 was allocated in a manner as to bring the MPLA up to par with 
the FNLA (Bender, 1978, para. 8). Soviet aid towards the MPLA was only making up for 
all of the months of assistance that the FNLA had received from China (primarily) and 
the U.S.  
Subsequent reports from the State Department suggest the Soviet Bloc was an 
aggressive actor in Southern Africa in early 1975. “A Brief Chronicle of Events in 
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Angola”, a secret State Department report from that year, argues that “a substantial 
increase in Soviet military assistance (to the MPLA) took place in March of 1975, when 
both air and sea deliveries were noted” (“A Brief Chronicle of Events in Angola”, p. 2). 
Such massive Soviet assistance to the MPLA, during the time in which the Alvor 
Agreement (a peace treaty among the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA) was signed meant the 
Soviets (or the MPLA) did not take the agreement very seriously. “A Brief Chronicle of 
Events in Angola”, as well as another State Department report from late 1975 entitled 
“Discussion of U.S. Policy and Soviet Involvement in Angola”, contended that instead of 
promoting peace in the region, Soviet military assistance in early 1975 served to turn the 
MPLA into an “intransigent” and aggressive force in the region (“Discussion of U.S. 
policy and Soviet Involvement in Angola”, p. 2). In fact, Soviet arms “changed the 
balance of power and ruined any hopes for a compromise” (“Discussion of U.S. policy 
and Soviet Involvement in Angola”, p. 3). Soviet aid beefed up the MPLA to the point 
where it believed it could run roughshod over the FNLA and UNITA despite the fact that 
these two groups together comprised a majority of the citizens of Angola.  
 The latter views of the State Department seem quite hypocritical however. A State 
Department report in June, one month before the MPLA achieved total victory, actually 
admits that a Soviet-backed MPLA victory would probably occur anyway (“Special 
Sensitive Memorandum Regarding the Response to NSSM-24”, p. 2).Why the sudden 
reversal? 
Cuba’s Role in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cuban and Soviet Archives) 
 
 To better understand what was occurring in this region it would be wise to study 
Cuba’s role in the Angolan conflict. There is evidence that Cuba actually pushed the 
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Soviets. Newly released documents from the Soviet Bloc, as well as Cuba, assert that 
Cuba was very much an independent instigator in the Angolan civil war.  
 For instance, Soviet archives argue that the initial deployment of Cuban troops in 
early 1975, in order to help the MPLA declare itself the leaders of the national 
government in Angola, came completely without the consent of Soviet leaders (Une 
Odyssee Africaine). N. Broutens, a member of the Soviet Politbüro, claims that the 
Soviets were enraged by these Cuban actions. The Soviet Bloc was striving for caution in 
this region and their most immediate pressing issue at the time was only to “prevent 
apartheid from making itself comfortable in Angola” (Une Odyssee Africaine). Pushed in 
by the Cubans, the Soviets had no choice but to defend their allies and their credibility.                            
 Cuban documents from 1975, recently retrieved by Peter Gleijeses (2003), in 
Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, also contends that 
Cuba initially intervened in Angola without the consent of the Soviet Bloc (p. 4). They 
firmly capture why Cuban leaders were determined to get involved in Angola in the first 
place. The Castro regime ultimately believed, as some U.S. documents suggest down 
below, that supporting left-wing revolutions in the less developed world would hurt the 
economic and political interests of the U.S. (Gleijeses, p. 6). They truly hoped that by 
embroiling the U.S. in costly and distant conflicts they would invariably be defending 
their own revolution at home. The weaker the U.S. was and the more pre-occupied it was 
in the less developed world, then the less likely it was that the U.S. would seek to engage 
in counter-revolutionary activity in Cuba.  
 Gleijeses (2003) also retrieved documents from 1975 that show how Cuba was 
more than willing to aid the Angolans in their fight against the U.S. “imperialists” even 
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without significant support from the U.S.S.R.  His archival research also shows Cuban 
leaders (such as Raul Castro and Raul Diaz Arguellas) and Angolan President Agostino 
Neto agreeing that Soviet assistance towards Angola was not enough (p. 134).  Neto goes 
on to blast the Soviets for not stepping up in the fight between socialism and the forces of 
imperialism. However, the Cubans would simply not be deterred in aiding the Angolans. 
The Cubans responded to Neto’s Soviet complaints by stating that they would continue to 
help the Angolans “indirectly or directly” in this cause.  
U.S. Archives on Cuban Independence 
Though U.S. archives do not specifically suggest Cuba was the primary instigator 
of the conflict in Angola, they do leave the possibility open. They do contend that Cuba 
did act in a quasi-independent manner as it pursued its political and strategic interests. 
For instance, NSC documents admit that Cuba was neither a “slave (to the Soviet Bloc) 
nor an autonomous international actor” during the late 1970’s in Angola (“The Cuban- 
Soviet Relationship”, p. 1).   
In fact, archives from the NSC paint a much more complex view of Cuba’s 
motivations for the war in Angola and throughout the less developed world. The NSC’s 
“Cuban Intervention in the Third World” posits that “Cuba’s aggressive posture in the 
international arena (Angola specifically) evolved directly from Fidel Castro’s belief in his 
historical role as a revolutionary leader of the Third World and from his hostility to the 
U.S.” (“Cuban Intervention in the Third World”, p. 1). The Cuban leader was simply 
determined to lead the “struggle against Western exploitation” (“Cuban Intervention in 
the Third World”, p. 1). After all, the Castro brothers truly believed that Cuba’s 
sovereignty (or perhaps their control of Cuba) was continuously threatened by the U.S. 
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Thus, they believed that the best way to defend Cuba was to help unleash continuous 
“Vietnams” for the U.S. to deal with. Of course, it is understood that Cuba was 
financially limited in its abilities to project force “without Soviet cooperation and 
support” (“Cuban Intervention in the Third World”, p. 3). However, despite this 
important limitation, the NSC documents suggest that Cuba was not involved in Africa 
solely or even primarily at the Soviet’s behest” (Cuban Intervention in the Third World, 
p. 3). 
 Comments from Kissinger, the Secretary of State at the time, also suggest that 
Cuba had its own political and strategic interests that were independent from those of the 
U.S.S.R. Speaking with Vice President Spiro Agnew, Kissinger states that: 
 
 If Cuba is free to act as a revolutionary surrogate wherever it wants, its prestige 
 in Latin America is bound to rise. If we tolerate Cuban adventures in Africa, it 
 scares the hell out of the Latin American Presidents I talked to on my trip. In 
 Colombia and Venezuela, they were afraid that the Cubans may at some point get 
 all the black Caribbean countries together and make a race war against the Latin 
 American countries which pretend to have integrated societies but really don’t. 
 (“SALT, Soviet-U.S. Relations, Angola, Cuba, Africa, PRC, TTBT/PNE”, p. 9) 
 
Kissinger’s analysis of Cuba’s role in Angola firmly demonstrates that Castro’s 
involvement in Angola significantly improved Cuba’s ability to pursue its political and 
strategic interests in Latin America. There was simply more to Cuba’s action that 
pursuing the strategic interests of the U.S.S.R. Kissinger’s subsequent comments also 
leads me to question whether the U.S. was more worried about Cuba’s involvement or the 
Soviet’s involvement. He explains to Spiro Agnew that, “I’m going to go to Africa soon 
and propose a solution for their problems in South Africa. But I can’t look as if fear of 
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Cuba is driving our position” (“SALT, Soviet-U.S. Relations, Angola, Cuba, Africa, 
PRC, TTBT/PNE”, p. 9). 
Section Conclusion 
 
  Fashioning a conclusion for this section is rather difficult. The initial U.S. 
documents from the State Department and the NSC argue that the Soviets did not seek to 
alter the balance of power and that their primary motivation was to mollify its local allies 
in the region (as the previous chapters showed). Once the MPLA achieved victory 
however, State Department and NSC archives start to interpret the U.S.S.R.’s assistance 
towards the MPLA (pre-MPLA victory) in a much different manner. They begin to 
contend that the Soviet Union was initially determined to reverse the balance of power in 
the Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 Ultimately, to better understand what was occurring in Angola during the middle 
part of the 1970’s, the next chapter will turn to analyzing U.S. actions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa during this time period. Analyzing U.S. actions would certainly help give insights 
as to how U.S. policymakers were interpreting the balance of power in this region After 
all, there is some evidence that the U.S. engaged in covert actions during the middle part 
of 1975. Perhaps this is why the U.S. altered its interpretation of the initial Soviet 
assistance. Could it be that U.S. agencies were upset that the U.S.’s aggressive actions 
did not go according to plan? 
In regard to the actions of Cuba during the early part of 1975, Soviet and Cuban 
archives do suggest that Cuba was the more of an instigator in this conflict than the 
U.S.S.R. U.S. archives also acknowledge that Cuba had a much larger independent role 
than that which was commonly portrayed in the news media. The NSC and State 
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Department archives show that the Cubans had a larger mission in Africa than just 
pushing ahead Soviet strategic interests.  
Overall, the findings in this chapter are mixed. For the first time, there is archival 
evidence that supports balance of threat realists. The archival research from the CIA/NSC 
demonstrated this. However, there is also evidence that favors structural Marxism. For 
those who adhere to bureaucratic politics they would dismiss these two previous theories. 
They would argue that bureaucratic competition explains U.S. action. As the next chapter 
will show, the aggressive CIA and the NSC overtook the State Department in the desired 
U.S. foreign policy approach. They would point to covert actions on the part of the 
CIA/NSC. 
U.S. Archives and the Balance of Power in Latin America 
 
Section Introduction 
 
 My findings from the U.S. archives show a rather cohesive foreign policy outlook 
from all agencies towards the balance of power in Latin America. Documents from U.S. 
agencies prove that Soviet involvement in the region, although increasing, did not make 
substantial gains in Latin America during the 1970’s. Soviet involvement, according to 
U.S. sources, was minimal. The archives show that the Sandinistas took power in 1979 
without much Soviet or Cuban military/economic aid. U.S. archives actually show that 
the Sandinistas received the bulk of their economic aid from non-communist countries. 
Finally, the archives also show that Cuban military aid (according to U.S. sources) 
towards Salvador and Guatemala began in the early 1980’s. 
 Therefore, U.S. archives (CIA, State, and DIA) blame revolutionary turmoil on 
the economic and repressive policies historically pursued by the U.S. and its clients in the 
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region. This is especially the case with Central America. The agency archives also 
suggest that the rise of the middle/professional classes of the region, such as in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, was a significant factor in the growth of nationalism in the 
region. Overall, economic and political repression in the less developed world, not Soviet 
aggression, explains the growth of revolutionary zeal in the much of Latin America.  
U.S. Agencies Agree that the U.S. is to Blame 
 A preponderance of U.S. agencies and archives suggest that Soviet involvement 
in Latin America was the U.S.’s own fault. Such was the conclusion of an April 1977 
CIA-led report (including State and Defense Department participation) entitled “Soviet 
Interest in Latin America.” The final page of the report states that, “in the final analysis, 
the key factor governing the extent of the Soviet-American relationship is the U.S. The 
Soviet Union still cannot influence Latin American affairs as much as it can exploit 
economic and political conditions and U.S. policies” (“Soviet Interest in Latin America”, 
p. 10). As such, as long as the U.S. “ fails to develop a consistent and acceptable policy 
for the region (moving away from exploitation and repression), political opportunism and 
tactical flexibility will work to Moscow’s advantage and further erode U.S. influence” 
(“Soviet Interest in Latin America”, p. 10). 
 Soviet caution in Latin America is the primary subject of a State Department 
report (from January of 1980) entitled “The Soviets in Latin America: Trends and 
Prospects.” Indeed, the report stresses that “despite or because of a generally non-
provocative approach, the decade of the 1970’s was a mixed record of gains and losses 
for the U.S.S.R” (“The Soviets in Latin America”, p. 3). The failure of the Chilean 
Marxists to consolidate their power is characterized in the report as a “severe blow to 
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Soviet expectations” (“The Soviets in Latin America”, p. 4). Although building some 
new trading relationships in South America and establishing military weapons sales to 
Peru, the only gain for the Soviets in the region came with the victory of the Sandinistas 
in Nicaragua.  
 Rather than provoke the ire of the U.S., the State Department report argues that 
the Soviet Union’s strategy in Latin America was to bide their time “in the Western 
Hemisphere in the expectation that Latin American disenchantment with the U.S. will 
rebound to their benefit” (“The Soviets in Latin America”, p. 3). The Soviets simply 
concentrated on improving cultural ties, trading relationships, and building state-to-state 
relations. Why such a cautionary approach? Besides the obvious fact that direct Soviet 
intervention would bring the wrath of the U.S. military, the report argues that the Soviets 
preferred the gradualist approach as they had learned that “anti-U.S. feelings did not 
automatically translate into pro-Soviet sentiment” (“The Soviets in Latin America”, p. 3). 
Thus, the Soviets did not believe that a U.S. loss would automatically turn into a Soviet 
gain. The U.S.S.R. also did not want “the burden of another Cuba in Latin America…The 
lesson it deduced from Chile was that Marxist revolutions must not only achieve power 
but must be able to protect themselves once they are in power” (“The Soviets in Latin 
America”, p. 15). 
 The rest of the foreign policy intelligence community agreed that Soviet policy in 
Latin America during the late 1970’s was cautious. “Soviet Goals and Expectations in the 
Global Power Arena”, a 1978 Soviet Secret Estimate produced by the CIA, Defense, 
NSC, and the State Department, stated that Latin America received a much “lower Soviet 
priority” than Africa or Asia (Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena, 
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p. 4). U.S. agencies argued that “Moscow’s diplomatic posture since the fall of the 
Chilean President Allende is fundamentally one of watching and waiting” (“Soviet Goals 
and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 4).  
The Soviets and Nicaragua 
 Most significantly, the archives also show that the Soviet Union and Cuba did not 
materially aid the Sandinistas in the late 1970’s. According to the CIA, “the Cubans were 
cautious in their dealings with the FSLN (in 1978 and early 1979) because they had been 
skeptical about the group’s capabilities and sensitive to international opinion” (“The 
Situation in Nicaragua”, p. 6). The report argues that Cuba “declined repeated Sandinista 
appeals for money, arms, and increased training outside of Cuba.” Cuba’s initial support 
for Nicaraguan revolutionaries in late 1979 consisted of organizational training “to help 
iron out their factional differences” (“The Situation in Nicaragua”, p. 6). It is only several 
months after the Nicaraguan Revolution that the Cubans substantially aided the 
Sandinistas.  
  However, Cuba did provide more than just organizational report to the rest of 
Central America during the early part of the 1980’s. The CIA, in such documents as 
“Cuba-Nicaragua: Support for Central American Revolutionaries: The First Six Months”, 
“Threat of a Leftist Extreme Makeover in El Salvador”, and “Cuba-Nicaragua: Support 
for Central American Insurgencies”, all suggest that Cuba provided a significant amount 
of military support to revolutionary groups in Central America. Such Cuban actions, 
however, occurred after the collapse of Détente. 
  The U.S. archives also show that the Soviet Union did not substantially equip 
Cuba for any direct type or large-scale involvement in Latin America during the Détente 
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time period. The CIA’s “Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba in 1979 and Trends in 1980” 
shows that the bulk of Soviet military aid during the late 1970’s was not geared toward 
disrupting the political dynamics of Latin America. Soviet military assistance to Cuba 
during the 1970’s, as argued in the previous chapter, actually aimed at funding Cuba’s 
military operations in Angola. The majority of the Soviet military aid increases (about 
7000 tons) from 12,000 tons a year during the 1970-1975 time periods to 21,000 tons a 
year between 1976 and 1978 reflected “the replacement of equipment sent by Cuba to 
Third World countries, particularly Angola” (“Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba in 1979 
and Trends in 1980”). So connected were Soviets’ military shipments to Cuba and the 
war in Angola that it was precisely the waning war in Angola that lead to a significant 
reduction (about 5000 tons less in 1979 from 1978) in Soviet military aid towards Cuba 
(Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba in 1979 and Trends in 1980).  
 The Sandinistas also did not illicit substantial economic support from other Soviet 
Bloc nations, such as the Eastern Bloc. Indeed, U.S. archives corroborate my findings 
from earlier chapters in regard to how the bulk of Nicaraguan assistance came from non-
Soviet sources. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the Soviet Bloc provided 
only $102 million in loans between July 19, 1979 and February 28, 1982 out of a total 
worldwide pledge of $1.2 billion to Nicaragua. Western Europe, with $129 million, and 
Latin America, with $230 million, provided substantially more loan support (“Aid to 
Nicaragua Since the Revolution”, p. 1). Most importantly, loan aid from international 
institutions (such as the International Development Bank) totaled $486 million (“Aid to 
Nicaragua Since the Revolution”, p. 1). The Soviet Bloc was also trumped in the 
176 
 
economic grants category by Western Europe, which was its sole competitor in this 
category, $129 to $71 million (Aid to Nicaragua Since the Revolution, p. 1). 
The U.S. and Central America 
 Thus, U.S intelligence agency archives confirm that U.S. policy was to blame for 
revolutionary turmoil. In stark contrast to much of the political rhetoric at the time, U.S. 
archives suggest that the growth of the revolutionary left in Central America in the 
1970’s, the area of Latin America of most strategic concern to the U.S. was the result of 
the poverty and political repression that U.S. policy had helped initiate.  
“Country Analysis and Strategy Paper: Guatemala”, an NSC report, confirms that 
years of U.S support for politically and economically repressive policies in the region 
were contributing to revolution in Guatemala. As a result, “Country Analysis and 
Strategy Paper: Guatemala” argues that “only by providing the people with an ever-
increasing measure of participation in the political process and in the economic wealth of 
the country will Guatemala remove the underlying causes of instability” (“Country 
Analysis and Strategy Paper: Guatemala”, p. 1). Thus, the U.S. government, with the 
backing of the conservative government in power at the time, agreed that best manner in 
which to preserve the best interests of each respective nation would be through the “the 
progressive strengthening of democratic institutions and practices; and the 
implementation of basic economic and social reforms”  (“Country Analysis and Strategy 
Paper: Guatemala”, p. 1). 
  CIA reports also agree that politically and economically repressive policies in the 
region were contributing to revolution in Central America. A February 1980 CIA report 
on El Salvador points out that the “brutal and repressive measures against the poor of the 
177 
 
population” during the 1950’s and 1960’s by the monopolistic military and the laissez-
faire economic policies of the traditional economic elites (pushed by the U.S.) were 
important reasons for the rise of the communists in El Salvador (“El Salvador: The 
Potential for Violent Revolution”, p. iii).  
 Robert Pastor (1992), U.S. national security advisor for Latin America under 
President Carter, argued that the rise of the middle classes in Nicaragua was directly 
responsible for the increased pressure on the oligarchic regime (p. 25). This is 
corroborated by U.S. agency reports. These reports argued that the system was stable 
(kept in check in a brutal fashion) until the emergence of certain sectors of the middle 
class which “launched new political and interest groups” in the 1960’s and 1970’s in an 
attempt to gain a larger share of political and economic power (“El Salvador: The 
Potential for Violent Revolution”, p. 1). Their efforts, the efforts of professionals, 
teachers, skilled workers as well as the labors of the Catholic Church to end political and 
economic repression ultimately “swelled the ranks of the Christian Democratic Party” 
(“El Salvador: The Potential for Violent Revolution”, p. 1). 
 Overall, U.S. agencies admit that this region had made the “grudging appraisal 
that they had been overly dependent on the U.S. for political, economic, and military 
assistance” (“Soviet Interest in Latin America”, p. ii) Blaming the U.S. for their 
economic problems and balance of payments difficulties, the underdeveloped agrarian 
societies of Latin America became “more receptive to Soviet aid offers” (Soviet Interest 
in Latin America, p. 8). They also sought to use their “raw materials as an economic lever 
against the U.S.” (“Soviet Interest in Latin America”, p. ii). 
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Carter’s Perspective 
 The belief that poverty and repression in Central America contributed to 
revolutionary turmoil, can also be found in the archives of President Carter. Following 
the Sandinista Revolution of 1979, President Carter outlines a memo arguing that the 
U.S. must push all Central American nations to make “the kinds of reforms necessary to 
deal with the inequities and inadequacies of the socio-economic and political structures. 
The alternative is revolution as occurred in Nicaragua” (“SCC Meeting on Central 
America”, p. 3). President Carter also pushed for humanitarian assistance for Nicaragua 
in an attempt to befriend the Sandinistas.  
Section Conclusion 
 
 These findings demonstrate a rather cohesive foreign policy outlook from all 
agencies towards the balance of power in Latin America. U.S. archives assert that Soviet 
involvement in the region, while increasing, did not make substantial gains in Latin 
America during the 1970’s (as chapter two showed). The Soviets feared angering the U.S. 
and they did not engage in covert actions in the region. Moreover, U.S. agencies (CIA, 
State, and the DIA) argued that political repression and economic problems significantly 
contributed to revolutionary turmoil in Latin America. Agency archives also suggested 
that the rise of the middle class in the region, such as in El Salvador and Nicaragua, was a 
significant factor in the growth of nationalism in the region. Indeed, the failure of the 
U.S. to deal with increasing nationalism in the less developed world, and not Soviet 
aggression, explains the development of revolutionary growth in much of Latin America.  
These findings fall right in line with those of structural Marxists. U.S. excesses 
were responsible for revolutionary turmoil. Balance of threat realists continue to have 
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their work cut out for them. Their argument that the Soviets were aggressive in this 
region during the 1970’s does not hold.  
U.S. Archives and the Balance of Power in Afghanistan 
 
Section Introduction 
  
To understand the U.S. analysis of the balance of power in Afghanistan I shall 
began by taking a hard look at documents from the State Department and its 
corresponding embassy in Kabul. These documents suggest that the Soviets were very 
cautious in light of the revolutionary turmoil that was occurring within its sphere of 
influence (as the previous historical and quantitative chapters showed). They also match 
up nicely with recently released Soviet documents that show Soviet leaders putting their 
utmost effort in trying to prevent having to send troops into Afghanistan. The CIA and 
NSC, largely silent during in U.S. archival analysis about events in Afghanistan, also 
seemed to have agreed with many of the assertions made by the State Department. 
Overall, interagency memorandums suggest the Soviets were going to painstaking means 
in order to not engage in a military invasion of Afghanistan.  
State Department View 
Recently declassified State Department memorandums make the case that the 
Soviet Union was extremely cautious in Afghanistan during the latter part of the 1970’s. 
“The Afghan Coup”, a secret memorandum delivered to Secretary of State Vance 
describing the 1978 leftist coup (which brought a Marxist regime into power), helps set 
the stage. “The Afghan Coup” argues that the “Soviets in the past years have acted with 
restraint toward Afghanistan and it would not seem to be to their advantage to assert 
control of this important non-aligned country” (“The Afghan Coup,” p. 1) It suggests that 
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while the Soviets may have tacitly approved of the coup, it was the internal domestic 
dynamics within Afghanistan that led to the coup in the first place.  
Additional archives from the State Department, such as “Soviet-Afghan Relation: 
Is Moscow’s Patience Wearing Thin”, a May 1979 secret State Department briefing 
memorandum, further chronicle the cautious behavior of the U.S.S.R. This State 
Department report also suggests the Soviets were concerned about how the internal 
politics of Afghanistan were causing significant problems for the Soviets.  It argues that 
“the Soviets may be annoyed at the haphazard and precipitous manner in which the 
Marxist DRA has plunged ahead with its reform programs without building the necessary 
public support…and [as a result] are facing a drastic rise in hostility among the 
traditionally xenophobic Afghan people” (“Soviet-Afghan Relations”, p. 2).  
The Soviets were also concerned about how their actions in Afghanistan would be 
viewed by the outside world. Rather than planning out any future invasion, the report 
mentioned above argues that “the Soviets are concerned by the effect their involvement 
in Afghanistan is having in the Moslem and Third Worlds (Cuba protesting). We doubt 
that the Soviets will turn loose of the Afghan tar baby, however, although they may try to 
engineer some changes at the top” (“Soviet-Afghan Relations”, p. 2).According to the 
State Department, the Soviets were also concerned about how developments in 
Afghanistan would affect SALT II negotiations.  
State Department/US Embassy Reports 
 Archives from the U.S. embassy, part of the State Department, in Kabul also 
focused on how domestic factors, such as Afghan leaders provoking the Islamic 
resistance movements (through unpopular policies), fermented the ingredients that would 
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eventually provide the sparks that would lead to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
(“United States Embassy: An Assessment of Soviet Influence and Involvement in 
Afghanistan”, p. 6). They chronicle how the new Marxist-Leninist regime infuriated the 
majority of the citizens in this conservative society. Pushing for agricultural 
modernization and the rights of women was simply too much for this conservative 
society. The result of the cultural backlash against these Western reforms was the rise of 
an Islamic insurgency movement.  
To deal with this opposition the Soviets urged the Afghan government to relax its 
reforms. The U.S. embassy in Kabul, reporting in September of 1979, argues that “the 
Khalqis have evidently been instructed by the Russians to tone down those aspects of 
their revolution which arose opposition” (“United States Embassy: An Assessment of 
Soviet Influence and Involvement in Afghanistan”, p. 6). For these reasons, Afghan 
leaders “declared (in mid-July of 1979) its land reform program successfully completed, 
thereby at least avoiding the creation of further opposition along the lines that this reform 
measure apparently had prompted” (“United States Embassy: Soviet Effort to Urge DRA 
to Find a Political Resolution of Domestic Conflict May be Underway”, p. 2). Other 
attempts to appease the opposition, according to the U.S. embassy, included declaring 
their literacy program a success as well as reducing the amount of agricultural land that 
would be seized from tribal leaders. Thus, the U.S. embassy in Kabul argued that political 
solutions, rather than military solutions were now the order of the day for the Afghan 
government and the Soviet Union.  
Ultimately, report after report from the U.S. embassy in Kabul stressed the fact 
that the Soviets were extremely cautious in how they handled the Afghan insurgency. 
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They did not seek an outright invasion. Even after the Islamic insurgencies were gaining 
ground, the Soviets still pushed for caution. Writing in May of 1979, a report entitled the 
“Soviet Role in Afghanistan”, points out that while “Soviet involvement in Afghanistan 
has increased (advisors and arms) perceptively in recent weeks [it] has not yet reached 
the exaggerated levels reported in the world’s press. Although there is a possibility that 
Soviet troops may intervene in this domestic conflict…the U.S.S.R. will probably avoid 
plunging into what could well become a Vietnam-type trap” (“United States Embassy: 
Afghanistan; Current Soviet Role in Afghanistan”, p. 2). “United States Embassy: 
Afghanistan; Current Soviet Role in Afghanistan”, the May of 1979 report cited above, 
also stresses that “in our opinion analogies with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
are faulty. We think the Soviets will continue to increase their advisory and logistical 
military support for the pro-Soviet Kabul people….and Moscow will probably avoid 
shouldering a substantial part of the anti-insurgency combat”  (“United States Embassy: 
Afghanistan:  Prospects for Soviet Intervention”, p. 1).  
Another memo from July of 1979 suggests the Soviets were cautious in regard to 
nearby Pakistan. An article entitled “Soviet Effort to Urge DRA to Find a Political 
Resolution of Domestic Conflict May Be Underway” underscores suggests that “there 
has recently been a moderation in this government’s (Afghanistan’s) anti- SI Pakistan 
propaganda.” Such a maneuver represented the Afghan government’s, at Soviet urging, 
attempt to “avoid or draw back selectively from confrontation” (“United States Embassy: 
Soviet Effort to Urge DRA to Find a Political Resolution of Domestic Conflict May be 
Underway”, p. 2). 
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The U.S. Embassy in Kabul also understood that invading Afghanistan would 
place important Soviet foreign policy interests in jeopardy. “United States Embassy: 
Afghanistan: Prospects for Soviet Intervention”, also argues that “a Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan would probably [be] to the disadvantage of its global strategic interests. It 
would deal a blow to Détente with the West at a time when Moscow is increasingly pre-
occupied with the growing Chinese threat in the East” (“United States Embassy: 
Afghanistan:  Prospects for Soviet Intervention”, p. 2). The report suggests that invading 
Afghanistan would allow China and the U.S. to paint the Soviets as Third World 
aggressors that should not be trusted by countries in the less developed world. Finally, the 
report contends that the Soviets also could never obtain the same result in Afghanistan as 
in Czechoslovakia. The rural topography of the country and the rural nature of the 
resistance were cited by the U.S. as constraining factors.    
Interagency memorandums Defer to State Department during Late 1979 
 
Besides the cautious analysis of the State Department and its embassy in Kabul, I 
find little interpretation of the events occurring in Afghanistan during the late 1970’s by 
the CIA, DIA, and the NSC. They seem conspicuously silent on this matter. What I do 
find are several Interagency Intelligence memorandums (which obviously include the 
CIA, DIA, and the NSC) suggesting that the Soviets were trying to evade an invasion at 
all costs. Responding to the increasing revolutionary turmoil on its border, an Interagency 
Intelligence memorandum for September 14, 1979 argues that “Soviet leaders may be on 
the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the 
regime and protect their sizeable interests in Afghanistan” (“The Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979”, para. 5). However, they couched their analysis by stating that the 
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Soviets would only do so in a gradualist fashion through the additional of some military 
advisors and small army units (“The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979”, para. 7).   
A subsequent Interagency memorandum, one that was actually commissioned by 
Brzezinski, concludes that “even if the current Afghan regime fractured and ‘no viable 
Marxist alternative’ emerged, ‘rather than accept the political costs and risks of a massive 
Soviet invasion to fight the insurgency,’ the Soviets ‘would promote installation of a 
more moderate regime willing to deal with them’” (“The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1979”, para. 11). The only way, according to the report, that the Soviets would invade 
would be if there was political chaos or if the Soviet-allied regime collapsed. Thus, while 
some elements of the U.S. bureaucracy disagreed over the reasons for the 1978 Marxist-
inspired coup, the entire U.S. intelligence community was in agreement in 1979 that the 
Soviets were trying the best they could to avoid an invasion. U.S. agencies were also in 
agreement that religious extremism/internal conflict in Afghanistan was a strong 
contributing factor for Soviet worry in Afghanistan. (“The Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979”, para. 13). 
Soviet Documents and Afghanistan 
 
 Recently declassified Soviet documents support the caution thesis. One such 
document, outlining a Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo Meeting on March 
17, 1979, shows Soviet Premier Leonard Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues going 
through painstaking means to avoid plunging the Soviet Union into an Afghan quagmire. 
They believed a Soviet invasion would run counter to Soviet foreign policy interests. For 
instance, Soviet leaders agreed that “all we have done in recent years with such effort in 
terms of détente, arms reduction, and much more-all that would be thrown back (should 
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the U.S.S.R. invade Afghanistan). China, of course, would be given a nice present. All 
the non-aligned countries will be against us” (“Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War 
document 1”, para 7). Soviet caution is further reinforced in a meeting between Soviet 
Politburo members A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov, B.N. Ponomarev and 
Afghan Premier N.M. Taraki a few days later on March 20, 1979. The Politburo members 
unequivocally tell Taraki that: 
 
The deployment of our troops in the territory of Afghanistan would immediately 
awaken the international community and would invite sharply unfavorable 
consequences. This would be a conflict with imperialist countries…Our mutual 
enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet forces appear on Afghan 
territory…the question of deploying forces has been examined by us from every 
direction…we came to the conclusion that that if our troops were introduced, the 
situation in your country would not only not improve but would worsen. Besides, 
as soon as our troops cross the border, China and all other aggressors will be 
vindicated. (“Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War”, document 3, para. 5). 
 
 Most importantly, Soviet leaders understood that the domestic internal politics of 
Afghanistan, such as the fact that the majority of the people supported the Islamic 
insurgency, prohibited the U.S.S.R. and the rebels from winning the hearts and minds of 
the Afghan people. Politburo members concurred that: 
  
It’s completely clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready at this time to resolve all 
the issues it faces through socialism. The economy is backward, the Islamic 
religion predominates and nearly all the rural population is illiterate….It is [in 
fact] under the banner of Islam that soldiers are turning against the government, 
and an absolute majority perhaps only with rare exceptions are true believers. 
(“Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War”, document 1, para. 8) 
 
The internal dynamics of Afghanistan ultimately prevented the Soviet Union from 
achieving a clean and immediate victory through the use of a military invasion. A.A. 
Gromyko stated, with agreement from fellow Politburo members that the U.S.S.R. should 
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“rule out such a measure as the deployment of our troops into Afghanistan…our army 
when it arrives will be considered the aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the 
Afghan people first of all and it will have to shoot at them” (“Afghanistan: Lessons from 
the Last War, document # 1”, para. 9). More so, information flowing to Soviet leaders at 
the time suggested the army and the Afghan people were switching their allegiances over 
to the rebels. Taraki even reported to Soviet leaders that “half the division located in 
Herat has gone over to the rebels” (“Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War, Document 
1”, para 16). 
Therefore, while Soviet leaders agreed that Afghanistan “must not be surrendered 
to the enemy”, they told Afghan Premier Taraki that “the most effective support we could 
give you would be through methods of our political influence through neighboring 
countries and through the rendering of extensive and manifold assistance. This would 
accomplish much more than through the deployments of our troops” (“Afghanistan: 
Lessons from the Last War, document #3”, para. 22). Such caution in the face of Soviet 
leaders believing that “bands of saboteurs and terrorists from the territory of Pakistan, 
trained and armed not only with the participation of Pakistani forces but also of China, 
the U.S.A, and Iran” were aiding and abetting the Afghan insurgents speaks volumes 
about the about the persistent caution demonstrated by Soviet leaders when it came to 
situation in Afghanistan. (“Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War”, document # 1. para. 
7) 
Section Conclusion 
 
 The archival evidence points to a cautious Soviet Bloc in Afghanistan. State 
Department, U.S. embassy, and Soviet archives demonstrate that the Soviets did not push 
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for the 1978 Marxist coup in Afghanistan. The Soviets also did not use this coup as an 
opportunity to expand their influence in the region (as the quantitative evidence in 
chapter three showed). Instead, the Soviets were grappling with religious extremists and 
trying to find a possible political solution to the events that were unfolding in 
Afghanistan. Chapter two’s historical summary showed this to be the case. The 
Brzezinski-backed NSC disagreed with the initial State Department assessment of the 
1978 coup. They contended that the coup was part of a Soviet drive towards the Persian 
Gulf. Nevertheless, they agreed with State Department during late 1979 that the Soviets 
were acting in a cautious manner. The U.S.S.R. was not seeking to invade Afghanistan 
and was doing all it could to avoid doing so.  
 Different theories would have different takes on this. Structural Marxists would 
argue that substantial evidence shows and will show the Soviets to be cautious in this 
region. For balance of threat realists, the Soviets were aggressive. These findings show 
this analysis as incorrect. As for domestic politics, at first glance it seems as though it is 
not useful in this section. However, supporters of domestic politics would argue that the 
seeds of interagency dissent were beginning to take hold in Afghanistan between the 
State Department and various other agencies. Indeed, supporters of domestic politics 
argue that they can show the more hawkish agencies pushing for covert action in 
Afghanistan and this undermining the initiatives of the State Department. I will, of 
course, evaluate this in the next chapter as this corresponds to U.S. actions in the region. 
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Soviets on the Defensive in Eastern Europe 
 
Section Introduction 
 
 The U.S. intelligence agencies seem to have been on the same page with regard to 
Eastern Europe. The State Department, CIA, DIA, and the NSC (and President Carter) all 
agreed that the “worker’s riots of June 1976 in Poland were especially unsettling to 
Moscow” (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 33). “Soviet 
Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena (NIE 11-4-78)”, further argues that 
economic problems in other Warsaw Pact countries had drastically affected Moscow. In 
fact, the interagency analysis finds that “in recent years, the Soviets have seen the 
economic burdens associated with maintaining their position in Eastern Europe grow, as 
communist countries in the area consumed subsidized energy resources that could 
otherwise be exchanged for hard currency” (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global 
Power Arena”, p. 33). Indeed, the weakening of Eastern Europe is precisely what I 
discovered in chapter three.  
 The unclassified documents from the CIA and National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski are the most telling, however. Indeed, newly released CIA documents from 
the Directorate for Intelligence, such as “Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade 
Conference” (1977) and “Dissident Activity Inside Eastern Europe” (1977), from 
National Security Advisor Brzezinski, such as “Prospects for Eastern Europe” (1977), 
and from President Carter, such as “Policy for Eastern Europe” (1977), all suggest the 
Soviet Bloc was on the defensive in Eastern Europe during the last few years of Détente. 
Western exploitation of the human rights issue in Eastern Europe, growing 
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disenchantment with Western European parties, and growing economic problems were all 
highlighted by these reports as growing problems for the Soviets.  
Misjudging Human rights 
 To understand the human rights issue one must go back to the Helsinki 
conference of 1975. This conference etched into agreement the “idea that the U.S.S.R. 
had a legitimate right to participate in the resolution of “all European issues,” that is a 
right to be heard in the councils of Western Europe as well as those of the East” (Soviet 
Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference, p. 2). In return, the Soviets “pledged 
to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms” in Eastern Europe and allow 
increased interchange between East and West (“Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the 
Belgrade Conference”, p. 3). The Soviets also gave ground on the prior notification of 
major military maneuvers through the deployment of confidence-building measures while 
the West agreed to provide the U.S.S.R. with its “coveted technology” (“Soviet 
Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference”, p. 3). 
However, “Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference” contends 
that the “Soviets misjudged the impact of human rights provisions of the Helsinki 
agreement in Eastern Europe and at home” (“Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the 
Belgrade Conference”, p. 1). Legitimizing the idea of increased interchanges with the 
West posed severe problems for the Soviet Bloc’s authoritarian control mechanisms. 
After all, an increasing amount of worker unrest, rioting, and dissident intellectual 
activity in Poland had begun to spread since the Helsinki accords (“Soviet Objectives and 
Tactics at the Belgrade Conference”, p. 4) The CIA’s “Dissident Activity in Eastern 
Europe” went so far as to characterize the situation in the country as volatile (“Dissident 
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Activity in East Europe”, p. 3). Eastern Germany, the border state between East and 
West, also witnessed growing “restiveness among workers in complaints about working 
conditions” (“Dissident Activity in East Europe”, p. 3). Unrest also was brewing in 
Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European states (“Dissident Activity in East Europe”, 
p. 3). 
Disenchantment with Western Europe  
The other side of the human rights coin, Moscow’s hope that opening up 
internally would allow for a closer working relationship with Western European left-of-
center political parties, also failed to come into fruition. The CIA’s “Dissident Activity in 
Eastern Europe” argues that Eurocommunist parties in Western Europe were actually 
extending “verbal aid and comfort to East European and Soviet dissidents” (“Dissident 
Activity in East Europe”, p. 2). In the end, left-of-center parties were simply unwilling 
push forward the socialist agenda without the inclusion of political freedom. Even more 
worrisome for the Soviet Bloc was the fact that Eurocommunism itself was gaining 
“appeal within the ruling parties in Eastern Europe” (“Dissident Activity in East Europe”, 
p. 2). 
U.S. Economic Warfare 
That was not the end of Soviet problems. “Prospects for Eastern Europe”, written 
by National Security Advisor Brzezinski, plays up the issue of the U.S. exploiting 
economic problems in Eastern Europe. In fact, taking advantage of these economic 
problems (in order to pull Eastern Europe away from the U.S.S.R.), through more trade, 
was the subsequent order of the day for U.S. policy. The Soviets could do little but 
“acquiesce or even encourage such expansion because they were reluctant to subsidize 
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the East European economies” (“Prospects for Eastern Europe”, p. 1). Brzezinski’s view 
was supported by President Jimmy Carter. Presidential Directive NSC-21 lays out 
Carter’s policy toward Eastern Europe. He outlines his support for a strategy of 
supporting Eastern European nations that “are either relatively liberal internally or 
relatively independent internationally” (“Policy Toward Eastern Europe”, p. 1). President 
Carter also pledges support to Poland and Romania, specifically to Poland due to its large 
debts to the West and argues in favor of a trade treaty with Hungary. 
Overall, “Prospects for Eastern Europe” nicely summarizes (and supports) the 
cumulative findings of the U.S. intelligence community. According to this report, 
destabilizing factors for the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe in 1977 included “détente (human 
rights), slower economic growth, and dissident activity” (“Prospects for Eastern Europe”, 
p. 1). The report admits that dissident activities in Poland (with its large scale dissident 
movement) and Eastern Germany (moderate dissident) activity could result in significant 
problems for the U.S.S.R.  
Section Conclusion 
These findings run counter to the arguments made by balance of threat realists 
that U.S. aggression in the early 1980’s was a result of unrestrained Soviet aggression. 
U.S. aggression at a time when the Soviet Bloc was cautious simply diminishes balance 
of threat theory. Structural Marxism comes out ahead once again. They would argue that 
there is clear evidence the U.S. was very aggressive in trying to weaken the U.S.S.R. in 
its most important sphere of influence.  
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Détente, the Third World, and Strategic Nuclear Arms 
 
Section Introduction 
 
 Herein I pursue two goals. My first goal was to search U.S. archives to understand 
why Détente collapsed. Was revolutionary conflict in the less developed world, and thus 
the Soviet contribution to that conflict, the primary or secondary reason for Détente’s 
collapse? After all, some asymmetrical realist scholars argue that Soviet gains in the 
strategic nuclear arms race was the most significant factor in Détente’s disintegration. In 
their view, revolutionary turmoil was only a contributing factor.  
Overall, the archival evidence points to Soviet actions in the less developed world 
as the primary reason for Détente’s collapse. Declassified documents from the State 
Department, Defense, and from President Jimmy Carter contend that this was the case. In 
addition, U.S. archives uphold the view that Soviet actions in the strategic nuclear arms 
race were defensive in nature. However, some agencies (such as Defense and NSC) were 
worried about some significant Soviet improvements in the strategic arms balance of 
power. Regardless, the U.S. archival evidence from 1978 and 1979 still shows moderate 
support for continuing SALT II negotiations.  
The Third World 
 
 State Department archival records argue that the disintegration of Détente can be 
firmly tied to events in the less developed world. One such report, published under the 
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, argues that: 
By 1974, strains on bilateral relations had already compromised U.S. support for 
 Détente and the crisis in Angola served to accelerate this trend. From the U.S. 
 point of view, one of the aims of Détente was to draw the Soviet Union further 
 into the international system so that Washington could induce Moscow to show 
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 restraint in its dealings with the Third World. The Ford Administration believed 
 that Cuba had intervened in Angola as a Soviet proxy and as such, the general 
 view in Washington was that Moscow was breaking the rules of Détente. The 
 appearance of a Soviet success and a U.S. loss in Angola on the heels of a victory 
 by Soviet-supported North Vietnam over U.S.-supported South Vietnam 
 continued to erode U.S. faith in Détente as an effective Cold War foreign policy. 
 The U.S. failure to achieve its desired outcome in Angola raised the stakes of the 
 superpower competition in the Third World. Subsequent disagreements over the 
 Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan contributed to undoing the period of Détente 
 between the Soviet Union and the United States. (“Angola 1974-1975”, para 6.) 
This argument is also promoted by another State Department report entitled Détente and 
Arms Control 1969-1979.  This report contends that:  
 
Overblown expectations that the warming of relations in the era of Détente 
 would translate into an end to the Cold War…. created public dissatisfaction with 
 the increasing manifestations of continued competition and the interventions in 
 the Third World. By the time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the 
 spirit of cooperation had been replaced with renewed competition and formal 
 implementation of the SALT II agreement stalled. (“Détente and Arms Control 
 1969-1979”, para. 4)  
 
 
Thus, State Department archives firmly contend that Soviet actions in the less developed 
world, specifically in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan, were responsible for 
the collapse of Détente. Even more significantly, State Department records argue that 
Soviet activity in the less developed world was responsible for the collapse of SALT II 
negotiations. As a result, I can argue that Soviet activity in/revolutionary activity in the 
less developed world was much more significant to Détente’s collapse than Soviet-U.S. 
competition in the strategic nuclear arms race. 
The Carter administration also blamed events in Afghanistan for the deterioration 
of Soviet-American relations in 1980. “Current Foreign Relations”, a State Department 
document summarizing Carter’s policy positions, suggests this was the case.  Indeed, as a 
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result of Soviet actions in the less developed world, Carter pushes to permanently shelve 
SALT II talks (“Current Foreign Relations”, p. 3). President Carter was simply adhering 
to Kissinger’s concept of linkage.  
Strategic Arms 
 
Despite the fact that Soviet activity in the less developed world is consistently 
cited as the strongest reason for the collapse of Détente and the deterioration of U.S.-
Soviet relations it is important to analyze U.S.-Soviet relations in the strategic nuclear 
realm since it can certainly bring in some important insights. After all, some realists 
argue that the most important aspect of the balance of power was none other than 
strategic arms. The U.S. intelligence agency archival reports in regards to strategic 
nuclear weapons during the late 1970’s disagree with this view and suggest that the 
Soviets were on the defensive.  
State Department View 
An August 1977 report from the State Department, entitled “Soviet-U.S. 
Relations: A Sixth Month Perspective”, maintains that there is evidence that Soviet 
“suspicions and doubts about Carter policies explain to a large extent the defensive-and- 
relatively-stand-pat-positions they (Soviets) have adopted during this period” (“Soviet-
U.S. Relations”, p. 1). Such positions and doubts, according to this report, were caused 
by a significant reversal in U.S. SALT policy. No longer was the U.S. adhering “to the 
détente formulas that shaped relations over the preceding five-year period-acceptance of 
nuclear parity, moderation of differences, etc” (“Soviet-U.S. Relations”, p. 1). On the 
contrary, U.S. policy “signified a new set of priorities, with the U.S. attempting to impose 
its view of these issues on the Soviet Union” (“Soviet-U.S. Relations”, p. 1). A new U.S. 
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approach is why the State Department reported in May of 1977 that “the prevailing mood 
in the Kremlin is one of resentment at the evolution in U.S. policy toward the Soviet 
Union” (“Soviet Military Leaders Take a Tougher Line in V-E Day”, p. 4). Regardless of 
these feelings, the State Department knew that an influential cadre of Soviet leaders still 
“clung to the hope of Soviet-American cooperation on a fairly broad basis and the cutting 
of Moscow’s defense expenditures” (“Soviet Military Leaders Take a Tougher Line in V-
E Day”, p. 4). 
Understanding that the Soviets were cautious is why the State Department was 
very supportive of the SALT II talks. In a mid-1979 analysis entitled “The Mathematics 
of SALT” the State Department concludes that “the current rough parity between the 
capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet strategic forces will continue through SALT II” (“The 
Mathematics of SALT”, p. 9). Rather than suggesting that SALT II would bog the U.S. 
down and give the Soviets the upper hand in the strategic nuclear forces arena, as 
suggested by the other agencies, the State Department report argues that: 
In terms of overall capability, the new systems that both sides will deploy during 
the period will more than compensate for the required force reductions. Moreover, 
on the Soviet side at least, most of the dismantled weapons will be converted to 
other military uses. Nevertheless, the intercontinental attack capabilities of each 
side will be less than they would have been without the required reductions—and 
much more extensive reductions will be required of the Soviets than of the U.S. 
On the Soviet side, the number of SNDV’s and MIRV capable launchers will be 
about 30% less than expected in the absence of SALT. (“The Mathematics of 
SALT”, p. 9) 
 
Overall, the State Department reports appreciated the defensive position of the Soviet 
Union.  They understood the fears of the Soviet Bloc. These fears included: 
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growing U.S. public and congressional advocacy of a harsher policy toward the       
U.S.S.R.…providing the U.S. with time and arguments for considering new arms 
programs which, if carried out, would pose even greater military and economic 
challenges for Moscow in the future. Furthermore, speculation about a variety of 
new U.S. advanced weapons projects were growing, feeding Soviet uneasiness 
about the prospects for holding on to parity. (“A Turn in U.S.-Soviets Relations”, 
p. 6) 
 
All in all, the State Department viewed Soviet actions as cautious. Considering that U.S. 
policy had turned a bit more assertive, as the State Department acknowledges above, they 
understood that the strategic situation improved in the U.S.’s favor.  
Other Agencies (Mostly) Agree  
Such a view was largely supported (at least in regard to strategic parity) by other 
U.S. intelligence agencies such as the CIA, NSC, and the Defense Department. These 
U.S. agencies, in a report entitled “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict 
through the Late 1980’s” (February 1978 version), did argue that, “Soviet forces for 
intercontinental attack will become more powerful and flexible. Even under constraints 
along the lines being negotiated in SALT. Soviet intercontinental offensive strength will 
grow in relation to that of the U.S. between now and the early 1980’s” (“Soviet 
Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through; the Late 1980s”, p. 9). 
 However, the report goes on to say that “the actual strategic significance of 
increases in Soviet striking power is debatable, especially in view of the many Soviet 
vulnerabilities and the retaliatory power of the U.S.” (“Soviet Capabilities for Strategic 
Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s”, p. 11) After all, the National Intelligence 
Estimate report firmly states that “under SALT conditions, advantages remain mixed” 
(“Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the Late 1980s”, p. 10). The 
reasons for the “mixed” advantages were the fact that the U.S. possessed several 
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significant advantages themselves. For starters, the U.S.S.R. was simply “unable to 
prevent U.S. alert bombers and at-sea SLBM’s from being launched” (“Soviet 
Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the Late 1980s”, p. 10). Soviet 
defenses against other threats, such as cruise missile and short-range attack missiles were 
also considered as low.   
 These views were slightly modified by the next year. The CIA’s National 
Intelligence Estimate of March 7th 1979 (signed off by all the intelligence agencies), also 
entitled “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the Late 1980’s”, 
notes that “evidence acquired during the past year indicates some near-term Soviet 
advances will be greater than previously anticipated” (“Soviet Capabilities for Strategic 
Nuclear Conflict through the Late 1980’s Version II”, p. 1). “Soviet Capabilities for 
Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the Late 1980’s” also states that the Soviets had 
already modified ICBMs and MIRVs (improving accuracy of missiles), which in the 
prior National Intelligence Estimate’s analysis, was not suppose to occur “until the 
advent of new ICBMs several years later” (“Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear 
Conflict through the Late 1980’s Version II”, p. 2). The report also argues that the 
Soviets increased their production speed for research and development for submarines.  
However, this National Intelligence Estimate reports still argued that Soviets 
efforts were largely defensive. Not only did the Soviets realize that they “faced mounting 
economic problems and leadership transition,” they were also aware that the U.S. and 
NATO were considering “several important military options which are as yet undecided” 
(“Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the Late 1980’s Version II”, 
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p. 24). For these reasons, the Soviet Bloc was determined to sign off on SALT II in an 
effort to reduce the possibility that the U.S. would augment their defense efforts. 
The final National Intelligence Estimate report entitled “Soviet Capabilities for 
Strategic Nuclear Conflict” also showed considerable support for SALT II. The report 
argues that this agreement would reduce Soviet delivery vehicles by 15-30% and force 
the Soviets to replace certain weapons instead of deploying them as follow-ons. The 
National Intelligence Estimate report even claimed that SALT II would “reduce certain 
uncertainties about the future size and composition of those Soviet forces which were 
limited” (“Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the Late 1980’s 
Version II”, p. 25). 
There is also additional evidence, despite public rhetoric, that several key officials 
in the Defense community showed support for SALT II in the Carter Administration. 
Documents from the Carter administration suggest this was the case. “The Case for 
SALT” shows that the “the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Commander of SAC believed that we [the USA] had a better chance of maintaining 
strategic equivalence with SALT II than without it” (“The Case for SALT”, p. 4). These 
key figures cited several reasons. Such reasons included the fact that SALT II did not bar 
the U.S. from finishing the production of certain key strategic weapons as well as SALT 
II’s limits on Soviet IBCMs and MIRVS. Ultimately, military officials did inform the 
Carter administration of their support for verification measures.  
Section Conclusion 
 
This section on the Third World and strategic arms has shown that events in the 
less developed world are what caused much alarm for U.S. policymakers. Détente did not 
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collapse because the Soviets made gains in the strategic arms race. There is no credible 
archival evidence this was the case. There is substantial archival documentation 
(rhetorical evidence) that Détente collapsed because of Soviet aggression in the less 
developed world. They simply violated the policy of linkage that Kissinger had 
previously established.  
These findings lead to a conundrum however. My analysis of U.S. archives has 
already shown that the Soviet Bloc was not aggressive in the less developed world during 
the late 1970’s. The Soviets were not able to significantly overturn the balance of power. 
So how could it be that the U.S. became aggressive and blamed the Soviets for conflict in 
the less developed world when their own archives argue against this view? 
Structural Marxists would argue that the U.S. was simply unleashing political 
rhetoric against the Soviets. They knew the Soviets were not aggressive in the less 
developed. The analysis of U.S. archives has shown this to be the case. However, because 
the U.S. was intensely worried about revolutionary activity in the less developed world 
the U.S. still went ahead and blamed the Soviets for it. For those that adhere to 
bureaucratic politics, they would point to evidence, which will be shown in the next 
chapter, which shows certain elements (Team B) of the U.S. pushed to suggest that the 
Soviets were aggressive in the strategic arms race.  
Conclusion 
 
My regional analysis examination has shown that the Soviets were primarily a 
cautious superpower in the Third World during the late 1970’s. The U.S. archives (and in 
some cases Cuban and Soviet documents) confirm my findings from the previous 
chapters. The balance of power did not tilt in favor of the Soviet Bloc. Neither in the 
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most vital areas of the world or those that were considered to be less vital to U.S. 
interests, do I find evidence suggesting that the Soviet Bloc was overturning the 
established balance of power.   
 The section on Asia shows that the Soviets were having a hard time in this region 
during the late 1970’s. The State Department, the NSC, President Carter, and Brzezinski 
argued that the U.S. balance of power position, primarily in the military realm, had 
significantly improved during the late 1970’s. The Sino-Soviet split was judged to be a 
huge nuisance for the U.S.S.R.  This perfectly matches my findings from the previous 
historical and quantitative chapters. I also found that the rise of ASEAN, as argued by the 
State Department, was a significant development that injured Soviet interests in the 
region. ASEAN grouped together the remaining nations in Southeast Asia into a potent 
Western economic bulwark against Soviet aggression. The Defense Department, 
however, did provide a dissenting viewpoint. They argued that the naval balance of 
power was in danger. Citing Japanese apprehension, they suggested that the U.S. needed 
to do more in this area.  
 Searching through the U.S. archives relating to the Middle East, I also found 
large-scale evidence suggesting the Soviet Bloc did not make gains in the area of the 
world considered the most vital to U.S./Western interests. U.S. archives showed that the 
U.S. made significant improvements in this area of the world. Documents from all U.S. 
agencies also argued that the rise of the oil-producing states (Saudi Arabia and Iran) and 
Soviet failings to counter Israeli influence through the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization were major setbacks to Soviet efforts. Finally, in regard to Soviet gains the 
Horn of Africa and Yemen, U.S. archives described these as “poor compensation for their 
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losses” in the region (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 52). 
These findings corroborate my historical and quantitative findings from the previous 
chapters.  
 The examination of Sub-Saharan Africa yields an interesting outcome. They show 
the State Department and the NSC suggesting that the Soviets were not aggressive with 
their aid towards Angola in the early part of 1975 (as chapter three showed). They 
suggest the Soviets had no long-term interests and were only helping to equalize the 
MPLA with its competitors. However, once the MPLA achieves victory, these agencies 
blast the Soviets as aggressive. Nevertheless, Soviet and Cuban archives show that Cuban 
helped instigate the conflict. Content on providing limited amounts of military weapons 
in order to please local allies, the Soviets did everything in their power to avoid getting 
involved in a protracted conflict. In fact, some U.S. archival hints at the possibility (as 
suggested by Peter Gleijeses when studying Cuban archives) that the battle in Angola 
could be characterized as a North-South conflict between the U.S./West and Cuba. They 
argue that Cuba had their own political and strategic interests at stake in pushing for war.  
 My study of Latin America, probably the most vital area of the less developed 
world for the U.S., also points away from Soviet aggression during the late 1970’s. As 
chapter two asserted, the Soviets did not make significant gains here. Documents from 
the U.S. actually attribute the rise of Latin American nationalism to large-scale poverty, 
repression in the region, and the political rise of the middle classes. In fact, these 
documents show U.S. policymakers (from the CIA, State, and DIA) agreeing that Soviet 
gains in the region came only because of U.S. errors. The policies of the U.S. were 
exacerbating these internal dynamics leading to a sharp rise in nationalism in the region. 
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The U.S. archives also show that the Soviets (or Cuba) did not provide significant 
assistance to the Sandinistas prior to their revolution. The bulk of Soviet assistance to 
Latin America, as traced by my findings in Chapter three, were recognized by U.S. 
sources as Soviet assistance to Angola in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
By and large, Latin America received a “lower Soviet priority” than other areas of 
the less developed world. Such Soviet caution correlates with the quantitative evidence in 
chapter three (“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 38). 
Ultimately, U.S. intelligence agencies documented that “Moscow’s diplomatic posture 
since the fall of Chilean President Allende is fundamentally one of watching and waiting” 
(“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 38). 
 Finally, my regional analysis concluded with the study of Afghanistan. This 
section demonstrated that the Soviet Bloc did not strive for aggression during the late 
1970’s. State Department, U.S. embassy, and Soviet archives corroborate to show that the 
Soviets did not push for the 1978 Marxist coup in Afghanistan. The Soviets also did not 
use this coup as an opening to expand their influence in the region. Instead, documents 
from the U.S. embassy (Soviet archives as well) show U.S. comprehension in regard to 
how the local internal dynamics, such as the clumsy modernization policies of the Soviet-
backed local regime, were the driving force behind Soviet concerns. The Soviets were 
grappling with religious extremists and trying to find a possible political solution to the 
events that were unfolding in Afghanistan.   
The Brzezinski-backed NSC disagreed with the initial State Department 
assessment of the 1978 coup. They contended that the coup was part of a Soviet drive 
towards the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, they agreed with State Department during late 
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1979 that the Soviets were still acting in a relatively cautious manner. The U.S.S.R. was 
not seeking to invade Afghanistan and was doing all it could to avoid doing so. 
The Soviets were even on the defensive in Eastern Europe. National Security 
Advisor Brzezinski backs up the cumulative findings of the U.S. intelligence community. 
He argues that “slower economic growth and dissident activity due to the” were putting 
the Soviets on the defensive in their own backyard (“Prospects for Eastern Europe”, p. 1). 
This point of view was backed up by the State Department and by President Carter. The 
quantitative evidence in chapter three also found this to be the case. 
Without a doubt, the regional analysis has shown that the Soviets did not make 
substantial gains in the less developed world during the late 1970’s. Backing up these 
findings, U.S. intelligence agencies summarized in mid-1978 that Soviet foreign policy 
simply reflected: 
 
 A purposeful, cautious exploration of the political implications of the U.S.S.R.’s 
 increased military strength. Soviet policy will continue…On the whole such a 
 prognosis, while projecting some increase in the assertiveness of Soviet external 
 behavior, represents a fairly natural evolution of the U.S.S.R.’s foreign policy. 
 The changes from past behavior are gradual and unbroken, and are rooted in the 
 basic perceptions and values that have long informed Soviet policy. (“Soviet 
 Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. x) 
 
Such statements suggest that U.S. agencies firmly understood the context of Soviet 
behavior during the late 1970’s. U.S. agencies believed, corroborating my foreign aid 
quantitative findings from chapter three, that Soviet behavior was cautious and gradual 
and would continue at the same pace into the early 1980’s. Subsequent U.S. suggestions 
that the Soviet Bloc was aggressive in the late 1970’s do not carry any weight. Assertions 
to the contrary are not substantiated by the overall thrust of U.S. archives.  
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For now, chapter four has shown once again that structural Marxism possesses an 
advantage over balance of threat realism. There is simply overwhelming evidence 
suggesting U.S. decision-makers believed Soviet actions were cautious in the less 
developed world. Still, evidence is also coming in for bureaucratic politics. Dissent from 
more hawkish U.S. intelligence agencies in Asia and Afghanistan has been discovered. 
How strong was this dissent? To better answer this question, as well as continue to test 
structural Marxism and balance of threat realism, I shall now turn towards the U.S. 
archives pertaining to the U.S. response and U.S. actions during Détente. 
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Chapter V: U.S Archives and the U.S. Response to the Soviet Threat in the  
Third World during the 1970’s 
Introduction  
I now follow up and examine the archival documents pertaining to U.S. actions 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the less developed world during the 1970’s.  Taking into 
account the cautious and defensive nature of Soviet actions during the middle-to-late 
1970’s, as discovered in the previous chapter, I will now seek to analyze the actions of 
the U.S./West in the less developed world during the final years of Détente. As in chapter 
four, I use the records from the Carter Administration, as well as those from U.S. 
intelligence agencies, in an attempt to interpret how U.S. policymakers viewed the 
international security environment.  
Balance of threat realism argued that the U.S. turned hostile during the 1980’s 
against the Soviet Bloc due to the fact that the Soviets became aggressive in the less 
developed world during the middle-to-late 1970’s. In fact, balance of threat realism traces 
Soviet aggression to the emerging power vacuum in the less developed world at the time 
due to the rise of nationalist movements in the less developed world. While these 
movements may have been independent of the Soviet Bloc when it came to their original 
growth, balance of threat realism suggested that a rival superpower, such as the U.S.S.R., 
would try everything in their power to secure these gains. They would surely exploit the 
emerging power vacuum.  
Nonetheless, the quantitative and archival evidence in the previous chapters have 
begun to weaken the theory of balance of threat realism. Since the evidence points to 
significant Soviet caution during this time, it is probably time to begin to dismiss balance 
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of threat realism. However, I shall continue to test this theory by analyzing the U.S. 
response within the U.S. archives. 
My findings of Soviet caution have given legitimacy to the structural Marxist 
argument. Structural Marxism argues that the U.S. was not concerned about the Soviet 
threat in the less developed world. They contend that the U.S. was more concerned with 
the structural economic interests of U.S. capital. On the other hand, the data has also 
given credence, both in Buffer Zone and Asia, to the theory of domestic politics. These 
regions witnessed a divergence in policy emphasis and policy proposals by various U.S. 
agencies. Thus, I will continue to test these important theories throughout this chapter.  
To better examine these theories, however, this chapter will now analyze the 
archives pertaining to the Western Alliance. These archives could provide additional 
clues as to how U.S. policymakers truly viewed the international strategic environment. 
After all, structural Marxists contend that the U.S. was significantly worried about its 
long-term credibility and power in the Western Bloc. The U.S. archives in the Western 
Alliance could help answer whether the structural Marxist view is correct or not.  
Regional Analysis of U.S. Actions in the Third World during Détente 
 
Regional Analysis of U.S. Actions in Asia 
Section Introduction 
 
The archival analysis of Asia during the final years of Détente highlights some 
significant U.S. moves in the region. Both the State Department and the Defense 
Department are shown to have pushed hard to strengthen U.S. interests and the U.S. 
balance of power in Asia. However, the archives reveal contrasting views on what 
exactly was the most important aspect of U.S. policy in the region. Records from the 
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State Department and the Defense Department show each agency pursuing very distinct 
strategies on the behalf of the U.S.  While the U.S. State Department’s archives focus on 
strengthening Southeast Asia (through economic means mainly) as the core of U.S. 
strategy in Asia, the Defense Department’s records focused its attention on improving 
U.S. naval power in the region.  
However, as we witnessed in the last chapter, the initial archives of the Defense 
Department were not presented in the same optimistic light as those within the State 
Department. Defense Department archives revealed an agency that was extremely 
worried about recent Soviet naval enhancements and activities in Northeast Asia. More 
specifically, they were concerned with how such developments would affect Japanese 
security. Arguing that the new situation was “in clear contrast with the past position of 
U.S. military superiority…the Soviet Pacific fleet and naval aircraft can [now] credibly 
challenge the U.S. and its allies”, the Defensive Department’s archives during the latter 
years of Détente focused much more (compared with State) on improving the military 
readiness of the U.S. in the region (“US/Japan-USSR Balance”, p. 1). Nevertheless, 
Defense Department archives do acknowledge that the tide had turned in the U.S.’ favor 
by the end of the 1970’s.  
State Department 
 
A 1979 State Department declassified report, entitled “Southeast Asia”, depicts 
ASEAN Bloc survival as the most important buffer to maintaining political stability 
(containing the Soviets) in the region. In fact, the State Department firmly believed that 
supporting ASEAN was the best counter against the further rise of Vietnam and the 
U.S.S.R. in the region (“Southeast Asia”, p. 1-2). To achieve the strategy of countering 
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the rise of Vietnam in Southeast Asia, the report focuses on helping the ASEAN Bloc rise 
up economically. 
State Department strategy in the region was two-pronged. First, they helped 
coordinate the necessary military aid to ASEAN members, specifically those that were 
considered essential to maintaining the alliance. A 1975 report from the State 
Department, entitled “Issues Paper on Future Pacific Strategy”, called for increased 
military aid for Indonesia. Considered an “influential member” of the ASEAN Bloc, U.S. 
policy called for “nurturing closer ties with this potential leader of Southeast Asia” (p. 4). 
The same policies were also promoted for Thailand. In an attempt to bolster Thailand’s 
goal of strengthening its ties to ASEAN (in order to pursue a foreign policy independent 
from Vietnam), the report called for maintaining U.S. military assistance (“Issues Paper 
on Future Pacific Strategy”, p. 4). 
However, the most significant strategy revolved around the significant political 
and economic support the U.S. placed upon the creation and development of the ASEAN 
Bloc. The State Department report explicitly states that only a “total collapse of will by 
the Asians themselves” would have led to additional Soviet gains in this region (“Issues 
Paper on Future Pacific Strategy”, p. 6). Arguing that the basic threat faced by ASEAN 
leaders dealt not with external threats, but with internal subversion, the report states that 
the elimination of poverty and racial strife in the region would go a long way in 
preventing any major power from dominating the region (“Issues Paper on Future Pacific 
Strategy”, pp. 5-6).  
The State Department also argues that U.S. and Japanese objectives in Southeast 
Asia were parallel to each other. Thanks to, “frequent and candid exchanges on the 
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situation in Indochina and the ASEAN region, we (the U.S. and Japan) have cooperated 
actively on such important issues as seeking to contain conflicts [and] minimize the 
Soviet presence” (“Southeast Asia”, p. 1). This is exactly why Japan “greatly stepped up 
its economic assistance” as well was as trade and investment to the region” (“Southeast 
Asia”, p. 1). Integrating Japan’s economy with the ASEAN Bloc was seen as something 
that enhanced the economic security of Japan and the political security of the Western 
Alliance in the region.  
 Moreover, the 1975 report, entitled “Issues Paper on Future Pacific Strategy”, 
highlighted the fact that the rise of the ASEAN Bloc was helping to achieve new gains 
for the U.S. and its Japanese ally. Stating that “despite our disengagement from Indochina 
and the decline in our military profile in the area, the trend towards the expansion of our 
trade (and Japan’s) and investment in East Asia and the economic integration (into the 
U.S.-led world system) of the Pacific Basin will continue”, the report highlights a 30% 
increase in trade with the region as well as a 25% increase in U.S. exports to the region. 
Increasing Japanese trade and influence within ASEAN was considered significant in 
bolstering the Western Alliance. In fact, the U.S. placed pressure on Japan to play a 
larger economic and political role in East Asia (“Issues Paper on Future Pacific Strategy”, 
p. 6).  
After all, Japan’s interests in the region were much more intense than that of the 
U.S. Dependent on raw materials for the continuation of its industrial economy, the 
Japanese moved quickly towards working with ASEAN members. However, rather than 
simply exploiting these countries (through extremely unfair trade agreements), as is 
typically done to other raw material producing nations by the developed world, Japan was 
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convinced that “regional stability (deterring U.S.S.R.) would depend on [securing] the 
economic and political strength of the ASEAN countries” (Issues Paper on Future Pacific 
Strategy, p. 3). 
All in all, the State Department argues that the U.S./West was stronger in the 
region than the Soviets and was taking the actions necessary to become even stronger. 
For instance, a report entitled “US and Japanese Relations with ASEAN”, argues that 
“ASEAN Unity, while still limited, contrasts sharply with the disarray of the Communist 
nations” (p. 3). Overall, the State Department knew that the economic power of the U.S. 
and Japan and the West was giving them a distinct advantage to cultivate allies in this 
region. 
Defense Department 
 
 The last chapter found the Defense Department stressing that the new 
international strategic (military naval balance of power) situation was “in clear contrast 
with the past position of U.S. military superiority…. [and that] the Soviet Pacific fleet 
and naval aircraft can [now] credibly challenge the U.S. and its allies” (“US/Japan-USSR 
Balance”, p. 1). However, speaking to several important Japanese leaders, such as Prime 
Minister Ohira, Foreign Minister Sonoda, and Defense Minister Yamashita, Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown emphasized in October of 1979 that there was a new strategic 
situation in regard to the naval balance of power. In fact, Brown reversed his previous 
pessimistic views on the naval balance of power and argues:  
  President Carter decided more than two years ago to reaffirm U.S. commitments 
 in the Pacific and to maintain existing U.S. military capabilities in the area with 
 the exception of planned adjustments in our force levels in Korea. We have 
 honored that pledge….We have also provided tangible evidence of our 
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 commitment to the security of Japan and other Asian allies through qualitative 
 improvements in our forces in the Pacific. (“Honorable Harold Brown”, p. 19) 
 
 The Secretary of Defense was not the only one in the Defense Department to 
suggest that there was a shift in favor of the U.S. Improvements to U.S. conventional 
military power in the Pacific were already being cited by Secretary of the Navy James 
Woolsey by December of 1978. Meeting with Japanese Defense representative Minoru 
Tampa, James Woolsey pointed out that Congress had “turned the corner” by 
significantly upgrading defense spending during the latter part of the 1970’s 
(“Conversation with Minoru Tampa on Military Relations”, p. 2). The lull in spending 
that occurred between 1974 and 1975 was no longer in place. In fact, Woolsey added that 
shipbuilding, marine aircrafts, submarines, and land-based missiles for Asia were now 
moving ahead full throttle (“Conversation with Minoru Tampa on Military Relations”, p. 
2). 
Key Policymakers Agree  
 
 Comments by President Carter also suggest the U.S. was significantly gaining 
back ground during the late 1970’s. In regard to the naval Pacific forces, President Carter 
pointed out during his meeting with the  Japanese Prime Minister in May 24, 1978, that 
the U.S. was significantly improving its Pacific forces (F 14s, F15s, F16s, AWACs, the 
Trident, and naval power) (“Your Visit to Japan”, p. 7). President Carter argued that 
continuing to develop ASEAN was vital for U.S. and Japanese interests in the region vis-
à-vis the Soviet Union. As such, the President expressed to the Japanese Prime Minister 
Ohira that the U.S. would help improve the “economic and political strength of ASEAN” 
(“Summary of the President’s Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Ohira”, p. 2).  
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 Brzezinski, Carter’s NSA Advisor, also agreed that U.S. economic policy in Asia 
was helping to turn Southeast Asia against the Soviet Bloc and argued that there was a 
strong determination on the part of the U.S. to isolate the Soviet Union in Asia. For this 
reason, Brzezinski commented to Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda about the 
U.S.’s determination to promote a world order in which a “large number of regionally 
influential countries would assume more independent responsibility in promoting 
independence from the Soviet influence” (“Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with 
Foreign Minister Sunao Sunoda”, p. 3). In furtherance of this strategy, Brzezinski cited 
the development of the ASEAN Bloc and the U.S./Japanese’s effort to widen the Sino-
Soviet split as significant occurrences. Brzezinski praised “the creative role Japan had 
played in supporting the “security and prosperity of ASEAN countries” (“Summary of 
Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Sunao Sunoda”, p. 4).  
 In regard to the military balance, Brzezinski believed that “we [the U.S. and 
Japan] have made significant advances in the promotion of our strategic objectives during 
the past year and a half” (“Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Sunao 
Sunoda”, p. 4). He dismissed the view that the Soviet Union was gaining on the U.S. He 
believed it was a “distortion and a reflection of only one dimension, that of military 
power. Even though the Soviets may have gained ground in the military realm, the U.S. 
was taking energetic steps to correct this” (“Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign 
Minister Sunao Sunoda”, p. 4). Such steps included developing new weapons systems 
and improving the strategic balance. Improving the strategic balance, according to 
Brzezinski, revolved around the U.S. and its policies with China, “because our [the 
U.S.’s] relationship with it had broad global strategic consequences” (“Summary of Dr. 
218 
 
Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Sunao Sunoda”, p. 4). He also conveyed to 
Sunoda that the U.S.-Japanese strategy (increasing ties with China) was helping improve 
the balance of power by shifting the Chinese away from the Soviet Bloc and towards the 
West.  
Section Conclusion 
 The archival evidence outlined in the records of the State Department and the 
Defense Department/NSC suggests the U.S. was on the offensive in Southeast Asia 
during the late 1970’s. Though differing in specific strategy, the evidence finds that both 
agencies pushed for the further development of policies that would promote either the 
economic or military power of the U.S. at the expense of the Soviet Bloc. In addition to 
evidence from U.S. agencies, I also found extensive evidence articulating the same view 
from President Carter and his very important National Security Advisor, Brzezinski. All 
of this conforms to my previous findings in chapters three and four. The quantitative and 
archival data in these chapters showed the West aggressive with its foreign aid to the 
ASEAN Bloc and the Soviets defensive in the region due to the Sino-Soviet split.  
 So what does all this suggest? For structural Marxists it suggests that the State 
Department and the Defense Department where focusing on different aspects of 
imperialism. The State Department was focusing on integrating the ASEAN Bloc nations 
into the Western capitalist system. In contrast, the Defense Department was upgrading its 
military capabilities in order to deter non-Western-Bloc from interfering with the 
accumulation of capital. Moreover, National Security Advisor Brzezinski stated above 
that calculations that suggested the Soviets had the advantage in the region were simply 
wrong as they only took the military balance of power into consideration. Economics 
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mattered and economic policy was the reason for the U.S.’s wide advantage in the region. 
Brzezinski also noted to Japanese Foreign Minister Sunoda that: 
U.S. policy towards China was not based on considerations of short-term tactical 
 advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union….our point of departure over the long-term 
 was a  sustained long-term improvement of relations with China and 
 modernization of that  country in close cooperation with the West rather than with 
 the Soviet Union.” (“Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign 
 Minister Sunao Sunoda”, p. 5)  
 
Brzezinski’s statement ultimately speaks volumes, according to structural Marxists, in 
regard to how U.S. political and strategic power truly comes from its economic power. It 
is only after Brzezinski lays out the central role of promoting U.S. economic power that 
he tells the Japanese Foreign Minister “the U.S. was also concerned with Chinese 
security needs—vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cambodia….[and the] 
continued Soviet presence, particularly naval presence in Southeast Asia” (“Summary of 
Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Sunao Sunoda”, p. 5).  
 Domestic politics, at first glance, seems to be a bit weaker as an international 
relations theory when it comes to explaining U.S. foreign policy in Asia. While the State 
Department and the Defense Department pursued different paths, large-scale inter-agency 
conflict seems to be vacant during the late 1970’s when it comes to Southeast Asia. After 
all, both agencies argued the balance of power advantage was on the U.S’s side during 
the late 1970’s.  
 Adherents of domestic politics, however, would suggest that such an outcome, 
unlike later on in Afghanistan, is due to an unintended congruence of their overall policy 
missions in this area of the world. That is, the Defense Department’s primary mission 
(NSC as well) of weakening the Soviet Bloc through the use of the “China card” came 
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together with the State Department’s primary mission of promoting stability and 
economic growth in the region. After all, the last chapter did see the State Department 
and Defense Department have different points of views in regard to whether the Soviets 
were initially acting aggressive in this region. The State Department did not believe so 
while the Defense Department did. Thus, the seeds of conflict were already there and 
they were only masked by the success of U.S. policy in the region.  
 While structural Marxists and adherents to bureaucratic politics may vouch for 
their respective theories, this is not the case with balance of threat realists. The evidence 
firmly dismisses their arguments. U.S. aggression with a cautious Soviet Bloc at hand 
points against the theoretical tenets of balance of threat realism. 
Regional Analysis of U.S. Actions in Middle East 
Section Introduction 
 
 The archival record suggests that the U.S. was on the offensive in the Middle East 
during the 1970’s. Kissinger, the architect of presidents Nixon’s and Ford’s policies in 
the Middle East at this time, confirms that the U.S. sought to expand its influence in the 
Middle East throughout the 1970’s. The former Secretary of State argued that “our 
[overall] strategy [during the 1970’s] was to reduce the Soviet role in the Middle East 
because our respective interests in the area could not be reconciled” (Slater, 1990, p. 
574). One of the ways in which to do that, as the archives will confirm, was to use the 
Arab-Israeli October War peace negotiations in such a manner as to marginalize the 
Soviets in the Middle East. Exercising such a strategy, in the face of a cautious Soviet 
Union (as shown by the quantitative data in chapter three and the archives in chapter 
four), suggests U.S. policymakers were determined to weaken the Soviets during Détente. 
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Indeed, U.S. leaders then went ahead and helped re-orient the political orientation of 
Egypt (using the leverage of the Sinai Peninsula) away from Moscow and towards the 
West. Such were the fruits of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the U.S. None of this should be 
surprising. As my analysis showed in chapter three, the U.S. was already starting to pump 
in significantly more military and economic assistance to the Egypt during the early 
1970’s.  
Soviet Actions 
 To begin with, records from the National Security Archive (NSA) show (as did 
the last chapter) that the U.S.S.R. was not an aggressive superpower in the Middle East 
during the 1970’s. It was Egypt and Syria that made the ultimate decision to launch the 
1973 October War (they were frustrated with the lack of assistance from the Soviets). 
The Soviet Union was not involved and did not push their proxies. In fact, NSA 
document #13 of the 1973 October War demonstrates that the U.S.S.R.’s failure to 
support Egypt and Syria’s drive for war had led to “a major crisis in Arab-Israeli 
relations” (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, p. 2). The Soviets did not believe their 
Arab allies could defeat the mighty Israeli military. NSA document #63 also confirms 
this to be the case. Henry Kissinger argues in this memo that the Soviets did not believe 
the Arabs countries could win (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, p. 9). Even when 
the war began, Kissinger states that Soviet actions in the 1973 October War were “not as 
provocative as those in 1967” (The October War and U.S. Strategy, document # 63, p. 
10). 
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Kissinger and U.S. Actions 
 Soviet actions are in far contrast to the actions of the U.S. Rather than work with 
the cautious Soviet Union in an attempt to cease hostilities, Kissinger’s actions shows the 
U.S. encouraging the aggressive actions of its Israeli proxy. For starters, rather than an 
honest push for a cease-fire in the United Nations to the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, NSA 
document #18 chronicles Kissinger’s attempt to allow the Israeli military the ability to 
strike back against the gains of Egypt and Syria. Kissinger, speaking with Israeli officials, 
argued in favor of the Israeli Defense Forces moving “as fast as possible” while the U.S. 
convinces the British to delay UN cease-fire actions (“The October War and U.S. 
Strategy”, p. 4). 
 Even when the cease-fire was finally agreed to, NSA documents show Kissinger 
giving the go ahead for Israeli violations of the UN cease-fire. NSA documents #51 and 
#54 confirm this to be the case. Document #51 witnesses Kissinger stating to Israeli 
officials that the U.S. “would understand if Israelis felt they required some additional 
time for military dispositions before cease-fire takes effect. We want to shoot for 12 
hours between Security Council decision and cease-fire but could accept the Israeli’s 
taking slightly longer” (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, p. 4). Document #54 
continues down the same path as Kissinger tells Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meier that 
there would be “no violent protests from Washington” should something happen “during 
the night while I’m flying (to help sign the cease-fire)” (“The October War and U.S. 
Strategy”, p. 4).  
 Ultimately, this was simply an invitation by Kissinger to the Israelis that they 
could go ahead and improve their bargaining situation. Surely enough, the Israeli military 
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did take advantage of the situation and improved their military positioning before the 
cease-fire finally took effect. In fact, NSA document #67 comments that “Israeli 
violations of the October 23/24 cease-fire appear to have reflected an effort to isolate the 
Egyptians’ southern flank” (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, p. 1). It also argues 
that “the Arab world will soon realize that there will be no automatic Israeli withdrawal, 
and that Sadat’s and Asad’s glorious assertions of Arab dignity suddenly turned into 
another crushing defeat” (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, document # 67, p. 2). 
 The Soviets bitterly complained about this strategy. NSA document #65, a letter 
from Soviet Premier Leonard Brezhnev to Secretary of State Kissinger, argues that the 
U.S. must put an “end to such provocateur behavior of Tel Aviv” (“The October War and 
U.S. Strategy”, p. 3). The document chronicles an extensive list of Israeli violations of 
the cease-fire. However, the U.S. and the Israelis simply refused to negotiate until Israel 
was able to reverse Arab gains. This is archived in document #13 of the 1973 October 
War. Highlighting a classified meeting between Chinese officials, such as Ambassador 
Huan Chen, and U.S. officials, such as Kissinger and members of the National Security 
Council, this memo finds Kissinger directly stating to the Chinese that “we advocate a 
return to the status quo (post-1967 borders) ante before the fighting started” (“The 
October War and U.S. Strategy”, document #13, p. 3). The U.S.’s strategy was to provide 
as much leverage for the Israelis as possible. The U.S. would simply not tolerate Egypt’s 
and Syria’s (as entrenched Soviet allies) drive to capture their lost territories from the 
1967 war (without a joint Israeli peace agreement). There was no middle ground. Either 
the Arabs returned to the post-1967 borders or the war continued.  
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 Kissinger really never took negotiations with the Soviet Union that seriously. In 
regard to the original cease-fire negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis, 
Kissinger states (in document #63) that it became apparent that “the Soviets could not 
deliver to what was in effect a cease-fire in place” (“The October War and U.S. 
Strategy”, p. 9). In other words, the Soviets could not force their proxies to return to the 
post-1967 borders. Thus, Kissinger argues that “we (the U.S.) had no choice except to go 
another route…And that therefore the longer the war would go on, the more likely would 
be a situation in which they (Arab states) would have to ask for a cease-fire rather than 
we. And this is the reason why we started the airlift on October 13 (to ensure a quick and 
decisive Israeli victory)” (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, document #63, p. 10). 
In short, Kissinger recognized the superior might of the Israeli military and thus he made 
sure that the U.S. aided the Israelis. For instance, document #18 shows Kissinger 
approving many different types of weapons for the Israelis in the early stages of the 
conflict (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, p. 4).  
 Nevertheless, Kissinger’s strategy went beyond trying to compensate for the 
U.S.S.R.’s lack of control over its Arab allies. Kissinger wanted to weaken the Soviet 
Union in the Middle East. Documented in archive # 17, just a couple days after the start 
of the conflict (October 6, 1973), I find Kissinger stating to members of the Chinese 
government that “our strategic objective is to prevent the Soviets from getting a dominant 
position in the Middle East” (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, p. 2). The best way 
to achieve this was to weaken their alliances. This is why Kissinger stated one of the 
U.S.’s objectives was to show “that whoever gets help from the Soviet Union cannot 
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achieve his [their] objective[s], whatever it is” (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, 
document #17, p. 2).  
 Ultimately, Kissinger’s actions during the October War in favor of Israel were the 
realization of this strategy. The U.S. was letting strategic countries in the Middle East, 
such as Egypt, know that the only way in which they would achieve part of their 
demands, regardless of how legitimate they were, was to work with the U.S. Allying 
themselves with the U.S.S.R. or seeking grievances through the battlefield would not be 
tolerated. 
  Indeed, once the U.S. and Israel had militarily defeated Egypt and Syria, and 
diplomacy resumed, Kissinger worked behind the scenes to cut off the U.S.S.R. from 
negotiations, which was a direct violation of the 1972 summit conference agreement 
between Moscow and Washington (Slater, 1990, p. 575). Kissinger actually used Détente 
as a way to would weaken the Soviet Bloc. For instance, he states to his staff on October 
23, 1973 that, “there was enough in that relationship (Détente) to moderate them (the 
Soviets) at critical points” (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, document #13, p. 1). 
Taken as a whole, the result of the 1973 October War for the Soviets, according to Henry 
Kissinger, “is that for the third time since 1953 they [Soviet Union] have lost much of the 
equipment they put into the Arab world. They were once again defeated” (“The October 
War and U.S. Strategy”, document # 63, p. 16).  
 Using U.S. political and military leverage during the 1973 October war and 
cutting off the U.S.S.R. from negotiations in the Middle East ultimately resulted in 
Egypt’s shift from the Soviet orbit unto the West’s. Kissinger’s early 1970’s strategy 
ultimately prevailed. The Soviets began to lose allies and they lost their most significant 
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ally in the region. They witnessed “Egypt’s shift away from the Soviet Bloc, Arab 
socialism and warfare and toward the United States, economic opening, and peace” 
(Alterman, 2005, p. 360). Egypt’s loss was helped along by the economic incentives 
provided by the U.S. and its strategic allies in the region. Jon Alterman, writing for the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, explains that Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat’s “turn away from republican revolutionary rhetoric….bought him more than $5 
billion in bilateral economic aid from the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf (U.S. 
allies) between 1973 and1976. His reorientation toward the U.S. in the 1970’s won him 
tens of billions more dollars from the U.S.” (2005, p. 360).    
U.S. Agency Cooperation 
Tightening the relationship with Egypt was pushed through with the assistance of 
all significant U.S. intelligence agencies. All of the top tier U.S. agencies (State, Defense, 
and CIA), with the leadership of the National Security Council, oversaw the U.S. Sinai 
Support Mission. The goal of the U.S. Sinai Support mission was to help coordinate 
Israel’s peaceful disengagement from the Sinai Peninsula starting in early 1976 
(“Establishment of U.S. Sinai Support Mission”, p. 1). None of these agencies 
complained that shifting Egypt’s alliance could damage the U.S.’s relationship with the 
Soviets.  
 The State Department helped coordinate an enormous amount of economic 
assistance for Egypt starting in early 1976. A declassified secret memorandum from the 
Kissinger transcripts, entitled “Meeting with State Department Advisors”, finds Kissinger 
and many of the top-tier of the State Department pressing for billions to be sent while 
also trying to figure out other ways in which to help Egypt (“Meeting with State 
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Department Advisors”, p. 3). In fact, Kissinger and the rest of the State Department staff 
were fretting about significant problems in the Egyptian economy and how this was 
“eroding Sadat’s position” in the country (“Meeting with State Department Advisors”, p. 
4). With a new significant ally in the Middle East, Kissinger and the rest of the State 
Department wanted to make sure there were no setbacks in this region.  
 It was also apparent that the Defense Intelligence (DI) Community also supported 
the U.S.’s push to envelope Egypt as a U.S. ally. More than that, the DI Community 
actually encouraged the deployment of Egypt in support of other U.S. allies in the Middle 
East. The Shah of Iran is one such example. A declassified DI document, entitled “Egypt: 
Efforts to Support the Shah of Iran”, from November of 1978 is just one case in point of 
the U.S. intelligence community’s push to strengthen U.S. power in the region (Egypt, p. 
1).  
Section Conclusion 
 
 The West and Israel ultimately proved too mighty for the Soviets to deal with. 
The Soviets’ faithfulness to Détente in this region of the world, which Kissinger himself 
admitted, and the fact the U.S. possessed a significant amount of bargaining capital in the 
settlement situation, due to the might of Israel, proved fatal to any Soviet aspirations in 
the region. It was simply dammed if you do and dammed if you don’t. Had the Soviets 
provided significant assistance to Egypt and Syria it could have launched a massive 
military confrontation in this region. Though they could battle it out within the nuclear 
realm, the Soviets knew their involvement would not have swayed a conventional war in 
their favor in this region. However, by not sending offensive weapons to the Arabs they 
alienated their allies to the breaking point. Egypt and Syria moved to capture their lost 
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territories. Ultimately, with the work of Kissinger, the U.S. was able to use economic and 
territorial carrots to shift the allegiance of Egypt toward the West. Thus, it is obvious the 
Soviets were cautious while U.S. policymakers exploited their advantages.  
 These findings parallel nicely with those of chapters three and four. As shown in 
those chapters, the Soviets acted cautiously (according to the quantitative and archival 
evidence. The Soviets did not send offensive weapons to Egypt while the U.S./West 
pushed forward in this region with the help of Israel.  
These findings also continue the onslaught against balance of threat realism. The 
archival evidence firmly points in the direction of U.S. aggression. We also discovered 
that the U.S. was intensely worried about the collapse of the Western Alliance. This, of 
course, fits nicely with structural Marxism. While not as strong, domestic politics cannot 
be completely dismissed. Something can certainly be said for Kissinger’s powerful 
lobbying ability within the Nixon administration.  
Regional Analysis of U.S. Actions in Southern Africa 
 
Section Introduction 
 
 The archives from the last chapter, pertaining to Soviet actions, were quite mixed. 
I first discovered that the NSC and the CIA argued the Soviets were cautious. However, 
this shifted once the Soviets achieved victory. To better understand whether this was an 
initial mistake by the NSC and CIA or just a shift in policy, I will now analyze the U.S. 
archives pertaining to U.S. actions in Southern Africa.  
 Archival research, such as U.S. State Department and Cuban archives, on 
Southern Africa does, in fact, seem to conflict with the latter assertion made by the State 
Department and the NSC about Soviets being aggressive in 1975 in the Angola conflict. 
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Rather than finding the Soviet bear and its Cuban proxy pushed for war, the archives 
suggest the U.S./West was aggressive in this region. The evidence also suggests that it 
was the U.S. that made the aggressive decision in the opening saga of this conflict. In 
fact, it is the U.S. who first began to coordinate and send foreign troops into Angola. 
These policies were firmly chastised by many members of the U.S. State Department. 
Officials in these agencies did not believe such actions were in U.S. interests. However, 
they were systematically silenced by officials in the NSC and the CIA. State Department 
officials, as well as State Department and Defense Department archives, suggest U.S. 
actions were premised on promoting U.S. economic interests.  
State Department Fights for Diplomacy 
 
The U.S. actions and decisions, especially those that occurred in July of 1975 
were covert and aggressive according to many members of the State Department. 
Assistant Secretary Davis, writing for the State Department’s bureau of African affairs 
argued (supported by much of the research from his State Department colleagues) that the 
U.S. should stay out of the Angolan conflict and seek a diplomatic solution. He 
chronicles how a U.S. interagency tasks force “composed of high U.S. experts on Africa 
strongly opposed military intervention; instead . . . they called for diplomatic efforts to 
encourage a political settlement among the three factions to avert bloodshed” (Davis, 
1978, Section II, para. 10). These efforts included putting pressure on the new center-left 
government of Portugal, influential African governments, and working with the UN 
(Davis, 1978, Section II, para. 11).  
All in all, Davis (1978) firmly believed that bellicose actions on the part of the 
U.S. would only strengthen the appeal of the Soviet Bloc to the MPLA. His push, and the 
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push provided by other military experts, on June 23rd, 1975 was to no avail for the 
moment. He describes in his personal memoirs how “at the direction of National Security 
Council aides, the task force recommendation [on a more diplomatic approach] was 
removed from the report and presented to NSC members as merely one policy option” 
(Davis, 1978, Section II, para. 10). 
 Assistant Secretary Davis and many within the State Department would continue 
to butt heads with the NSC as well as the CIA (specifically Secretary of State Kissinger) 
for several more months. Writing in his personal memoir, he blasts many of the assertions 
presented by a subsequent CIA Action Plan paper to the NSC and the Ford 
Administration. For example, he contests that: 
The [CIA] Paper suggests that arming Roberto and Savimbi could “discourage the 
further resort to arms and civil war. So far, however, the arming of the various 
factions has fed the civil war, not discouraged it. The Paper gives no clear 
explanation where the courses of action described will take us, explicitly 
acknowledging that the anti-Neto forces cannot win militarily, and rather 
hopefully expressing the view that restoration of some sort of triangular ‘balance’ 
(which has been the past reality) will produce a peaceful, negotiated, collective 
solution (which the record in Angola and experience elsewhere in Africa indicate 
is most unlikely).” (Davis, 1978, Section: “Other Questions, para. 1) 
 
Thus, Davis is questioning what the exact goals of the NSC and the CIA were.  
Perhaps the following comments by Davis help shed some light in this. These 
comments, which also attack the NSC-CIA covert action plan in a July 12th, 1975 memo 
to the State Department representative on the NSC Committee (Under Secretary Joseph J. 
Sisco), imply that economic motives may be overriding the strategic interests of the U.S. 
He writes: 
covert intervention would not serve larger U.S. interests; that an attempted 
intervention could not be kept secret; and that a covert intervention would have to 
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be so circumscribed as to fall between stools in any case - while the other side 
could escalate at will….? We have so far succeeded in avoiding the engagement 
of our vital interest in Angola and even the accusations of U.S. intervention are 
sporadic and not a serious political liability. So far as concrete interests are 
concerned, Gulfs $300 million stake in Cabinda is the principal one. . . .If we 
become engaged under . . . [the specific proposals put forward for covert military 
intervention] (and developments over this weekend make it clear - if it was not 
clear before - that . . . [the proposals under consideration] would probably be 
inadequate), the Soviets will become aware of our decision almost immediately. 
The CIA paper significantly notes that the ‘Soviets enjoy greater freedom of 
action in the covert supply of arm, equipment and ammunition’ and ‘can escalate 
the level of their aid more readily than we.’ The CIA paper makes clear that in the 
best of circumstances we won't be able to win. If we are to have a test of strength 
with the Soviets, we should find a more advantageous place. (Davis, 1978, 
Section: III, para. 2-5).  
 
In the end, Davis (1978) believed that diplomacy “was favored by most of the 
agencies participating” (Section: “Other Questions”, para. 4). However, “the CIA Action 
Plan was considered once again by the Forty Committee (I believe on July 17); it was 
given to President Ford sometime within the next several days; and it was approved” 
(Davis, 1978, Section: “Other Questions”, para. 15). The hawks defeated the doves. 
Aggression trumped diplomacy.  
Kissinger’s Power and U.S. Instigation  
 
Ultimately, Secretary of State Kissinger simply possessed too much power and 
too much influence over the U.S. President. According to Robert Hultslander, who served 
as CIA station chief in Angola, “Kissinger's support for the anti-communist faction in 
Angola's civil war during the mid-1970s was a major contributor to instability in 
Southern Africa at that time” (Gedda, para. 1). Hultslander further contends (his 
comments can be found in the National Security Archives) that Kissinger was determined 
to challenge the Soviet Union, although no vital U.S. interests were at stake” (Gedda, 
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para. 8). All things considered, it was not Soviet assistance to the MPLA, as Kissinger 
suggested, that contributed to the MPLA victory in Angola but U.S. policy. Hultslander 
states that “it was our [U.S.] policies which caused the destabilization” (Gedda, para. 4). 
The positions of the State Department were ultimately “irrelevant…. U.S. policy towards 
Angola would be determined not by what happened there, but by his [Kissinger’s] 
conception of the U.S. position in the world at the time” (“Kissinger Watch”, p. 6).  
This is why Nathaniel Davis agrees with research that shows the U.S. was 
extremely involved in the opening drama of the Angolan conflict. In fact, records indicate 
that U.S. support for the FNLA and UNITA actually began in January of 1975 when the 
CIA requested over $300,000 in covert aid for the FNLA. Anticipating the collapse of the 
Portuguese colony, CIA officials argued that such aid would provide the U.S. “with some 
capital in the bank with one of the leaders of a government that was going to control a 
fairly sizable country” (Harder, para. 13).This is corroborated by Davis in July of 1975. 
He states that: 
William G. Hyland, the Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research, told me that a $300,000 program of covert support for the veteran 
Angolan liberation fighter, Holden Roberto, had been approved that past January 
by the Forty Committee, the top-level review board that passes on covert 
operations abroad. This came as a surprise. While the money was for political 
action and expenses, and not for arms, I had not been aware that such programs 
were still being approved in the wake of the congressional investigations and 
interest in U.S. covert activities abroad. (Section: II, para. 1) 
On the other hand, Soviet military aid towards the MPLA also started in March of 
1975 (“Kissinger Watch”, p. 7). This was obviously several months after the CIA became 
involved. Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State Newsom told British officials that “we [the 
United States] were surprised by the low level [during early 1975] of Soviet support to 
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the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories” (“Kissinger Watch”, p. 7). Of 
course, Kissinger would dismiss his views as well. 
Cuban Archives show U.S. Aggression 
Peter Gleijeses (2003), author of Conflicting Missions: Secret Cuban Documents 
on the History of Africa Involvement, also finds startling evidence suggesting that the 
United States (and its allies), not Cuba/Soviet Union, was the principal instigator of the 
actual war itself. Using Cuban and American archives, Gleijeses (2003) shows that it was 
the U.S., with the help of South Africa and China, who began to coordinate the inflow of 
foreign into Angola in July of 1975, thereby starting the conflict (p. 3).  
Gleijeses (2003) also catches Secretary of State Kissinger in a serious of lies 
regarding U.S. motives. According to Gleijeses (2003): 
One lie is that Washington intervened in Angola in 1975 only after large numbers 
of Cuban troops had been sent to that country to support the MPLA. Kissinger 
testified before Congress in January 76 that ‘in August (1975) intelligence reports 
indicated the presence of Soviet and Cuban military advisers, trainers and troops, 
including the first Cuban combat troops. (p. 146). 
 
However, this was in flat contradiction to the now declassified CIA and other intelligence  
 
reports of the time. Kissinger was simply “rewriting the history.” Gleijeses (2003) goes  
 
on and argues that, “when the United States decided to launch the covert intervention, in  
 
June and July, not only were there no Cubans in Angola, but the U.S. government and the  
 
CIA were not even thinking about any Cuban presence in Angola” (p. 146).  He states  
 
that “if you look at the CIA reports which were done at the time, the Cubans were totally  
 
out of the picture” (Gleijeses, 2003, p. 147). Thus, Gleijeses (2003) concludes that  
 
“Kissinger forced the CIA to rewrite a document on Angola to show an earlier Cuban  
 
presence than was accurate” (p. 147). 
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Thus, Gleijeses’ (2003) research shows that Cuban troop intervention was 
actually a response to U.S./South African joint covert operations from Zaire (p. 3). 
President Castro dispatched troops into the country only after he determined that the 
Angolans were under attack. More than that, Castro did not even wait for the Soviets go 
ahead. Gleijeses (2003) documents that Cuban leaders immediately sent troops to push 
back the South Africans and they did this without directives from Moscow. Indeed, 
Soviet officials were stunned by Cuban actions (p. 4).  
State Department Officials Agree with Cuban Archives 
 Recent interviews with U.S. government officials confirm the validity and 
insightful interpretation of Gleijeses’ findings. For instance, Thomas Hughes, a former 
director of intelligence for the State Department during the Angola conflict comments 
that this “book does seem to have nailed Henry [Kissinger] quite specifically on this 
question… [and] it is an impressive account, a sad story that seems to be written almost 
out of a feeling that it might be lost” (French, Section: “Devastating Warfare”, para 6.). 
Davis also supports this work and argues that “considering that things came to a head 
over covert action in the U.S. government in mid-July, there is no reason to believe we 
were responding to Cuban involvement in Angola” (French, Section: “Devastating 
Warfare”, para 5). After all, the Cubans were not yet physically present in the conflict nor 
were they sending large amounts of assistance. Thus, the U.S. was fueling the conflict 
and sending in troops without any actual evidence that Cuban or Soviet troops were 
significantly involved in the conflict. 
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Economic Interests? 
 
 Why did the NSC and the CIA work in favor of an aggressive approach? The 
answer lies in studying the fact that the superpower with the most economic interests on 
the line in Southern Africa was none other than the United States. An NSC report entitled 
“United States Policy toward Angola” piggybacks on the aforementioned assumptions 
made by Davis regarding the fact that U.S. actions in Angola revolved around economic 
and not strategic motives. For instance, the report argues that the U.S. must protect “U.S. 
investments, [the promotion of U.S. exports, and [the continuation of U.S. access] to 
Angola’s raw materials” (“United States Policy Toward Angola”, p. 62). Such 
investments, which totaled $400 million, included $300 million worth of investments in 
the Gulf Oil Fields of Cabinda (“United States Policy Toward Angola”, p. 62). Protecting 
U.S. investments in oil meant protecting such American companies as Texaco, Sun Oil, 
Hess, Amoco, and Conoco. These companies possessed significant oil holdings in Angola 
and they were worried that their previous oil concessions off the Angolan coast would not 
be honored by the MPLA.  
Archives from the Defense Department also demonstrate the primacy of strategic 
economic resources in regards to U.S. interests in Angola. In a National Security Meeting 
on June 27, 1975 involving Secretary of State Kissinger, the President, CIA Director 
William Colby, and other high-level government officials, I find Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger stating that “we might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola. 
Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu (the U.S.’s Zairian ally) would mean far greater 
security of the petroleum resources” (“Meeting of the National Security Council”, p. 7). 
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If the economic interest evidence does not suggest that the U.S. policy was based on 
economic resources, than I do not know what does. 
 The report also documents that U.S. exports and imports from Angola had 
significantly increased in the last few years. Increasing exports and imports had to 
continue (U.S. officials argued) since it was benefiting some of the most competitive U.S. 
business sectors. The economic interests section of the NSC report also highlights the 
importance of protecting U.S. mineral interests in the region of such U.S. companies as 
Guggenheim (diamonds), Chromalloy (gold), and Tenneco (sulphur) (“United States 
Policy Toward Angola”, p. 62).  
 Of course, Southern Africa was also important for the U.S. strategically. The 
transportation routes along Angola Western oil tankers and the overfly routes for U.S. 
military personnel could fall into grave risk should the Soviet-backed MPLA gain power 
in the region. The NSC and the State Department did worry that Soviet access to ports 
would increase the U.S.S.R.’s military capabilities in the region. However, there is not a 
lot of evidence in U.S. archives that the U.S. was overly concerned about these issues. 
The archives focus time and time again on the economic resources that Angola possessed. 
Section Conclusion 
 
 Overall, when I combine the U.S./South African covert actions, discovered in this 
chapter, with the lack of Soviet response, discovered in the previous chapter, it is obvious 
the U.S. was initially more aggressive in its actions than the U.S.S.R. Secretary of State 
Kissinger, with the help of the NSC and CIA, was simply determined to send covert U.S. 
aid towards U.S. allies from the very beginning. The State Department questioned these 
tactics. It did not believe that aggressive U.S. actions would work. Assistant Secretary 
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Davis and the State Department machinery believed there were other ways to avoid war 
and avoid Soviet expansionism in the region. More specifically, Davis did not believe 
significant U.S. strategic interests were at play. However, Davis and the State Department 
were silenced by its more powerful foes.  
 These findings and the fact that U.S. government reports focused much more on 
the economic aspects of Angola (rather than the strategic aspects), means that balance of 
threat realism does not explain what occurred in Angola. Such archival evidence does 
suggest that structural Marxism can be regarded as possible explanatory theory. Cuba’s 
determinative actions in this region, in light of Soviet caution, could suggest that the 
battle in Angola was primarily a battle between Cuba and the U.S. Peter Gleijeses 
believes this to be the case. He believes, from President Castro’s very own statements to 
Kissinger’s lies, that Angola was a North-South conflict (2003, p. 6). Weight is also 
added to this theory once you consider that Europe also provided significant assistance 
towards the FNLA. Officials in the Ford administration admitted that “French assistance 
was ‘substantial’ although below the American level, whereas they characterized British 
support as ‘modest’” (Gleijeses, 2003, p. 137). 
Domestic politics has a story to tell, however. As I showed, there was significant 
bureaucratic infighting. The State Department did not believe aggressive covert actions 
would lead to an outcome that suited U.S. interests in the region. Kissinger simply 
overrode the other intelligence agencies. Thus, adherents of domestic politics suggest 
U.S. policymakers, such as Kissinger, were out to support the interests of business 
interest groups in the U.S. However, they were defeated by other more hawkish U.S. 
agencies. 
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Regional Analysis of U.S. Actions in Latin America 
Section Introduction 
 
 The U.S. archives in the last chapter argued that the Soviet Union was not 
aggressive in Latin America during the 1970’s. Despite large amount of Soviet assistance 
towards Cuba, as shown in chapter three, U.S. agency archives contested that the Soviets 
were not significantly involved in the region. Instead, U.S. archives argued that 
revolutionary turmoil in Latin America was the result of the political and economic 
repression pushed by U.S. clients in the region. As a result, U.S. agencies recommended 
that the U.S. use its political and economic power to change such behavior. This was the 
best way, in the eyes of many U.S. agencies, to curtail Soviet interventionism in Latin 
America. President Carter agreed with such an analysis. He embarked (publicly) on a 
quest to alter U.S. policies in the region.  
Now I show that the Carter administration/U.S. agencies were not successfully 
able to push their clients in Latin America to adopt alternative policies that would have 
brought many leftist followers into the democratic fold and stopped the emerging 
revolutionary violence. Carter’s liberal foreign policy towards Central America seems 
largely rhetorical. It was all purely political marketing meant to dissociate the U.S. from 
its clients in the region. Statistical evidence confirms this to be the case.  
Liberalism Defeats Realism? 
Robert Pastor, Carter’s head national security advisor for Latin America, makes 
the case that the Carter administration attempted to pursue a more liberal and human 
foreign policy in Latin America. He writes about a battle that occurred on March 24, 
1977 between several career officers of the State Department’s American Republic 
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Affairs (ARA) and the Defense Department against Secretary of State Vance, NSC 
Advisor Brzezinski, and the Treasury Department (Pastor, 1992, p. 25). The ARA and 
Defense argued in favor of a “special relationship” with Latin America consisting of 
helping countries that were the most strategic to the U.S. while Vance and Brzezinski 
argued in favor of a North-South strategy of pursuing liberalism throughout the region. 
Pastor chronicles that the doves won out over the hawks and attempted to deploy their 
favored approach (Pastor, 1992, p. 25).  
Failure to Change U.S. Policy 
However, there is damming evidence comes from Carter’s national security 
advisor for Latin America. Robert Pastor (1992) concurs that [foreign aid] cuts towards 
Central American nations violating human rights “were not large, but symbolically the 
initiative was important” as it freed the U.S. from the policies of the past (p. 25). Pastor 
(1992) argues that Carter pursued such a policy believing that it would “send a clear 
signal that the U.S. was prepared to pay a price for pursuing human rights” (p. 25). 
However, the U.S. was really not ready to pay a price.  
Subsequent U.S. actions demonstrate that the U.S. was extremely risk averse in 
regards to changing U.S. policy in this region. For instance, archival evidence 
undermines much of Carter’s early 1977 human rights rhetoric (profoundly encompassed 
within Carter’s January 1977 inaugural address). One of the most important documents 
pertaining to U.S. policy towards U.S.-allied repressive regimes, entitled “Presidential 
Review Memorandum NSC-28: Human Rights” failed to support many of the public 
statements made by President Carter in regards to how the U.S. should change course and 
pursue human rights and socioeconomic development in Latin America. Rather than 
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pushing for change in the region, the report postulates a set of positives and negatives that 
tilts the picture heavily in favor of the negative drawbacks to promoting human rights 
(“NSC 28”, p. 4). The negative possibilities, which include damaging U.S. national 
security interests, political and economic interests and retaliation by the recipient country 
of U.S. assistance against resources that U.S. vitally needs is pitted against supporting 
human rights for the sake of promoting human rights (“NSC 28”, p. 5). The report also 
adds that the curtailment of U.S. economic and military aid towards repressive regimes 
“ought not to be considered lightly or until less drastic measures have been taken” (“NSC 
28”, p. 15). These less drastic measures included public statements and various symbolic 
acts, which were simply useless.  
U.S. Clients Resist Change 
Consequently, it proved to be very difficult for President Carter and U.S. agencies 
to challenge U.S. clients in Latin America even when they actually wished to do it. The 
U.S. ran into a complete wall in regard to the cutting of military sales to repressive right-
wing regimes in Latin America. Threats of aid cuts did not change the behavior of these 
regimes. For example, upon learning that the Carter Administration was going to cut 
military sales to Brazil in late 1977, Brazilian military leaders proclaimed that they would 
not accept $50 million in military sales from the U.S. (Fagen, Section IV, para. 3). The 
political/military leaders of other Latin American right-wing regimes, such as Argentina, 
El Salvador, and Guatemala, announced similar intentions. They vowed to obtain military 
aid from alternative sources and blasted the U.S. for interference in Latin America 
“sovereign” affairs.  
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The U.S. archives also show the Carter administration struggling to “convince” 
U.S. allies in Central America to change course. “U.S. Objectives and Goals in 
Guatemala”, a December 1978 State Department report, pointed out that the government 
of Guatemala “while supporting U.S. initiatives aimed at improving the lot of the poorest 
Guatemalans, [their] efforts to remedy income inequities remain a low priority” (“U.S. 
Objectives and Goals in Guatemala”, p. 3). The report chronicles that while the U.S. 
continued to push for a more humane approach in the region the Guatemalan government 
still “lacked sympathy” for the U.S. human rights approach.  
In fact, the Carter administration’s efforts to “hold-up” military aid from 
repressive regimes as an attempt to change their human rights and socioeconomic policies 
simply fell on deaf ears. Having helped establish and consolidate these repressive 
regimes over a period of several decades, it was simply too difficult for the U.S. to 
change or mold the behavior of its allies by simply cutting off U.S. military aid.  
Carter’s Failure to Rein in U.S. Repressive Clients 
Regardless of this, all of the statistical evidence shows that the U.S. did not truly 
alter their foreign aid policies towards Latin America. For instance, a statistical study by 
Michael Stohl, David Carleton, and Steven Johnson (1984) entitled “Human Rights and 
U.S. Foreign Assistance” further backs up the archival evidence. This study finds that 
“the Carter administration did not implement a policy of human rights which actually 
guided the allocation of economic and military assistance” (Stohl et al, 1984, p. 215). The 
Carter administration simply allocated military and economic aid (for the most part) 
regardless of human rights. President Carter was only different in that he actually did not 
increase economic aid to countries that increased their human rights violations. In fact, 
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President Carter did not significantly cut foreign assistance to strategic allies in Latin 
America (specifically Central America) that actually misbehaved. The study also found 
this to be true for the Nixon and Ford presidencies (Stohl et al, 1984, p. 221). These facts 
show that the U.S. simply continued (and this was the true strategy behind the Carter 
March 24, 1977 speech) talking the liberal economic talk.  
James Lebovic (1988), in National Interests and U.S. Foreign Aid, further 
postulates that the Carter and the subsequent Reagan Administration also differed very 
little. His data suggests that “a great portion of Reagan policy can be explained by that of 
Carter, and even though aid amounts and recipients changed, some of the same interests 
(economic) prevailed in both” (Lebovic, p. 129). The only difference between Carter and 
Reagan was that Carter cut aid to human rights violators that were not aligned with the 
U.S. Such is of little significance however.  
Success in Panama 
However, there was one victory for the liberals in Panama. In fact, Pastor (1992) 
argues in The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle that the 
Carter administration undertook a “liberal approach” when it came to the Panama Canal. 
He argues that the Carter administration undertook significant political risk and endured 
significant criticisms from defense intelligence agencies when it came to the issue of 
handing over the Panama Canal to the Panamanians (1992, p. 52). Ultimately, this 
gesture was grand and it did fall in line with the liberal approach of undercutting 
revolutionary extremism by handing over more democracy and respect towards the Latin 
Americans.  
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Section Conclusion 
Overall, admissions from Carter’s own Latin America national security advisor, 
the archival evidence, and statistical examinations of U.S. foreign aid to Latin America 
demonstrate that the Carter administration did not significantly pursue a “new policy” of 
liberalism in Central America. These facts, combined with the fact that U.S. archives 
show the Soviets as cautious in this region, significantly injures balance of threat realism. 
Carter’s failure had significant consequences for U.S. policy in Central America. The 
result was significant revolutionary turmoil in Central America during the 1970’s.  
Why did President Carter not truly pursue liberalism in Latin America? Some 
scholars have suggested that domestic politics explains U.S. policy in Latin America, 
especially Central America, during the final years of the 1970’s. It is suggested that these 
core U.S. interest groups fought against the liberal policies of President Carter and forced 
him to reverse course. After all, followers of domestic politics would argue that the doves 
chronicled by Robert Pastor were just beginning to lay the groundwork for a more human 
policy in the region. Handing over the Panama Canal is one example. However, they 
simply had very little time and they were defeated by more powerful elements.  
Structural Marxists, however, would point out that it is only when conflict in 
Central America had all but exploded into significant revolutionary upheaval, that there 
was significant business conflict between labor-intensive and capital-intensive firms. 
Such business conflict at the end of Détente is very well documented by Ronald Cox 
(1994) in Power and Profits: U.S. Policy in Central America. However, such bureaucratic 
conflict did not significantly occur (for the most part) prior to Détente’s collapse or the 
Nicaraguan revolution. It started in late 1979. The battle between the doves and hawks, 
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chronicled by Robert Pastor, was all but an illusion for structural Marxists. It led to no 
real change in U.S. policy as the statistical evidence showed.  
Regional Analysis of U.S. Actions in Afghanistan 
 
Section Introduction 
 
Chapter four showed that the Soviets did everything in their power to avoid an 
invasion into Afghanistan. State Department archives show that the Soviet Bloc was also 
not planning to spread its influence towards the Persian Gulf. However, rather than take 
this analysis into consideration, the archival evidence of U.S. actions in this region during 
the late 1970’s suggests that certain bureaucratic agencies, such as the NSC and CIA, 
were engaging in actions that would destabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Indeed, 
there is considerable archival evidence that U.S. policymakers in the CIA and the NSC, 
helped incite the Afghan Islamic insurgency during the late 1970’s, through indirect and 
direct aid mechanisms, thereby helping to ignite the Soviet invasion in the first place.   
The Bureaucratic Battle 
 
The evidence suggests there was a bureaucratic battle brewing at the top between 
the State Department and the NSC/CIA. More specifically, there were intense 
disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski in regard to Soviet motives in Afghanistan. 
Following on the advice and facts laid out by the U.S. embassy in Kabul (and the State 
Department in general), Vance argued in favor of diplomacy with the Soviet Union. He 
disregarded Brzezinski’s previous argument that the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan was 
part of a Soviet drive to achieve hegemony in Southwest Asia since the U.S. “had no 
evidence of Soviet complicity in the coup” (Galster, para. 9). He also trusted the counsel 
given by his Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
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Harold Saunders, who argued in a recently declassified document that “we need to take 
into account the mix of nationalism and Communism in the new leadership and seek to 
avoid driving the new regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union than it might 
wish” (Galster, para. 5)  
Brzezinski, however, scoffed at Vance and the State Department’s suggestions. 
Gary Newsom, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, chronicles how Brzezinki: 
had a much more confrontational view of the situation than Vance and most of us 
at the State Department. He thought we should be doing something covertly to 
frustrate Soviet ambitions. On some occasions, I was not alone in raising 
questions about the wisdom and feasibility of what he wanted to do. (Harrison, 
para. 4) 
 
Still, Brzezinski firmly believed that recent actions by the Soviets in the region suggested 
they “might turn Afghanistan into a launching pad for aggression in the region” (Galster, 
para. 2). 
Brzezinski’s desire for an aggressive U.S. response begins in the early months of 
1979 as he “pushed a decision in April of 1979 through the Special Coordination 
Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council…to be, as he put it, more sympathetic 
(through the use of covert aid), to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their 
country’s independence” (Galster, para. 7). Aggravated by the State Department’s 
cooperative approach toward the Soviets in Afghanistan, which was currently holding 
sway with President Carter, the April 1979 decision begins the process of altering U.S. 
policy in the region. Gone was the cautious policy of the past. U.S. policy now shifted 
toward organizing the Afghan rebels and sending covert assistance.  
The true significance of the April 1979 NSC SCC decision was that Brzezinski 
was able to transfer control of the CIA from the State Department over to the NSC 
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(White House is technically in charge of the NSC, but State had been in charge of 
supervising it under President Carter). Brzezinski himself chronicles how he was able to 
convince President Carter to transfer control over the CIA from the State Department to 
the NSC in 1979 (Galster, para. 7). He was very tired of the naïve foreign policy 
approaches of the State Department in Afghanistan as well as other areas of the world. 
Ironically enough, Brzezinski was actually able to pressure the State Department to shift 
their tone on Afghanistan. Indeed, he more than: 
“convinced State Department officials that the rising Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan threatened American national security. He also got them to see that 
the Afghan situation presented a valuable political opportunity for the U.S. As a 
State Department report later put it, "the overthrow of the D.R.A. would show the 
rest of the world, particularly the Third World, that the Soviets' view of the 
socialist course of history as being inevitable is not accurate” (Galster, para. 9).  
 
Brzezinski’s new leadership of the NSC, State, and the CIA was instrumental in 
helping to provide covert assistance to the Afghan rebels. His new leadership coincides 
with the CIA and State providing covert military assistance to the rebels several months 
before the Soviets invaded (Galster, para. 11). Covert assistance, as an October 30 1979 
field report from the CIA documents, was pushed forward by securing the allegiance of 
Pakistani military officials (Galster, para. 10). The CIA also helped the Afghan rebels 
secure funding from China and other U.S. allies. Overall, it was pretty obvious that the 
CIA was determined to provoke the Soviets. Why else would CIA officials fail to 
repudiate suggestions by “conference participants (organized by the Cold War 
International History Project) that a U.S.-funded arms pipeline was in place as early as 
August of 1979” (Ostermann, page 140)? 
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High-level officials from Pakistan also suggest that the CIA began to aid the 
Afghan Islamic insurgents several months before the Soviets decided to invade 
Afghanistan. According to a former Pakistani military official who was interviewed in 
1988:  
the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad had asked Pakistani military officials in April 
1979 to recommend a rebel organization that would make the best use of U.S. aid. 
The following month, the Pakistani source claimed, he personally introduced a 
CIA official to Hekmatyar who, while more radically Islamic and anti-American 
than most Afghans, headed what the Pakistani government considered the most 
militant and organized rebel group, the Hizb-i Islami (Hekmatyar). (Ostermann, p. 
142) 
 
More than anything, Brzezinski’s response to a question by a reporter from “Le 
Nouvel Observateur” in 1998 about whether he regretted his actions in regards to 
Afghanistan says it all. Brzezinski responds to the reporter by stating: 
Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of 
drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the 
Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the 
opportunity of giving to the U.S.S.R. its Vietnam War. Indeed, for almost 10 years, 
Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought 
about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire. (Information 
Clearinghouse, para. 6) 
 
Brzezinski also explains that U.S. advisor Robert Gates account of the events in 
Afghanistan was right on the mark. He agrees that while the official version of history 
states that CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan “ the 
reality is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed 
the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul” 
(Information Clearinghouse, para. 2). 
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Section Conclusion 
 
 It is ultimately quite telling that I found extensive U.S. documents (in the last 
chapter) from the U.S. embassy in Kabul, part of the less hawkish State Department, 
initially portraying the Soviet Union’s actions as defensive while I now find Brzezinski 
and his supporters in the CIA and NSC taking control over the State Department and 
engaging in covert actions (with Brzezinski’s lead) against the U.S.S.R. Brzezinski 
completely overrode Vance and the rest of the leadership in the State Department. After 
all, “not all U.S. officials believed that the Soviet intervention was part of an expansionist 
drive…[these officials] advocated quiet diplomacy with the Soviet Union in order to 
provide the Kremlin with a way out of what they believed was a political and military 
miscalculation” (Galster, para. 8). It was Brzezinski’s ability to influence President Carter 
that shifted the dynamics in this region. Overall, Brzezinski’s ability to influence 
President Carter, of course, lends immense credibility to the theory of domestic politics. 
  Structural Marxists would not be surprised that the U.S. became aggressive. For 
one, they would argue that the U.S. tried to compensate for the loss of Iran in the Buffer 
Zone. More importantly, they would argue that the U.S. was aggressive and was trying to 
weaken the Soviets in their backyard. 
 Regardless, it is obvious that balance of threat theory has been weakened yet 
again. The evidence firmly shows that the U.S. was aggressive during a time in which the 
Soviet Bloc was playing cautious.  
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The Strategic Arms Race 
 
Besides whether or not the Soviets were making significant gains in the less 
developed world, there were also battles within U.S. intelligence agencies in regards to 
the question of whether or not Détente collapsed due to Soviet advances in the strategic 
arms race. Vance and Brzezinski deal with this topic.  
Trusting that the U.S./Western Alliance had significant deterrents in place, Vance 
(1983) argues in his memoirs that the Soviets had not turned the strategic nuclear arms 
race in their favor. He confidently believed that the Soviets were putting their best foot 
forward and countered his critics by stating that the SALT II arms limitation treaty was a 
“balanced, carefully wrought set of agreements” which would lead to “SALT III and to 
negotiations leading to much deeper reductions and increased qualitative constraints on 
intercontinental nuclear weapons” (Vance, 1983, p. 135).  
Hardliners, such as Brzezinski, were instead concerned that the Soviets were 
coming very close to being successful in their attempt to “politically decouple” Western 
Europe from the U.S. in the strategic arms arena (“NFAC Bi-Monthly Summary on 
Soviet Affairs”, p. 3). “NFAC Bi-Monthly Summary on Soviet Affairs”, a report from 
William Odom of the CIA to National Security Advisor Brzezinski in October of 1979 
(prior to the Soviet invasion), suggests this was the case. Taking advantage of the “erratic 
nature of U.S. policy” the Soviets were able to paint themselves as the sole superpower 
that wished to pursue nuclear peace and “military détente” in Western Europe. As argued 
by a CIA report from early December of 1979, the Soviets were “encouraged that their 
diplomatic pressure had provoked left-wing and center-left political sentiment throughout 
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European NATO in favor of an arms control dialogue with the U.S.S.R.” (“Possible 
Soviet Responses to an Affirmative NATO Decision on TNF Modernization”, p. 4).  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed everything however. The U.S. 
hardliners realized that invasion had brought some major benefits for the U.S. within the 
domain of the strategic arms race. Initially failing in its push to get Europe to modernize 
the West’s long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in Europe, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan” pushed Western Europe to sign off on the U.S.’s proposal to augment the 
Western alliance’s LRTNF (“Likely Soviet Approach to Preliminary Exchanges on TNF”, p. 
6).Western European countries, such as West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
were now, unlike in the prior year, pushing harder and harder for the increase of long-
range theater nuclear forces in the European continent. The “disarray of the Alliance over 
enhanced-radiation weapons” several years ago no longer existed. 
The tightening of the Western Alliance during the early months of 1980 surprised 
and worried the Soviets. Soviet leaders contested that “new NATO forces will be able to 
destroy targets up to the Volga line-beyond the heart of the Soviet military infrastructure” 
(“Likely Soviet Approach to Preliminary Exchanges on TNF”, p. 6). Soviet leaders 
believed the NATO improvements gave a significant advantage to the West. Unlike the 
theater nuclear improvements made by the U.S.S.R., which were only qualitative 
improvements in the forces with the same combat tasks, the Soviets contested that 
Western improvements in LRTNF were quantitative improvements in the arsenal of the 
West. Accordingly, the CIA warned that the Soviets would intensify their diplomatic 
dialogue hoping that it “would serve as evidence that U.S.-Soviet détente was still viable, 
thus making the West Europeans more willing to conduct business with them as usual”  
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(“Likely Soviet Approach to Preliminary Exchanges on TNF”, p. 4). However, the Soviet 
diplomatic push did not succeed. 
As a matter of fact, in contrast to the initial arguments made by U.S. hawks that 
the U.S. was losing the strategic nuclear balance in the late 1970’s, Carter Administration 
documents suggest that U.S. was strategically much stronger in the strategic arms race 
during the final years of Détente. In fact, the Carter Administration boasted that NATO 
military strength had significantly improved between 1977 and 1979. No longer was 
NATO military strength in Europe “eroding in the face of an increased Soviet threat (as 
the report claims was happening in 1977)” (“Likely Soviet Approach to Preliminary 
Exchanges”, p. 3). On the contrary, Carter Administration documents contend that the 
U.S. was able to reverse the trend. The administration argued that the “1977 and 1978 
NATO Summits led to the adoption of the NATO Long-Term Defense Program….These 
commitments (more military spending) brought about improvements in Alliance 
capabilities and will have a major impact in the future” (“Likely Soviet Approach to 
Preliminary Exchanges”, p. 3). 
Not only has balance of threat of threat theory been weakened (asymmetrical 
realism), but the findings relating to strategic arms have also weakened symmetrical 
realism. Détente did not collapse due to Soviet gains in this arena. The evidence shows 
the U.S. made gains while Soviet capabilities decreased. 
U.S. Archives and the Deterioration of the Western Bloc during the 1970’s 
 
Section Introduction 
 
 Since balance of threat realism has been severely weakened in chapters four and 
five, I will now introduce archival documents pertaining to the Western Bloc. Such 
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documents are immensely significant for structural Marxists. For them, they show the 
U.S. significantly worried about the chasms within the Alliance. 
Structural Marxists would contend that the U.S. was pursuing the structural 
economic interests of U.S. capital. They firmly disagree with realists in regards to U.S. 
motivations in the less developed world. Rather than responding to the Soviet threat, 
structural Marxists firmly believe that the U.S. was most concerned with the rise of its 
fellow allies in the Western Alliance and the effect of that competition on U.S. interests 
in the Third World. Structural Marxists would argue that the U.S. push against the Soviet 
Bloc during the late 1970’s was an attempt to re-assert its influence within the West in 
their endeavor to continue Western cumulative superiority over the U.S.S.R. and the less 
developed world. In fact, they would argue that Brzezinski pushed to link Western 
Europe and Japan closer together during the late 1970’s as he feared that the U.S. was 
losing the leadership mantle of the Western Alliance (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 148). As I 
discussed in the first chapter, a tight relationship with Western Europe and Japan was a 
significant cornerstone of U.S. policy. After all, if the U.S. was worried that Soviet 
Détente diplomacy was starting to “politically decouple” Western Europe from the U.S., 
then it would surely worry if events in the less developed world were starting to 
economically decouple Western Europe from the U.S.  
Indeed, U.S. archives reveal that Japan and Western Europe’s increasing 
economic strength, their activities in the less developed world, and the perceived 
weakness of the U.S. to defend the “status quo” were all significant concerns for the U.S. 
in the late 1970’s. The archives also suggest that Europe was becoming too independent 
and much more willing to challenge/question the U.S. than ever before. Taken as a 
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whole, these occurrences frightened U.S. leaders from all significant U.S. intelligence 
agencies, and brought concerns about the long-term viability of the Western Bloc. 
U.S. Archives and the Cracking of the Western Alliance during the 1970’s 
 
To gauge the U.S.’s interpretation of its relations with the rest of the Western 
Alliance I shall begin with a blunt 1979 CIA report entitled “Changing Power Relations 
among OECD States”. “Changing Power Relations among OECD States” argues “that 
greater independence or initiative” on the part of the Western Europeans and the Japanese 
occurring during the late 1970’s occurred due to the loss of U.S. leadership, especially 
within the economic arena (p. 2). The report also argues that Western European and 
Japanese partners were becoming (throughout the 1970’s) much more resistant to U.S. 
economic initiatives (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 2). In the past, U.S. allies had “no 
choice but to accept U.S. leadership, even if they worried that some American decisions 
might not be in their best interests” (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 2). However, thanks 
to a persistent “U.S. effort throughout the post-war period to enhance its partner’s 
military and economic capabilities (to woo them away from the Soviet Bloc),” as well as 
the general decline in American political, economic, and military power, the report goes 
on to argue that U.S. allies now “believe that their capabilities go far beyond resistance, 
and that their interests increasingly demand that they seize the initiative or even act 
independently” (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 3).  
Most importantly, the report contends that U.S. dominance over the West’s 
strategic arsenal no longer resulted in European acquiescence in the economic arena. The 
“spillover” effect that the U.S. gained from military issues into other areas was now 
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voided (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 6). Economic assertiveness on the part of the 
U.S.’s allies was now a reality.  
The most glaring economic concern in the report revolves around Western 
European and Japanese relations with the less developed countries. The report affirms 
that allied (economic) activities “in Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia have 
already caused considerable friction with the U.S., and threatens to cause more in the 
future” (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 8). Such activities include the French and 
Germans selling nuclear technology to less developed countries not allied with the U.S. 
and the Western Europeans establishing bilateral ties in the Middle East region (to the 
exclusion of the U.S.) (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 8).  The report perceives 
Germany to be one of the most worrisome cases. No longer ready to do the “bidding of 
the U.S.,” Germany “is [was] increasingly pursuing independent political-economic 
interests (in Brazil for instance) and working at persuading its EC colleagues to join in its 
policies designed to advance their common interests” (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 
11). In regards to OPEC and other rapidly developing countries the 1979 CIA report cites 
concerns that the “allies are pursuing their national interests there aggressively, while 
paying relatively limited attention to the possible global strategic implications of their 
actions.” Thus, Western Europe and Japan’s moves to form closer ties with the semi-
periphery and OPEC nations also concerned U.S. leaders in regard to the viability of the 
Western Alliance.  
There are additional economic examples of the Western Europeans and Japanese 
taking on a more assertive role against the U.S. Within the OECD macroeconomic arena, 
which the U.S. had historically dominated, the report finds that France and West 
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Germany launched the European Monetary System (EMS) in order to “provide some 
exchange rate stability.” These Western European countries took this initiative as they 
felt that U.S. economic and fiscal mismanagement was the cause of international 
monetary disorder (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 4). The Europeans also pressured the 
U.S. to adopt anti-inflation and dollar support programs (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 
4).  
The U.S. economic problems (loss of energy self-sufficiency, loss of U.S. 
productivity, and economic mismanagement) also brought forth allied concerns about 
“America’s freedom of action in foreign policy and military affairs (“Changing Power 
Relations”, p. 10). For instance, the military decline of the U.S. sparked concerns about 
U.S. resolve against the Soviet Bloc and areas of strategic concern to the alliance in the 
less developed world. Germany and the Europeans worried about Soviet gains in the 
strategic arena. The Japanese feared that U.S. troops would slowly begin to disengage 
from nearby South Korea (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 10).  
More than that, the U.S.’s decline and inability to display firm leadership was 
causing U.S. allies to become increasingly resentful of relying on the U.S. for military 
leadership and protection when considering the “disparity between their growing 
economic strength and their military weakness” (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 13). 
The lack of U.S. leadership caused many within the Western Alliance, specifically West 
Germany, and Japan to consider the unprecedented step of making an accommodation 
with the Soviet Bloc (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 13).  
The basis and starting point for U.S. suspicion about the strength of the Western 
Alliance comes from the 1973 October War. As mentioned in the Middle East section of 
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this chapter, this conflict witnessed the rise of an intense friction between the U.S. and its 
European allies over the degree of European assistance (or lack thereof) during this 
conflict. An October 26, 1973 meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger and 
German ambassador Von Staden finds Kissinger chiding the Europeans. He comments 
that: 
It is the overall position of our allies that raises the most serious questions. Time 
and time again we have offered to consult and work out our common positions. 
What we receive is conspicuous dissociation of our allies. We think we are 
engaged in a common exercise to defend our common interests. What we have in 
the present instance is two weeks of intense crisis in which we sought to 
discourage Soviet adventurism. These are the facts however one views the merits 
of Israeli policy now and over the past six years. Once the war started it was in no 
one’s interest to see the Israelis defeated. (“The October War and U.S. Strategy”, 
document #81, p. 2) 
 
Kissinger continued further and blasted European capitulation to the Arabs. He tells the 
German Ambassador that:  
 
such disassociation (Europeans pushing for a cease-fire between Israel and the 
Arabs at a time when Israel was weak)… [will] not result in their insuring their oil 
supply, but it can have disastrous consequences vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, who if 
allowed to succeed in the Near East, can be expected to mount more aggressive 
policies elsewhere. To the degree that Soviet influence can be reduced, we will 
gain a long term advantage if we pay a short term price. (“The October War and 
U.S. Strategy”, document #81, p. 2) 
 
Ultimately, Kissinger firmly believed that European consultations with the Soviets and 
their push to have them help arrange an early cease-fire were to the long-term detriment 
of the Western Alliance. As a result, Kissinger stated that the “general attitude our 
European allies have adopted is an issue. It is one that profoundly concerns us. It has 
happened with too much consistency too many times” (“The October War and U.S. 
Strategy”, document #81, p. 4). 
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As the U.S.’s Middle East archives show, the U.S. was still able to take the lead 
(through Kissinger’s scuttle diplomacy) and ensure an outcome that would be beneficial 
for the West and its leadership within it. However, U.S. leaders remained concerned 
about the looseness of the Western alliance throughout the rest of the 1970’s. The issues 
presented above, such as the continuing economic deterioration of the U.S., the economic 
rise of its Western allies, and increasing nationalism in the less developed world, still 
haunted U.S. policymakers. 
However, U.S. policymakers understood that the Western Europeans and the 
Japanese lacked the political will (at that specific time) to make the necessary domestic 
economic adjustments to create their own independent sources of military power 
(“Changing Power Relations”, p. 13). In regard to Japan, while the Japanese Defense 
White Papers always called for significant increases in military spending, the CIA report 
states that their leaders knew and accepted the fact that the public would only agree to 
very moderate increases in military spending (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 14). 
Secondly, the Europeans really did want the U.S. to remain militarily in charge of the 
Western Alliance. The European public certainly did not wish to turn in their universal 
health care.  
Most significantly, the Europeans and Japanese were not about to enter (at that 
time) into any type of strategic military alliance with Saudi Arabia or Iran and they still 
desired U.S. leadership when confronted with communist threats in the Third World 
(“Changing Power Relations”, p. 12). The Western Europeans and Japanese still had 
much more in common with the U.S. than with the U.S.S.R. or developing nations. The 
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result was “an alliance in transition…characterized by both continuity and change” 
(“Changing Power Relations”, p. 4). 
For these reasons, the report contends that the Western Alliance could be secured 
and straightened should the U.S. take into account the changed power dynamics and help 
guide them in the right direction (as the U.S. did during the 1973 October War). The 
report implies rational-choice/game theory as the solution by stating that, “an alliance of 
more equal partners could eventually prove stronger than one under American 
dominance. But such a positive outcome would require major changes in the OECD 
decision-making processes, based on substantial alterations in the allies’ behavior and 
expectations” (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 2). A collapse of these institutionalist 
ends would result in “an essentially leaderless OECD with a substantial increase in 
uncertainty, complexity, and friction on basic political, military, and economic issues” 
(“Changing Power Relations”, p. 2). In the end, large-scale aggressively competitive 
actions, either within the military or economic realm, against alliance members would 
prove to be against the interests of alliance members (“Changing Power Relations”, p. 
13). 
Section Conclusion  
As a result, structural Marxists would point to these U.S. documents and suggest 
that U.S. maneuvers in the late 1970’s, leading to Détente’s collapse, were the result of 
the U.S. trying to re-assert itself as the leaders of the West. The U.S. needed to take 
control of Europe and Japan’s attempt to make gains in the less developed world as well 
as stop Europe and Japan from developing their own military alliances. The Soviet Bloc 
was simply used as the scare tactic to rally the West in regard to foreign policy. The 
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Soviet scare tactic, and not the facts regarding how the less developed world was 
pursuing nationalism and interests’ independent of Soviet action, was also used as 
domestic consumption to rally the American people to support U.S. incursions abroad. 
Certainly, harping on the less developed world suggests that the U.S.’s main 
concern during this time period dealt with how events in the less developed world were 
affecting the U.S.’s position in the new multi-polar world order. None of this should be 
any surprise considering that the core philosophical underpinnings of Détente for the U.S. 
(according to a State Department report) dealt with responding “to multipolarity and 
relative U.S. decline” (“Foreign Relations of the U.S.”, para. 16).  Kissinger and Nixon 
had already argued that the “bipolar structure of the Cold War, in which only two 
superpowers held a preponderance of power” was now over (Foreign Relations of the 
U.S. para. 15).  
Conclusion 
Section Introduction 
 
 The U.S. archival analysis of U.S. actions during the late 1970’s showed that the 
U.S. was very aggressive in all of regions in the world. Whether through 
economic/political means (Asia, Latin American), political/military means (Middle East), 
or just military means (Afghanistan, Africa), the U.S. used various forms of power at its 
disposal in an attempt to successfully reduce Soviet influence in the region. Even in the 
strategic arms domain, the U.S. was able to turn the tide against the Soviets. Indeed, the 
most hawkish U.S. official at the time, Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, noted that while the Soviets were making “significant advances….in Ethiopia 
and Angola.....such advances should be measured against the success of our policies vis-
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à-vis ASEAN, India, Nigeria, Latin America, and the PRC (China)” (“Summary of Dr. 
Brzezinski's Meeting with Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda”, p. 4).  
Policymakers in the U.S. justified their actions as legitimate attempts at reducing 
Soviet power. Still, such an analysis is questionable. The previous chapter, which 
analyzes Soviet actions in the region, has U.S. archives suggesting the Soviets were very 
cautious in most of the regions in the world. This suggests that the U.S. was perhaps not 
truly responding to Soviet interventionism.  
 Such a theory is given credence by U.S. archives relating to Western Europe and 
Japan. These archives show the U.S. to be extremely worried that Western Europe and 
Japan were starting to go their own way economically and politically. Europe’s actions 
during the Arab-Israeli conflict were but one example of this. The archives showed Henry 
Kissinger extremely worried that Europe was no longer a valuable member of the 
Western Alliance. However, before I turn to these archives, I shall first summarize my 
regional findings. 
Regional Findings Summary 
 My analysis of U.S. Asian archives correlates perfectly with those in chapters 
three and four. They show that the U.S. worked with the economically rising ASEAN 
countries, China, and Japan to completely counter against the perceived Soviet gains of 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Not only did U.S. agencies believe this was the case, but 
they went further and suggested that the U.S. was gaining the upper hand in the region. 
Document after document from the State Department showed just how cooperative the 
U.S. relationship with ASEAN had become. They show the U.S. making political and 
economic gains during the late 1970’s.  
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 On the military side, I found that President Carter, Brzezinski, and the NSC 
arguing that the U.S. balance of power position, primarily in the military realm, had 
significantly improved in favor of the U.S. during the late 1970’s. The archives also show 
the Department of Defense much more content during the late 1970’s as compared to 
several years earlier with the balance of power. Increases in the U.S.’s military spending 
in the Pacific theater brought this about. Most importantly, U.S. archives showed that the 
intensification of the Sino-Soviet split was judged to be the biggest nuisance for the 
U.S.S.R. in the region. Rather than seeking to create instability, U.S. archives show that 
“the overarching motivation of Soviet policy (during the late 1970’s) remained the 
isolation of China, with Vietnam as the U.S.S.R.’s most important anchor” (“Soviet 
Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”, p. 38).  
 The U.S.’s archives relating to the Middle East also match very nicely with those 
in chapters three and four. They point to large-scale evidence of the U.S. making gain 
after gain “in the part of the Third World of greatest concern to the Soviet Union” 
(“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena”. p. 36). More specifically, 
the U.S. also (through Kissinger) did everything within its power to strip Egypt away 
from the Soviet orbit. This all began with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war between Egypt and 
Israel. U.S. archives showed Kissinger using all leverages at his disposal to secure an 
outcome that would all but eliminate Soviet influence in the region. My archival analysis 
of U.S. agencies also showed significant synchronization. No U.S. agency argued that 
U.S. actions in the region, in regards to pulling Egypt away from the U.S.S.R., were 
risking war and the collapse of Détente. Instead, U.S. agencies worked to secure Egypt’s 
turn to the West. 
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 The examination of Sub-Saharan Africa provides a similar result. The archives 
(U.S. and Cuban archives) show that the principal instigator, through the use of covert 
military activities, of the Angolan civil war were none other than the U.S. and South 
Africa. The U.S., with the help of the CIA and the NSC, worked with China and other 
Soviet enemies in an attempt to weaken the MPLA. Rather than push for diplomacy and 
work in an honest fashion, as promoted by the State Department, the evidence suggests 
the U.S. was willing to do anything to prevent the MPLA from gaining a foothold in the 
government. Officials in this State Department did not believe this approach would 
advance U.S. interests in the region. However, the NSC and the CIA were successful in 
their aggressive approach that eventually pushed the Cubans and the Soviets to aid the 
MPLA. 
 These findings eliminate the possibility, left open in chapter three and four, that 
the Soviets may have been aggressive in this region. For instance, chapter three showed 
that the Soviets allocated a lot of military assistance but did not corroborate such 
assistance with the economic assistance necessary to help the regimes in Angola and 
Mozambique consolidate control over their countries. Chapter three also showed that the 
Soviets did not move into Southern Africa until the collapse of the Portuguese empire. 
Nevertheless, U.S. covert actions in this region together with the last chapter’s argument 
that the Soviets were cautious in this region, suggests the U.S./West was the aggressive 
superpower Bloc.  
 The archival analysis of Latin America showed that the U.S. did not alter its 
policy of aiding economically and politically repressive regimes in the region. Although 
admitting that such assistance was causing revolutionary turmoil in the region, which 
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would only aid the Soviets, the Carter administration did not significantly cut funding to 
those who violated human rights in the region. Quite the contrary, “Presidential Review 
Memorandum NSC-28: Human Rights” tilted the balance sheet in the favor of a cautious 
U.S. approach (p. 3). It argued the U.S. should tread lightly with its allies in the region as 
many of them were politically and economically significant for U.S. interests in the 
region.  
 It also seemed that U.S. agencies were on the same page in regards to U.S. policy 
in the region. I did not find evidence of inter-agency conflict during most of the late 
1970’s. However, conflict arises after the Nicaraguan revolution between the State 
Department and the more hawkish agencies (Defense, NSC). The State Department 
argues in favor of an aid package and diplomacy while the more hawkish agencies 
pushed for aggression.  
 These findings help liquidate the possibility, left partially open in chapter three, 
that the Soviets may have been aggressive in Latin America. I showed in Chapter three 
that the Soviets sent more military assistance to Cuba than the West did to Central 
America. However, the archival findings in chapter four showing Soviet caution and the 
findings in this chapter showing U.S. aggression eliminate the doubt I had of whether or 
not the Soviets were more aggressive in this region than the U.S./West. 
 The study of Afghanistan shows the U.S., through the work of the NSC and the 
CIA, pushing to aid Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan several months before the 
Soviets invaded. US officials Brzezinski and Gates, as well as other Pakistani and U.S. 
sources, confirm that the U.S. (or the hawks at least) wished to involve the Soviet Union 
in a costly war. This completely went against the advice and counsel of the State 
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Department. According to State Department archives examined in the last chapter, the 
Soviets were doing everything in their power to not invade Afghanistan. However, 
Brzezinski was able to reduce the power of the State Department and increase the power 
of those with more hawkish views. This was done by convincing President Carter to turn 
over the reins of leadership (supervisory role) of the NSC’s SCC over to Brzezinski.  
 Together with chapters three and four, these findings support the argument that 
the U.S./West was more aggressive than the Soviet Bloc in the Buffer Zone during 
Détente. Chapter Three found little evidence of Soviet military aggression. The Western 
Bloc was sending more military and economic aid to the strategic parts of the Buffer 
Zone than the Soviets. I also mentioned that chapter four witnessed the State Department 
pleading that the U.S.S.R. was doing everything in their power to avoid an invasion. 
Strategic Arms Summary 
 The U.S. archives also showed that the strategic nuclear balance was turning 
against the Soviet Bloc and in favor of the West. The Carter administration had 
successfully pushed to re-arm and re-strengthen the NATO alliance through significant 
military spending increases. From conventional to strategic arms deterrence, the archives 
showed a U.S. resilience to gain an edge in the strategic nuclear balance.  
 More success in this domain was found when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. 
Ironically occurring due to the work of the hawkish U.S. agencies that were warning 
about increasing Soviet strengths in the strategic nuclear arms arena, the war in 
Afghanistan actually helped unify the Western Alliance. Western European governments 
were no longer balking at U.S. proposals to increase strategic arms capabilities. Perhaps 
one can say that the U.S. knew which buttons to push. They knew that successfully 
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painting the Soviet bear as an expansionist nemesis that threatened Western Europeans 
would turn the Europeans away from diplomacy with the Soviets. 
Reducing Soviet Gains? 
The overall thrust of these regional and strategic arms findings by U.S. 
intelligence agencies is that the U.S. was now turning the corner and significantly 
reducing Soviet gains during the Détente throughout the less developed world, increasing 
U.S./Western gains, and increasing U.S./Western strategic power. Nevertheless, the 
suggestion that U.S. foreign policy revolved around curtailing Soviet expansion breaks 
down when one considers that U.S. archives (along with the quantitative foreign aid data) 
already showed the Soviets were cautious throughout the less developed world during the 
1970’s. After all, the archives strongly show that the events in Latin America and the 
Buffer Zone had nothing to do with the Soviet Bloc. Perhaps they had something to do 
with revolutionary turmoil and the aspirations of local actors fighting for social change.  
U.S. Archives and the Interpretations of Structural Marxism, Domestic Politics, and 
Balance of Threat Realism 
 
Conflict within the Western Alliance, as a result of revolutionary turmoil, is the 
cornerstone argument of many within the structural Marxist camp. They firmly believe 
that the decline of the U.S. vis-à-vis other Western powers in the 1970’s propelled the 
less developed to rise up against injustice. In turn, the other core states, such as those in 
Western Europe, seeing that the dominant core was declining would seek opportunities 
for gains in the less developed world at the expense of the core (as the quantitative 
evidence showed in South America). 
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Indeed, U.S. archives showed that deteriorating U.S. relations with the Western 
Alliance was a major concern during the 1970’s. A 1979 CIA report entitled “Changing 
Power Relations among OECD States” argued that Western Europeans and the Japanese 
were becoming much more economically and politically independent (“Changing Power 
Relations among OECD States”, p. 2). While U.S. allies previously had “no choice but to 
accept U.S. leadership, even if they worried that some American decisions might not be 
in their best interests,” quick submission to the U.S. was no longer in play (“Changing 
Power Relations among OECD States”, p. 2). The Europeans and Japanese were now 
much more willing to take the initiative in many facets of the economic arena as well as 
in the less developed world. For U.S. policymakers, such European actions were 
ultimately detrimental to the Western Bloc.  
Therefore, Structural Marxists would further contend that conflict in the less 
developed was causing the U.S. to worry that nations in the Third World would turn to 
the new emerging multi-polar world order (other Western nations) for assistance. After 
all, U.S. archives point to significant U.S. concerns in Latin America during the 1970’s. 
U.S. policymakers were concerned that poverty and repression, not Soviet meddling, was 
unleashing revolutionary activity in the less developed world. It explains why the U.S. 
took a very aggressive approach in the Middle East and Asia. The U.S. wanted to control 
the situation in the 1973 October War in order to bring Europe back into the fold. 
Therefore, U.S. actions ultimately had nothing to do with the Soviet Bloc and everything 
to do with Europe and the less developed world. 
Supporters of structural Marxism would point out that Kissinger and Nixon had 
already argued that the “bipolar structure of the Cold War, in which only two 
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superpowers held a preponderance of power” was now over (“Foreign Relations of the 
U.S. 1969-1976”, para. 15). The era of Détente, now involved responding “to political 
multipolarity” and relative U.S. decline (“Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1969-1976”, 
para. 16). The actions described above are how the U.S. dealt with its decline. It sought to 
remain in charge of the Western Alliance and continue to reign as the leader of the multi-
polar capitalist order. U.S. actions ultimately had nothing to do with the Soviet Bloc and 
everything to do with reining in Europe and the less developed world. 
Proponents of domestic politics would point to Afghanistan, Asia, Southern 
Africa, and Latin America as evidence that U.S. foreign policy revolved around inter-
agency conflict. They would contend that various branches of the U.S. intelligence 
community were captured by certain interest groups/business groups in an attempt to 
promote their interests. These scholars would look at Afghanistan and Southern Africa 
and cite the evidence showing the State Department pushing for a cautious approach 
while the NSC and the CIA were engaging in covert operations. They would also cite the 
immense influence of Secretary of State Kissinger and Brzezinski during the Ford and 
Carter administrations as having immense influence over U.S. actions in Angola and 
Afghanistan. 
They would also point to Asia and show how the State Department was concerned 
with developing ASEAN while the more hawkish agencies were more concerned with 
increasing U.S. naval and air power. While serious conflict did not occur between U.S. 
agencies in this region, as compared with Afghanistan, backers of domestic politics 
would argue that the potential for fierce conflict was there. It was only subdued by the 
fact that each agency got to push their respective approaches at the same time. These 
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theorists would also look at Latin America and suggest that serious conflict erupted once 
the Sandinistas achieved victory in Latin America.  
I have chronicled how structural Marxists would dismiss this. They would argue 
that the State Department did not push for a cooperative approach when they had a 
chance. However, supporters of domestic politics would argue that the inertia of U.S. 
foreign policy worked against President Carter. It is very difficult for the U.S. to alter its 
foreign policy. In rebuttal, supporters of domestic politics would argue that the doves 
only stood up (in the case of Nicaragua) when a significant opportunity to alter U.S. 
policy finally emerged.  
Balance of threat realist theorists would dismiss the interpretations provided by 
structural Marxists and supporters of bureaucratic politics. They would argue that these 
theories only explain things at the periphery. American foreign policy, in their view, was 
the result of the U.S. trying to reduce the rise of the Soviet Bloc.  
The overwhelming evidence finally pushes me to dismiss this theoretical 
approach. Perhaps there were many members of the State Department (and other more 
dovish agencies) that did firmly adhere to the tenets of balance of threat theory. However, 
the actions of the more dominant agencies take me in a different direction. The hawks did 
not believe in balance of threat realism. What did they believe in? The conclusion will 
now try to answer this question. The foreign aid and archival data have driven me 
towards the theories of structural Marxism and domestic politics. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
Introduction
My dissertation has directly answered its central research question. Evidence does 
not support the idea that the Soviet Bloc was aggressive during the final years of Détente in 
the less developed world. The historical/quantitative evidence, found in chapter three in 
form of foreign aid expenditures from the U.S. Disarmament Agency’s WMEAT, and 
archival evidence, found in chapter four in the form of U.S. archives, succinctly shows 
Soviet actions to have been defensive and cautious in nature vis-à-vis the U.S./Western 
Bloc. On the other hand, the quantitative and archival evidence (chapter five) points to the 
U.S. (the leader of the Western Bloc) as the aggressive superpower during the late 1970’s. 
But why did the U.S. then become aggressive during the final years of Détente? Why did 
U.S. leaders so eschew and abandon the principles of Détente (lower military spending, 
accommodation with the Soviet Bloc) in the late 1970’s? There must certainly be a reason 
for this occurrence.
Thankfully, I not only used the chapters as a test for the central research question, 
but I also used the chapters as springboards for an examination of which international 
relations theory best explains why Détente collapsed, why the U.S. became aggressive, and 
why the U.S. blamed the Soviets when the evidence at hand pointed to Soviet caution? 
After all, the evidence has rejected balance of threat theory as a plausible explanation. The 
prediction made by such theorists, based on rising Soviets military expenditures, U.S. 
military and political decline, and rising revolutionary turmoil during the late 1960’s/early 
1970’s, that the Soviets would be determined to take advantage of the emerging 
superpower vacuum in the less developed world was ultimately incorrect. 
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Fortunately, however, I was able to use chapters three, four, and five as theoretical 
examinations for the alternative theories of structural Marxism and domestic politics. 
Structural Marxism, as I described in my opening chapter, predicted that the evidence 
would highlight the U.S./West as the aggressive superpower bloc. In fact, these theorists 
firmly believe that U.S. actions during the final years of Détente were a response to 
indigenous revolutionary turmoil, and not Soviet actions, in the less developed world. The 
foreign aid quantitative evidence firmly backs up these predictions. Chapter three 
demonstrated that American and Western foreign assistance, both military and economic, 
to the less developed world was much more aggressive than the military and economic aid 
provided by the Soviet Bloc to the less developed world. The U.S./West was aggressive 
with their foreign assistance to the Buffer Zone (Afghanistan/Pakistan), the Middle East, 
and Asia while the Soviets had only significantly increased their foreign assistance to their 
satellite region of Eastern Europe. Such findings were corroborated with the archival 
evidence in chapters four and five. 
Chapter four, an analysis of U.S. foreign policy archives of the Soviet Union from 
various U.S. bureaucracies, showed that the Soviets were defensive in the less developed 
world during the final years of Détente. Chapter five found the reverse for the Americans. 
The U.S. archives also showed the U.S. being aggressive in Buffer Zone, the Middle East, 
and Asia. 
Secondly, structural Marxists also believe there was a second battle going on 
between the U.S. and the rest of the Western Bloc. For although both the U.S. and the West 
worked together to exploit and control the less developed world, as somewhat 
demonstrated with the foreign aid quantitative evidence in chapter three, the emerging 
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decline of the U.S. during the early 1970’s was leading to increasing tensions between the 
U.S. and West. The closer parity (especially economically) between the U.S. and West was 
causing increasing friction between the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe. I found archival 
evidence to support this contention in the U.S. bureaucratic foreign policy archives. From 
Kissinger’s remarks about Western European capitulation to the Arabs during the Arab-
Israeli and oil embargo conflicts of the early 1970’s to the 1979 CIA report entitled 
“Changing Power Relations among OECD States”, which argued that Western Europe and 
Japan were becoming too independent and engaging in actions that were detrimental to the 
Western Alliance, there is evidence to support the contention of inter-West conflict causing 
the U.S. to ratchet up the Cold War hysteria in order to smooth over the tensions with the 
Western Alliance.
The followers of domestic politics would argue that there is substantial evidence 
supporting their interpretation of the final years of Détente. U.S. bureaucratic documents 
from chapter four and five display a significant amount of interagency conflict between the 
State Department and the more hawkish NSC, Defense, and CIA. For instance, the archives 
in chapter five showed the NSC and the CIA working in favor of covert actions against the 
Soviets in Angola and Afghanistan when the State Department, both in chapters four and 
five, was arguing that the Soviets were trying everything in their power to not involve 
themselves in those countries. Interagency conflict regarding US policy toward Angola and 
Afghanistan was epitomized by the bureaucratic maneuvering of both Kissinger and 
Brzezinski to have their preferred policies adopted by the President. 
The Latin American archives of the U.S. in chapter five contained evidence of 
conflict between the State Department’s American Republic Affairs (ARA) and the 
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Defense Department in opposition to Secretary of State Vance (and most of the State 
Department), NSC Advisor Brzezinski, and the Treasury Department. Indeed, the ARA and 
Defense argued in favor of a “special relationship” with Latin America consisting of 
helping countries that were the most strategic to the U.S. while Vance and Brzezinski 
argued in favor of a North-South strategy of pursuing economic liberalism throughout the 
region. The battle between the hawks and the doves would only intensify by the end of the 
1970’s with the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. 
Finally, while Asia did not initially witness the same tension that occurred in 
Afghanistan and Southern Africa, supporters of domestic politics would argue that such 
tension was only masked by the fact that the State Department and the Defense Department 
were both able to have their respective interests satisfied. For example, the archives in 
chapter four and five showed the State Department pushing for the development of 
ASEAN and U.S. economic interests and Soviet accommodation. On the other hand, the 
archives in chapter four and five showed the Defense Department pushing for increased 
funding for the U.S.’s naval and air power. Still, such a push by the Defense Department 
was couched in its belief (as shown in the archives in chapter four) that the Soviets were 
becoming aggressive in the region. This was not the view of the State Department. 
Structural Marxism versus Domestic Politics
It is not possible at this time to decide whether structural Marxism or domestic 
politics best explains U.S. actions during the 1970’s. Although I did set out to find out 
whether one specific alternative theory (should balance of threat have been rejected) best 
explains the aggressive actions of the U.S., the archival evidence does not fall strongly on 
one side or the other. Structural Marxists can argue that U.S. hostility in the Middle East, 
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Asia, and Eastern Europe was followed through without any significant chasms between 
U.S. bureaucratic agencies. Moreover, in the case of Latin America, they would argue that 
the “liberals” did not really pursue the moderate political approaches when they truly had 
the opportunity. This, however, can be countered by supporters of domestic politics. 
Significant bureaucratic conflict was detected in Afghanistan and Southern Africa. They 
would also make the case that there was bureaucratic disagreement in the regions of Latin 
America and Asia. 
To determine, if it is even possible, which of these two alternative theories best 
explains U.S. actions during the middle-to-late 1970’s it would be necessary to engage in 
further testing. I would advocate for future researchers to explore the specific connections 
and linkages between U.S. bureaucratic agencies and U.S. corporate and capitalist interests 
in the less developed world during the 1970’s. They should explore whether there was a 
connection between certain business interests favoring one approach while other business 
groups were clamoring for another approach. The military industrial complex and all of the 
business connections they have with certain sectors of the U.S. military should definitely 
be investigated. Also, I would advocate for researchers to study how much influence 
Kissinger and Brzezinski truly possessed in setting U.S. policy. Doing this would go a long 
way in determining whether structural Marxism or domestic politics is a stronger theory.
Of course, many scholars have already explored these questions and have come out 
in favor of one approach or the other. However, such works are usually either too specific 
(case studies) or too broad and theoretical in nature. I would advocate for a more focused 
approach. It should look at region by region, especially the regions each theory has a 
significant disagreement, in order to determine whether there is an engine to U.S. 
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capitalism at the top that pushed the U.S. to seek power and resources in the less developed 
world or whether there is really no such engine. Is it just as simple as business competing 
with each other for superiority?
Seeking a Preponderance of Power?
Section Introduction
Now that the conventional realist theory has been dismissed, it is time to consider a 
realist theory that falls more in line with the predictions made by structural Marxists and 
adherents to bureaucratic politics. Offensive realism is this theory and although it can be 
considered an ideological cousin of balance of threat realism, the former sharply breaks 
with latter’s contention that aggressive actions on the part of the U.S. against the Soviets 
and the less developed world would have to be premised by a persistent Soviet challenge 
against U.S. interests in the less developed world. With respect to structural Marxists and 
supporters of domestic politics, offensive realism would challenge the notion that the 
U.S.’s actions and the collapse of Détente stemmed from economic and/or bureaucratic 
motives. Such theorists would argue that U.S. actions can be explained as an attempt to 
capture as much military, economic, and political power as possible. 
As I mentioned in the first chapter and throughout this dissertation, balance of 
threat realists proposed that the Soviets were being aggressive in the less developed world 
during the late 1970’s as a result of U.S. military/economic decline. Should there have not 
been such a newfound vacuum in the balance of power, giving way to new opportunities 
for the Soviets to make gains in the less developed world, balance of threat realists would 
have argued that the U.S. would not have been aggressive during the final years of Détente. 
Balance of threat realism, like most structural realist theories, believes a superpower 
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hegemon is usually pleased with a given amount of power. Any continuation of 
accumulation of power by the hegemon is too risky and too costly of a strategy. War, the 
strategy often used to attain power, is expensive and there is no reason for a hegemon 
nation to exhaust its military power engaging in perpetual war when a hegemon can already 
dominate and control the system through various mechanisms at its disposal. Given that the 
fact that the evidence suggests that this was not the case, it is important to consider an 
alternate realist theory that falls more in line with the findings of this dissertation. 
After all, adherents of offensive realism would counter that the foreign aid 
quantitative data and the archival evidence goes against all of the tenets of balance of threat 
realism. The U.S. did not step back just because it determined that Soviet actions in the less 
developed world were defensive in nature. Quite the contrary, the U.S. vehemently pushed 
in favor of its interests in the less developed world. U.S. covert actions in Afghanistan and 
Southern Africa and its aggressive actions in Asia and the Middle East suggest the U.S. 
sought to capture as much power (military and economic) as possible. While the immediate 
goal may have been to reduce Soviet influence in the less developed world or the influence 
of nationalist/leftist forces, the overriding goal for the U.S., according to offensive realists, 
was to amass as much power in the international system as possible. John Mearsheimer 
(2002), the proverbial father of offensive realism, summarized this theory in his book The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer (2002) argues the following: 
     Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and   
     tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to  
achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another 
great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to become 
hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive. 
(p. 35)
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He is basically arguing that it is the uncertainty of the international system that forces states 
to capture as much power as possible. The U.S. was structurally obliged to push for gains 
in the less developed world during the 1970’s despite the defensive posture of the Soviet 
Union. 
The Imbalance of Power at the Start of the 1970’s
The quest of unyielding strategic power throughout the world by the U.S. is 
chronicled in Perils of Dominance:  Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam   
by Gareth Porter. Porter (2006) argues that:
It was not Cold War ideology or exaggerated notions of the threat from 
communism in Southeast Asia that paved the U.S. road to war in Vietnam but the 
decisive military dominance of the United States over the Soviet Union. The 
extremely high level of confidence on the part of national security officials that the 
United States could assert its power in Vietnam without the risk of either a major 
war or a military confrontation with another major power conditioned the series of 
decisions that finally led to war. To put it another way, the imbalance of power so 
constrained the policies of Moscow and Beijing toward Vietnam (and toward the 
peripheral countries more generally) that it created incentives for ambitious U.S. 
objectives in that country. (p. 259)
Therefore, the overwhelming strategic power of the U.S. gave U.S. strategic planners the 
green light to engage in aggressive actions in Vietnam. There were no checks and balances 
in the international system as China and the U.S.S.R. could not challenge American 
military power. 
The case for aggressive actions in Vietnam, based on the realization of a 
preponderant imbalance of military power in favor of the U.S. (sometimes in 1954-1955), 
begins with Eisenhower’s Secretary of State during the 1950’s. Surveying the balance of 
power in Southeast Asia, Porter (2006) argues that: 
  John Dulles was accumulating evidence that the Soviet leaders had adopted a soft 
 foreign policy because they were particularly concerned over their relative 
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disadvantage during the next few years until they have acquired nuclear weapons 
and delivery capabilities sufficient to counterbalance those of the U.S. (p.102)
Dulles’ evidence combined with indications that the “North Vietnamese were effectively 
constrained by Soviet and Chinese fears of war with the U.S.,” caused Dulles to feel that 
there “was no serious downside to scrapping the elections called for by the Geneva 
Accords” (Porter, 2006, p. 103). The U.S. would force the hand of the North Vietnamese 
and engage in aggressive actions against them.
Porter (2006) argues that the same dynamics continued throughout the 
administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In the case of the 
Kennedy administration, Porter (2006) argues the “absence of any external constraint 
[U.S.S.R., China] led Kennedy’s key advisers to advocate the use of U.S. forces in South 
Vietnam with little or no debate” (p. 260). The same goes for Johnson’s administration. 
U.S. national security officials still believed the U.S. possessed such an asymmetry of 
power, both over Vietnam and the Communist bloc (China and Russia), that they believed 
America’s might would eventually lead it to victory.
By and large, this appetite for unending power came from the national security 
bureaucracy. Key national security officials, as the leaders of the organizations that 
processed foreign policy intelligence and controlled the flow of information to the U.S. 
president, ultimately possessed “values, attitudes, and interests…that were focused 
overwhelmingly on U.S. power and [so] the signals of highly unequal power relations had a 
very direct influence on their policy preferences” (Porter, 2006, p. 259). The incoming 
presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, according to Porter, never stood a 
chance against the constant pressure placed on them by the national security bureaucracy. 
283
Though all of the presidents wanted to avoid war in Vietnam (or go at least go about it in a 
different way), the unified pressure of the national security bureaucracy and their ability to 
control the flow of information significantly altered the policy preferences and approaches 
of the incoming executives.
Porter’s Thesis and the Fall of Détente
Porter’s hypothesis fits very well with the narrative and the evidence found 
throughout my dissertation. As in the case of Vietnam, Soviet constraint during Détente did 
not lead the U.S. to a more moderate foreign policy in the less developed world. Quite the 
opposite, Soviet constraint actually led to aggressive U.S./Western Bloc foreign policies in 
the less developed world. The historical/process-tracing findings in chapter three showed 
that the West was significantly more aggressive than the Soviet Bloc in the less developed 
world. The same goes for the archival findings. Assertions from U.S. national security 
officials of Soviet caution during Détente (as in chapter four) only led to a more hawkish 
tone from U.S. national security officials and a more aggressive foreign policy. 
As I go region by region, I found that U.S. foreign policy was aggressive in all of 
them. The historical/quantitative and archival findings pertaining to Asia did not show the 
U.S./West losing ground to the Soviets in the region. While the U.S./West may have pulled 
out of Vietnam, the foreign aid and archival data shows U.S. officials simply opted for a 
different strategic approach. The West focused on developing and securing ASEAN as a 
counter-Bloc to the Soviets. The West also used China as a wedge to weaken the Soviets. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, I found that the Soviets were not truly aggressive with their 
foreign aid packages. They did not send in the necessary aid to allow the state of Angola to 
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consolidate. We also found that the U.S. engaged in highly aggressive covert operations 
with South Africa.
The data on the Middle East, which was obviously the most important region to the 
U.S./West, also showed that the West was more aggressive than the Soviets. The West 
provided significantly more foreign aid to its allies in the region. The U.S. was also 
engaged in a strategy of trying to expel the Soviets from Egypt which they succeeded in 
doing.  
Latin America, the U.S.’s perennial backyard, is another region where the Soviets 
were not aggressive. Not only was Soviet aid to Cuba mostly en route to Angola, but the 
evidence showed the U.S. to have engaged aggressively in the region while the Soviets 
acted cautiously. Just by comparing U.S. actions in Chile versus Soviet actions in 
Nicaragua you would see that the U.S. engaged in very aggressive actions in the former 
while the Soviets engaged treaded very cautiously in the latter. 
Finally, the quantitative and archival evidence also showed the U.S. was more 
aggressive than the Soviets. The U.S./West sent more aid to Pakistan/ Afghanistan than the 
Soviets. The U.S., knowing that the Soviets did not want to invade Afghanistan, also 
engaged in covert operations that plunged the Soviets into Afghanistan.
Therefore, it is obvious that Porter’s thesis directly connects with the findings in my 
dissertation. Soviet constraint did not lead the U.S. to a less aggressive foreign policy in the 
less developed world. Instead, it pushed U.S. officials more and more to capture as much 
power in the international system as possible.
Porter’s findings about U.S. key national security officials pushing for aggression 
without any significant trace of Soviet belligerence also strikes a connection with my 
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findings relating to national security officials. There simply was a precedent for the 
subsequent actions undertaken by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski during the rest 
of the 1970’s. The uncompromising thirst for U.S. power never abated. Porter’s research 
finds key national security officials, such as Dulles and McNamara, as vital gatekeepers to 
the U.S.’s continuing aggression. 
The same can be said for Brzezinski in the Carter administration and Kissinger in 
Nixon’s administration. Indeed, my dissertation found President Carter admitting that 
Brzezinski had immense influence over his foreign policy decisions. There is also evidence 
that Kissinger intensely lobbied Nixon over U.S. actions during the Arab-Israeli War of 
1973. 
Offensive Realism Fails as a Strategy
Though offensive realism may be a useful theory in explaining the actions of the 
U.S. during the Cold War and the final years of Détente, it ultimately leads to a significant 
amount of failures. Oftentimes, pursuing this aggressive strategy actually leads to negative 
results for the nation that deploys them.  Porter (2006) agrees that this was the case with 
Vietnam as he writes that: 
The tragedy of Dulles’s [original] decision (to engage in aggressive actions) is 
compounded by the fact that Eisenhower had already ruled out U.S. military 
intervention to save South Vietnam from just the kind of internal Communist 
insurgency that arose in 1960 in response to the U.S.-instigated repression. (p. 259)
Therefore, aggressive actions on the part of the U.S. in Southeast Asia only increased the 
flames of resistance. It did not break the backs of the communists nor lead to victory for the 
U.S. Porter (2006) continues and adds:
The notion that the ability of the United States to threaten North Vietnam with vast 
destruction could be used to control Hanoi’s role in the war in the South still had a 
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strong hold on the thinking of Johnson’s advisers in March–April 1965. It was 
based on a historical reality: the North Vietnamese had constrained their role in the 
South for years out of fear of U.S. retaliation. Those advisers failed to consider two 
new realities, however: first, the major escalation of the war in the South—and of 
American military involvement in it—meant that Hanoi’s leaders had reached a 
threshold where they regarded the failure to send North Vietnamese troops to the 
South as having potentially irreversible consequences. Thus they were willing to 
accept some increased risk of U.S. bombing by late 1964 and early 1965 in order to 
achieve an improved military balance in the South. (p. 263)
Thus, the hyper-aggressive actions on the part of U.S. planners did not result in North 
Vietnamese acquiescence. The complete opposite occurred. Increased hostility on the part 
of the U.S. forced the North Vietnamese to lead no stone unturned in their battle for 
survival against the U.S. 
Blowbacks and U.S. Policy
Quite the contrary, there are many times when hyper-aggressive actions on the part 
of the U.S. have had a blowback effect. Chalmers Johnson (2004), author of Blowback: 
The Costs and Consequences of American Power writes that: 
Blowback refers to the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret 
from the American people. What the daily press reports as the malign acts of 
‘terrorists’ or ‘drug lords’ or ‘rogue states’ or ‘illegal arms merchants’ often turn 
out to be blowback from earlier American operations. (p. 8)
According to Johnson (2004) U.S. policy only results in the U.S. “reaping what it sows” 
(p. 17).The attacks of 9/11 firmly fall in this category. As Johnson (2001) writes: 
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We are badly mistaken if we think that we in the United States are entirely 
blameless for what happened to them. The suicidal assassins of September 11, 
2001, did not ‘attack America,’ as our political leaders and the news media like to 
maintain; they attacked American foreign policy. Employing the strategy of the 
weak, they killed innocent bystanders who then became enemies only because they 
had already become victims. Terrorism by definition strikes-at the innocent in order 
to draw attention to the sins of the invulnerable. The United States deploys such 
overwhelming military force globally that for its militarized opponents only an 
‘asymmetric strategy,’ in the jargon of the Pentagon, has any chance of success. 
When it does succeed as it did spectacularly on September 11, it renders our 
massive military machine worthless: The terrorists offer it no targets. On the day of 
the disaster, President George W. Bush told the American people that we were 
attacked because we are ‘a beacon for freedom’ and because the attackers were 
‘evil.’ In his address to Congress on September 20, he said, ‘This is civilization's 
fight.’ This attempt to define difficult-to-grasp events as only a conflict over 
abstract values- as a ‘clash of civilizations,’ in current post-cold war American 
jargon-is not only disingenuous but also a way of evading responsibility for the 
‘blowback’ that: America's imperial projects have generated. (para. 2) 
The original arming of these Islamic terrorists against the Soviets in the late 1970’s/
early 1980’s is another example of how aggressive actions on the part of the U.S. begin the 
cycle of blowbacks. Arming Islamic terrorists against the Soviets only came back to 
boomerang the U.S several decades later in the form of the Taliban. Interestingly enough, 
the U.S. policies of supporting the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian dictatorships throughout the 
Cold War are what spawned Islamic terrorism in the first place. Blowbacks are often 
preceded by blowbacks.
Connecting the Johnson thesis with my findings leads me to believe that continuous 
U.S. hyper-aggression contributed to an increase in the revolutions and revolutionary 
turmoil during the 1970’s. From the indigenous peoples of Latin America to the 
shantytowns of Southern Africa, it is obvious that U.S./Western political and economic 
repression has led many in the less developed world to rise up and support communist and 
nationalist insurgencies. U.S. support for dictatorships in Latin America and apartheid in 
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Southern Africa only fanned the flames of revolution. Blowback, after all, does not just 
come from the damage inflicted by drug lords and terrorists. It also comes, as Porter shows 
with the case of Vietnam, from guerrillas and communist insurgents.
As I move forward from the Détente time period it is obvious that U.S. blowbacks 
continue. Apart from 9/11, there have been other instances of blowbacks that currently 
afflict the U.S. For instance, forced to introduce “democracy” in Latin America due to the 
rise of nationalist insurgencies, past U.S. repression and aggressive policies has led to 
large-scale anti-Americanism in the region. From Venezuela and Bolivia to Argentina and 
Brazil, it is obvious that leftist resistance has somewhat weakened the U.S.’s hold in the 
region. Another example is the case of Iraq. The invasion of this country has only allowed 
Iran’s strategic power to increase. The result of this rise is increased tension between Israel, 
the U.S.’s major proxy in the Middle East, and Iran. This is because Israel now views Iran 
as its major competitor in the region. Critics would argue that the U.S. should not have 
used aggression against Iraq as it only served to significantly weaken Iran’s mortal enemy. 
Iran was no longer contained. 
Offensive realists would argue that 9/11 was only the collateral damage. Despite 
the fact that U.S. hyper-aggression resulted in an attack on homeland soil, they would 
argue that the aggressive approach will allow the U.S. to eventually dominate the Middle 
East. Invading Iraq (and possibly overthrowing Iran) and using repressive regimes (such as 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt) to control the region will result in the U.S. remaining the most 
dominant nation in the world. Of course, terrorists will strike. September 11 was simply the 
collateral damage and the price Americans must may for empire. 
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I would counter that hyper-aggressive U.S. action in the international system is not 
a sign of strength on the part of the U.S. but a sign of weakness.  Indeed, Johnson (2004) 
cites David Calleo as stating that, “the international system breaks down not only because 
unbalanced and aggressive new powers seek to dominate their neighbors, but also because 
declining powers, rather than adjusting and accommodating, try to cement their slipping 
preeminence into an exploitative hegemony” (p. 222).
Johnson (2004) continues and writes:
I believe that the United States at the end of the twentieth century fits this 
description. …one must conclude that blowback will ultimately produce a crisis 
that suddenly, wrenchingly impairs or ends America's hegemonic influence…
barring an unforeseen reform movement, it seems most probable that economic 
contradictions will force the unraveling of the American empire. (p. 222)
America, in my view, is a declining power. There are signs from the past that point 
in this direction. As highlighted in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, structural 
Marxists have shown that superpowers on the decline have a historical tendency to become 
more militant. I agree with this view. Rather than seek accommodation, studies of the 
Kondratieff cycle have shown that the core state within the core becomes very hostile 
towards the less developed world once it realizes that its grip on the international system is 
not what it once was. Thus, it responds with militancy. However, this militancy is 
ultimately not successful. It fails because its decline, closely related with the cycles of 
financial and productive capitalism, is pretty much set in stone. 
There are signs all around showing that this is occurring. The rise of China is, of 
course, the most obvious signal. After all, how else can one explain the fact that the U.S. 
does nothing about its economic policy towards China (which causes economic problems 
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in the U.S. and will result in China becoming a superpower down the road) while it goes 
ahead and fights insignificant enemies in the Middle East?  
Finally, should offensive realism guide the strategic thinking of U.S. policymakers, 
it is probably time for national security officials to discard hyper-aggression as a strategy. 
The costs are too high. The burden of policing the world is starting to catch up with the 
U.S. Policymakers in the U.S. need to let go of their desire to control the policies of 
countries throughout the less developed world. The U.S. was allowed to chart its own path. 
It gained its independence from England and was, for the most part, free to pursue the 
economic policies it wished to pursue. Policymakers in the U.S. need to let go so that we 
may truly build a true integrated, prosperous, and nonviolent world older. 
Supporting Structural Marxism
In the end, I personally agree with the theory of structural Marxism. There are 
several reasons why I do. First of all, offensive realism’s claim that alliances do not last in 
the long run because states can not trust each other does not hold in my view. Quite the 
contrary, the Western Alliance has not fractured. Rather than seek total dominance in the 
international system, the U.S. glued together Japan and Western Europe with the rest of the 
world economy. Significant friction within the Western Alliance has not developed. In fact, 
when faced with the possibility of friction in the Western Alliance, U.S.  documents show 
the U.S. doing everything in their power to stop it. Yes, there have been frictions within the 
West (Iraq). However, the type of conflicts predicted by realists after the Cold War has not 
held sway. The economic institutions and frameworks set up by the Western Alliance have 
continued to dominate the international relations system.
291
I also believe that the economics behind the linkages within the Western Alliance 
are also very significant in explaining the past and predicting the future. It is imperative to 
study economic power in order to truly appreciate the evolving nature of the international 
system. There are other important agents in the international arena. From transnational 
corporations (structural Marxists) to belligerent agencies in the government that are tied 
together with certain business interests (domestic politics), there definitely are other 
important components of the international system. By bringing in these important structural 
aspects of the world economy, I believe structural Marxists can better explain the 
transformation and transformative potential of the international system. 
From the early Italian city-states, to the Netherlands, to England, and then to the 
United States (and eventually to China), the way in which structural Marxists can 
horizontally connect (through economics) the dynamics behind the evolvement of the 
world economic system is simply unmatched. How else can one explain the huge outflows 
of capital that left the Netherlands in favor of England? How else can one explain the rise 
of China, India, and Brazil? For sure, no one can argue that China’s rise has been as a 
result of its military power! 
The cycles of militant hyper-aggression and blowbacks, while U.S. economic 
policy allows China and India to continue to ascend, invariably reduces the legitimacy, in 
my view, of offensive realism in favor of structural Marxism. U.S. foreign policy has not 
served the interests of the U.S. Perhaps this is because U.S. national security officials are 
not really realists, but members of a U.S. economic transitional elite class whose interests 
are more class-based than state-based. 
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